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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation is a twentieth-century social history of the relationship between mixed 
marriage and national identity in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  More precisely, it examines the ways in 
which different types of elites—political, religious and social—operating under different 
regimes—Austro-Hungarian, royal Yugoslav, Yugoslav Communist, and post-Yugoslav 
nationalist—used the idea of mixed marriage to articulate their conceptions of national identity.  
Starting in 1911 and ending in 1994, the dissertation illustrates how mixed marriage stirred 
anxieties even among those who professed to be immune to the seductive power of nationalism, 
including the Communists.  It argues that the mixedness of marriages between members of 
different ethnic groups becomes socially relevant only at moments of ethnic polarization, 
reflecting the episodic nature of ethnicity itself.  The episodic character of ethnicity is why the 
dissertation focuses on three moments in the twentieth-century life of Bosnia: the 1930s, the late 
1960s, and the early 1990s.   
Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the mixed marriage cases which came before the Sarajevo 
Supreme Shari’a Court during the 1930s.  The decisions of the court in these cases are viewed 
within the larger context of a cultural civil war engulfing much of the Bosnian Islamic 
establishment during the interwar period.  The hardening of the court’s position vis-à-vis mixed 
marriage by the end of the decade is seen as a symptom of the more profound transformation of 
Bosnian Muslimness from a purely religious to a more secular, national, identity.   
Chapter 3 puts to rest the widely accepted notion that the Yugoslav Communists actively 
encouraged mixed marriage as a trope for a Yugoslav identity.  It argues that mixed marriage 
emerged in the thoughts of regime’s ideologues only as an afterthought, and only after the 
regime had abandoned Yugoslavism and embraced nationalism.  The Communists’ embrace of 
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nationalism in the late 1960s resulted in a political and statistical neglect of mixed marriage 
which made their identities all the more vulnerable in the 1990s when the nationalists marked 
them as threats to the health of nations. 
Finally, Chapter 4 is an exploration of how the breakup of Yugoslavia affected the 
identity of one family, my own.   The unorthodox methodology employed in this chapter is 
essential in unearthing the subjectivity of those declared as mixed during Yugoslavia’s violent 
death and in illustrating the overwhelming ability of nationalism to rope ordinary people into its 
smothering embrace. 
Consulting a variety of archives—from Sharia court records, personal correspondence of 
clerics, to Communist party archives and author’s personal diaries—and interpreting these via a 
variety of methodologies—from legal anthropology to autobiography and oral history—the 
dissertation aims to move the discussion of mixed marriage in the former Yugoslavia beyond the 
polarizing and, by now stale, debates of the 1990s.  More specifically, it uses mixed marriage not 
to explain the breakup of Yugoslavia, argue for or against the Yugoslav project in general, or 
measure the ethnic distance between certain groups, but rather to explain how and why 
nationalism is able to exploit mixed marriages for its own ends, and how ordinary people 
experience this process.  The last chapter in particular makes a case for the unapologetic use of 
autobiography in the study of history. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the summer of 1991, my parents, my brother, and I took what proved to be our last 
Yugoslav summer vacation to the Croatian coast.  It was a very strange summer.  For the first 
time, my parents had talked about not going, something that would have been unthinkable just a 
year before as the ten-day long vacation was an old family tradition.  The summer was also 
strange because the small coastal town where we stayed looked eerie: the empty promenades 
along the shore, the stale bread in a vacant hotel, and the despondence of the waiters that was 
worse than their customary rudeness.  Finally, the summer was strange because while at the 
beach, my father began wearing a band-aid above his left knee.  Not being aware of any injury he 
could have sustained, I kept asking him where he had cut himself.  Visibly irritated by my 
harassment, he would shrug off the question always telling me that “it’s nothing, just a small 
wound.”  It was only after we returned to Mostar that I learned that the war had broken out in 
Slavonia (northern Croatia) and was spreading to the coast.  And it was around this time that I 
realized that the “wound” my father had talked about was his tattoo he had gotten some twenty 
years earlier after getting out of the military.  The tattoo, slightly above his left knee, depicted a 
Christian cross and a Muslim crescent and star held together by a big lock.  It would be several 
months later, as the war ripped through our own neighborhood, that it became clear to me that 
the reason why my father had abruptly decided to hide the tattoo on that deserted beach was 
because it revealed that my parents were “mixed.”  What had been my father’s personal memory 
of camaraderie with his army buddies suddenly became our family’s scarlet letter.  My father 
may have feared that in the eerie silence of the coastal town, the tattoo shouted Josip Broz Tito’s 
mantra of “brotherhood and unity”—which was disappearing in the rubble just a few hundred 
miles north of the coast—and assigned to my parents the nouns I had only read about in my 
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history textbooks, Muslim and Croat.  The summer of 1991 was the moment my parents became 
mixed. 
What was the constellation of social and cultural forces that led to this moment and 
forced my father to cover up his tattoo?  The band aid may have been a temporary relief, but 
what was the long-term effect of this moment on the identity of my suddenly “mixed” family?  
And did my father’s act of getting the tattoo in the late 1960s imply his awareness that his 
recently began relationship with my mother was a “mixed” one, was it simply an act of youthful 
rebellion, or both?  If the latter, what do his actions on that beach tell us about the interaction 
between larger social forces and individual identity?  Although the opening anecdote is a 
personal one the questions it raises could be projected back into Yugoslavia’s history in 
exploring the process through which mixed marriages have become designated as a social 
problem and the strategies individuals have adopted in navigating the sudden intrusion of 
ethnicity into their everyday life.  This dissertation is about the process of becoming mixed. 
Studies of Mixed Marriage 
The literature on mixed marriage has for the most part been dominated by sociologists 
who have studied structural factors in determining the patterns of mixed marriage and its varied 
meanings for the societies in which they occur.  They have studied the psychological “social 
distance” between diverse social groups,1 group’s size2, its proportion to other groups in an area3, 
the changing generational attitudes4, the socio-economic differences between groups5, or a 
                                                 
1 E.S. Bogardus, “Measurement of Personal-Group Relations,” Sociometry 10 (1947): 306-311. 
2 Romanzo Adams, Interracial Marriage in Hawaii.  (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1937).  Adams argued 
that the group’s size and prevalence of intermarriage are inversely related: the greater the group is within a society 
lower its rate of exogamy. 
3 Milton Barron.  The Blending American.  (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1972).  Barron refined Adams’ argument 
insisting that it was not the group’s general number within a country but rather its representativeness, percentage-
vise, within the society, that impacts its outmarriage patterns. 
4 This approach has been especially prominent in literature on interracial and interreligious marriage in the United 
States where there is a general agreement that there is a growing tolerance towards these marriages with each 
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group’s heterogeneity6, all as indicators of patterns of mixed marriage in a given society.  Their 
different methodologies notwithstanding, all of the studies of mixed marriage have a shared 
assumption that intermarriage reveals how successful a society is in integrating its diverse social 
groups into a coherent, stable, and peaceful coexistence.  Anthropological literature has largely 
been in agreement with this conclusion suggesting that in societies with smaller groups 
intermarriage is essential for long-term stability.7 Applying this approach to the study of conflict 
entails sharing the assumption that “the existence of mixed marriages between the members of 
groups in a society is generally expected to reduce the probability of violent conflicts among 
those groups…”8 
This assumption has dominated the discussion of mixed marriages in the former 
Yugoslavia, a topic that became a contentious area of research as the country was crumbling 
amidst a brutal civil war in the early 1990s.  Reporting on the increasingly vicious Bosnian war, 
many Western journalists nostalgically imagined the pre-war Bosnia as a place where marriage 
between the now warring ethnic groups had been commonly accepted as a mundane part of “a 
multiethnic, multireligious society as symbolized by the mingled minarets and church steeples of 
Sarajevo.”9  Major newspaper stories, covering mixed marriage couples being torn apart by the 
war, epitomized the general Western bewilderment as to how a seemingly stable multiethnic 
                                                                                                                                                             
successive generation.  James A. McRae, “Changes in Religious Communalism Desired by Protestants and 
Catholics.”  Social Forces 61 (1983): 709-30.  Paul Spickard, Mixed Blood: Intermarriage and Ethnic Identity in 
Twentieth Century America. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1989). 
5 Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure: Toward the Codification of Theory and Research.  
(Glenncoe, Ill: Free Press, 1949). 
6 Blau, Peter M., Terry C. Blum and Joseph E. Schwartz, 1982.  “Heterogeneity and Intermarriage.”  American 
Sociological Review 47: 45-62 
7 Pierre L. Van de Berghe.  Human Family Systems: An Evolutionary View.  (New York: Elsevier, 1979).  Claude 
Levi Strauss.  The Elementary Structures of Kinship.  (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969). 
8 Jeoren Smits, “Ethnic Intermarriage and Social Cohesion: What Can we Learn from Yugoslavia.”  Social 
Indicators Research (2010), 96: 417-432, 418. 
9 Roger Cohen, “Bosnians Fear a Rising Islamic Authoritarianism.”  The New York Times, 10 October 1994. 
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European country could disappear so suddenly and so violently.10  It was not long before 
prominent historians of the region joined in the nostalgic invocations of Bosnia’s pre-war 
tradition of multiethnic tolerance, as illustrated by the title of John Fine and Robert Donia’s 
popular history of the country Bosnia Herzegovina: A Tradition Betrayed in which the two 
historians argued that the high percentage of urban mixed marriages, hovering around forty 
percent, reflected the success of the Communist-led modernization and the general weakening of 
ethnic identities.11  Inadvertently highlighting the lack of empirical evidence in the matter, Noel 
Malcolm put the number of such marriages at thirty percent, but echoed the argument that mixed 
marriage reflected the growing “Westernization” of the Bosnian society prior to the war.12  As 
the Bosnian war ended with the Dayton Peace Accords in late 1995, some analysts pointed to the 
existence of some 2 million mixed marriages in the former Yugoslavia, repeating the figure of 
30-40% for Bosnia-Herzegovina, as evidence that the country’s postwar future was not so 
bleak.13  The overall effect of these studies was the impression that the wars in Yugoslavia were 
a tragic anomaly in that they did not reflect any popular ethnic hatreds, a conclusion that was 
largely a response to the then dominant mainstream view of the wars as the culmination of 
ancient ethnic hatreds between Bosnia’s communities.14 
                                                 
10 Tyler Marshall, “Thousands of Mixed Families Caught in Yugoslavia’s Bitter Ethnic Divide,” Los Angeles Times, 
21 July 1991; “War Takes Toll on Serbo-Croatian Couples” Washington Post, 4 August 1991; as cited in Nikolai 
Botev, “Where East Meets West: Ethnic Intermarriage in the Former Yugoslavia, 1962-1989.”  American 
Sociological Review, Vol. 59, No. 3 (June 1994), 461-480: 461. 
11 Robert J. Donia and John V. A. Fine.  Bosnia and Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed.  (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1995). 
12 Noel Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History.  (New York: New York University Press, 1994), 222. 
13 Jane Sharp and Michael Clarke, Making Dayton Work: The Future of the Bosnian Peace Process.  (London: 
Centre for Defence Studies, 1996). 
14 The ancient ethnic hatreds explanation of the wars was so widespread that it is hard to determine where it 
officially originated, but the work that was most often cited as evidence for the view was Robert Kaplan’s Balkan 
Ghosts (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993), detailing the journalist’s travels through the region and perpetuating 
many of the Balkan stereotypes.  Western politicians who were involved in solving the crisis further perpetuated this 
view.  A version of this argument was also echoed by the EU’s co-chairman of the Conference for the Former 
Yugoslavia Lord David Owen who during his visit to the shell-shocked Sarajevo at the end of 1992, said: “Don’t, 
 
 
 
5
 However, the first in-depth demographic study of mixed marriage in the former 
Yugoslavia convincingly countered the argument that mixed marriages had been steadily 
increasing prior to the wars.  Nikolai Botev’s statistical, census-based analysis of mixed 
marriages in the country, between 1962 and 1989, showed that contrary to popular perception, 
the rate of interethnic marriage in the country remained relatively steady, hovering around twelve 
to thirteen percent, a number that was modest given the ethnic heterogeneity of Yugoslavia.  
Using log-linear models Botev mapped the prevalence of mixed marriage across the Yugoslav 
republics, incorporating the size, sex ratio, and residence of each ethnic group to determine the 
prevalence of mixed marriage.  His figures for Bosnia-Herzegovina were quite at odds with the 
picture painted by the boosters of Bosnia’s multiethnic history: despite having an ethnic 
composition that was more heterogeneous than most of the country, the republic had a lower rate 
of intermarriage, around eleven percent, than it appeared at the federal level.  In fact, Bosnia’s 
two major ethnic groups, the Serbs and the Croats, were less likely to intermarry within the 
republic than they were if they were living outside of it although at the federal level they were 
more open than the rest of the nationalities.  Although the majority Muslims were more likely to 
intermarry within Bosnia than outside of it their rates of endogamy were still relatively high.  
According to Botev, the only place where mixed marriage had been on the rise prior to the wars 
was also the place where the rate of intermarriage had been the highest throughout the period, 
between twenty-two to twenty-eight percent: Vojvodina, a region with an exceptionally 
heterogeneous ethnic composition where many groups were minorities making exogamy more 
expected.  While admitting some fallacies of his model—such as, using the census data only 
                                                                                                                                                             
don’t, don’t live under this dream that the West is going to come and sort this problem out.” (Ian Traynor, “Trying 
the tyrant we helped to create,” The Guardian, 16 January 2002). 
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starting in 1962 after the nationality categories had stabilized,15 not zooming in his analysis onto 
Bosnian cities where he admits “the intermarriage among these groups has been more prevalent,” 
and excluding “Yugoslavs” because the category “is fluid and heterogeneous”—Botev makes a 
claim that is essentially the repudiation of the “Bosnia the good” argument: “These findings once 
again emphasize the importance of the differences in the cultural traditions within the Yugoslav 
society and underscore the inherent fragility of the former Yugoslavia as a federal state.”16  Just 
as the boosters of Bosnia the good argument used mixed marriage as a template to project their 
nostalgic visions of a multiethnic paradise, Botev used it to explain how the country “managed to 
disintegrate so quickly and so convulsively.”17  
 Recently, demographers have further refined Botev’s analysis, but with essentially the 
same conclusion: rather than being evidence of an emerging Yugoslav nation, the mixed 
marriage patterns in the former Yugoslavia were a harbinger of its violent disintegration.  
Inspired by the social cohesion theory—which argues that the probability of a violent conflict 
between groups is lower the higher the rate of intermarriage between them—Jeroen Smits has 
investigated the correlation between the prevalence of intermarriage with the Serbs and the 
violent conflicts of the 1990s most of which involved the members of this nationality.  
Integrating the data on the marriages concluded in 1962, 1971, 1980, 1981 and 1989 into log 
linear and more sophisticated models, to check for the variance in group size, Smits showed that 
the instance of intermarriage with the Serbs was rather low amongst most of the groups, but 
particularly the Slovenes, the Muslims, and the Albanians, the groups which, in addition to the 
                                                 
15 The first two censuses in Yugoslavia reflected the Communist regime’s struggle to decide whether or not to treat 
the Bosnian Muslims as a religious minority or a national group: in the first postwar census in 1948 they could 
declare themselves only as Serbs, Croats, or undeclared, in 1953, the category of “Yugoslav-undeclared” was 
introduced but in the 1961 census they could declare themselves “Muslim in the ethnic census,” and only in 1971 
was Muslim introduced as a national category without any caveats.   
16 Botev, 475, 467, 476, respectively. 
17 Ibid., 462. 
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Croats, were most heavily engaged in fighting the Serbs during the wars.  For example, given the 
troubled history of the Albanian-Serb relations in Kosovo, Smits’ findings were particularly 
revealing: the rate of Albanian intermarriage with the Serbs decreased from 1962 to 1989, 
plummeting to 0.4% on the eve of Yugoslavia’s disintegration.18  Similarly, in 1981, only 1 in 90 
Muslims married a Serb and in 1989, this number was 1 in 70 for the Slovenes.  The groups with 
the highest incidence of intermarriage with the Serbs were the Montenegrins, a nation with 
deeply intimate relations with Serbia, and the Hungarians who were a small minority and were 
integrated into a post-Yugoslav Serbia with relatively little controversy.  Although Smits’ model 
found that the social distance19 between the Croats and the Serbs was shorter than their rates of 
intermarriage suggested his conclusions generally supported the social cohesion theory which 
sees the lack of intermarriage between groups as one indicator of a potential for violence 
between them.  As Smits argued, this point is very much confirmed by the recent intermarriage 
studies in Turkey, where the conflict between the Kurds and the Turks was reflected in their low 
intermarriage rate of 8%20, and Latvia, where the high rate of intermarriage between the minority 
Russians and the majority Latvians (16%) could be seen as indicative of that country’s peaceful 
separation from the Soviet Union21.  In the context of these findings the disintegration of 
Yugoslavia was neither surprising nor unpredictable, but in fact almost inevitable. 
 Although exceptionally useful in finally providing some empirical evidence for the 
discussion of mixed marriage in the former Yugoslavia, these statistical studies have a tendency 
to cloak authors’ own biases with scientific authority, distorting the complicated reality behind 
                                                 
18 Smits, 425. 
19 Social distance between groups generally refers to the “degree of negative or positive social contact” (Smits, 430). 
20 A. Gündüz-Hoşgör and Jeroen Smits, “Intermarriage between Turks and Kurds in Contemporary Turkey.”  
European Sociological Review, 18, 417-432 
21 C. Monden and Jeroen Smits.  “Ethnic Intermarriage in Times of Social Change: the Case of Latvia.  Demography 
42 (2), 323-345.  Both works are cited in Smits, “Ethnic Intermarriage and Social Cohesion,” 429. 
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Yugoslavia’s death.  This is evident in Botev’s conclusion that his findings show the extent of 
the separation between the three different cultural traditions of the region: the “Western 
tradition,” encompassing the Catholic Croats and Slovenes, who were under the Austro-
Hungarian rule, “an endemic Balkan cultural tradition,” which includes the Orthodox Serbs, 
Montenegrins, and Macedonians, who lived for centuries under the Ottoman occupation, and the 
“Middle Eastern cultural tradition,” including most of Yugoslavia’s Muslims.22  Botev’s 
classification of different “cultures” seems quite arbitrary since it is based solely on the type of a 
foreign rule the groups endured and the religion they had adopted.  Botev never explains how the 
differences in religion and imperial legacies of the different ethnic groups rise to the level of 
“cultures,” particularly given the ample ethnographic and historical evidence of religious 
syncretism, linguistic kinship, shared cultural values, and the multiplicity of regional identities 
amongst the many ethnic groups of the Balkans.  For example, in Bosnia-Herzegovina—where 
Botev’s classification would place three different cultural traditions within the area of 19,000 
square miles—the three major ethno-religious communities (Serbs, Croats, and Muslims) have 
shared the same language, been largely united in one political unit since the Ottoman occupation 
in 1463, have exhibited a high degree of inter-communal coexistence,23 and have on occasion 
espoused regional identities.  With his concept of “antagonistic tolerance” Robert Hayden 
usefully reminds us that peaceful coexistence between ethnic groups does not necessarily 
indicate “an active embrace of the Other,” or an existence of a multicultural utopia, but rather a 
                                                 
22 Botev, 462. 
23 In her exceptionally meticulous ethnographic study of a central Bosnian village, Toni Bringa shows that although 
the village’s Muslims and Croats maintain a clear inter-ethnic line of division their close interaction has generated 
numerous shared identities, including that of their village (when dealing with a neighboring villagers) or that of a 
villager (when dealing with city dwellers).  Bringa finds a solid line dividing the two communities, but “with 
overlapping social environments.” Tone Bringa, Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a 
Central Bosnian Village, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 83).  For instances of religious divisions, but 
also cooperation, see William G. Lockwood.  European Muslims: Economy and Ethnicity in Western Bosnia.  (New 
York: Academic Press, 1975). 
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modus vivendi the groups had established in the absence of conditions that would have allowed 
one to achieve dominance over the other.24  But, it is one thing to argue for the existence of 
socially salient and occasionally violent inter-ethnic divisions in a society, but quite another to 
suggest that these divisions are evidence of different cultures.  Botev’s inclusion of the 
Macedonians within the (never explained) “endemic Balkan” cultural tradition only on the basis 
of their common Eastern Orthodox faith ignores the decades’ long struggle of the Macedonian 
nationalists for the recognition of a separate national identity.  His decision to lump the Bosnian 
Muslims along with the other Islamic groups in Yugoslavia, including the Albanians and the 
Turks, despite their different languages, histories, and national identities, is equally confounding.  
Thus, Botev shows the tendency to transfer the unambiguous statistical data into historical and 
cultural observations which are not supported by empirical evidence. 
 This hasty observation leads Botev to suggest that Yugoslavia disintegrated “quickly” 
and “convulsively.”25  While the latter adverb is certainly appropriate given the brutal wars 
which tore the country apart, to conclude that Yugoslavia disappeared quickly is to ignore the 
copious amount of literature which has shown the country’s torturous and slow political 
disintegration.  The general consensus amongst the scholars of Yugoslavia is that the federation 
began its descent in the mid-to-late 1960s when the political and economic liberalization and de-
centralization empowered the republics, leading to the Constitution of 1974 which effectively 
prevented the federal government from exercising its authority over the republics.26  Others have 
attributed the disintegration to the Communist regime’s experiment with self-management, 
                                                 
24 Robert M. Hayden, “Antagonistic Tolerance: Competitive Sharing of Religious Sites in South Asia and the 
Balkans.”  Current Anthropology, Volume 43, Number 2, April 2002: 219. 
25 Botev., 462. 
26 Robert M. Hayden, The Blueprints for a House Divided: The Constitutional Logic of the Yugoslav Conflicts.  Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000; Dejan Djokic, ed.  Yugoslavism: Histories of a Failed Idea, 1918-1992.  
(University of Wisconsin Press, 2003); John R. Lampe, Yugoslavia as History: Twice there was a country.  
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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starting as early as the 1950s, arguing that while it decentralized economic decision-making it 
also empowered local elites who had no interest in working with the other republics or with the 
federal government.27  Finally, completely missing from Botev’s analysis is the confluence of 
geopolitical factors in the post-Cold War Europe which denigrated Yugoslavia’s status in the 
eyes of the West, leading many countries to adopt a more contradictory and at times destructive 
economic policy towards the country.28  Thus, one has to be careful in reading the mixed 
marriage statistics into Yugoslavia’s death as Botev does, ultimately concluding that “there is no 
mystery to that country’s disintegration.”29   
 Another erroneous observation Botev draws from his statistical study is the argument that 
the Communist regime actively encouraged mixed marriage, an assumption shared by many 
other similar studies.  Botev argues that following World War II Tito’s regime granted the 
nominal rights of self-determination to Yugoslavia’s ethnic communities, but stressed a 
Yugoslav socialist culture that would eventually supersede the parochial ethnic identities.  Botev 
argues that the Communists condemned nationalism as a “bourgeois prejudice,” and strove to 
assimilate minorities into majority cultures in creating a socialist, Yugoslav identity. He pits the 
“efforts to create a uniform society” against the more localized struggle of various groups to 
preserve their ethnic identities. 30  Le Goff and Giudici have gone a step further by claiming that 
because children from mixed marriage were supposed to grow up in a multiethnic environment 
“[m]ixed marriages were then strongly encouraged by authorities of former Yugoslavia.”31  
Echoing Botev, Jeoren Smits also argues that during Communism in Yugoslavia, the “impression 
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was raised that intermarriage was a rather common phenomenon in this country, and that the 
number of mixed marriages was increasing.”32  Following this assumption, the low rate of mixed 
marriage becomes a symbol of the failure of the Yugoslav project in general. 
 As Chapter III will argue, the argument that the Communists actively encouraged mixed 
marriage as some sort of a trope for a socialist Yugoslav identity is based more on the 
ideological debates of the 1990s—caused by the rush to explain the country’s disintegration—
than any substantial empirical evidence.  It is true that in the mid-1950s the regime’s chief 
theoretician Edvard Kardelj criticized nationalism as “one of those reactionary ideological 
factors which draws people backwards” and hoped for the emergence of a Yugoslav socialist 
consciousness, jugoslovenstvo.33  But as Paul Shoup points out, Kardelj also acknowledged the 
historical continuity and importance of the nation in the development of economic relations.  The 
question of whether nations would emerge at the level of the republics or if the separate nations 
would melt into one Yugoslav socialist consciousness Kardelj left unanswered.34  The hesitancy 
could be attributed to Communists’ almost obsessive efforts to distinguish themselves from the 
discredited integral Yugoslavism of the interwar period, which had become inextricably 
associated with Greater Serbian monarchic hegemony, that were in large part the reason behind 
the Communists’ success in gaining popular support during and after World War II.  Thus, the 
Communist slogan of “brotherhood and unity” between Yugoslavia’s nations always had to be 
carefully balanced by the emphasis on the equality of nations and their inalienable rights to 
national self-determination, the latter being enshrined in the country’s federal system.35  By the 
early 1960s the efforts at creating a Yugoslav socialist consciousness were abandoned altogether 
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as the 1963 Constitution transferred more powers to the republics, turning the country into what 
Ramet has called an “international balance of power system” with republics operating almost as 
independent states.36  The devolution of political power led to the first public revival of 
nationalism since World War II, even spearheaded by the Communists, most evident in the 
Croatian Spring movement and the recognition of the Bosnian Muslim nationhood in 1968.  Not 
only did the regime not encourage mixed marriage, but around this time high-level Communist 
officials, such as the head of the Bosnian Communist Party Hamdija Pozderac, mocked the idea 
that mixed marriages could lead to Yugoslav consciousness.  Arguing that national identity was a 
social and not a biological category, Pozderac insisted that “even though there [were] numerous 
mixed marriages in our country this [did] not create any Yugoslav nation.”37  That the only 
literature the demographers such as Botev and Smits cite to support their claim that the 
Communists encouraged mixed marriage are the studies of Soviet demographers from the early 
1980s (Bromlei and Kashuba)38, an American analyst’s book on the Western intervention in the 
Bosnian war from 1995 (Rieff)39 and a single study by a Yugoslav sociologist from 1986 
(Petrović)40, written already at the height of the Yugoslav crisis and six years after Tito’s death, 
shows the dearth of empirical evidence for their assumption.  I propose to approach the issue of 
mixed marriage somewhat differently and the best way to illustrate this approach is to start with 
a story. 
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Mixed Marriage Before Yugoslavia: The Romance of Andromaha and Sabit 
 Judging by the information contained in her employment file, Andromaha Morait was an 
exceptional woman.  Born in 1886 in the Macedonian town of Veleš at a time of staggering 
illiteracy, particularly among women, by the age of twenty-two Andromaha was fluent in Greek 
and Serbian, and proficient in French, German and Romanian.  By May of 1907, her official 
residency was in Sarajevo where she graduated from a women’s high school.  While most 
Bosnian parents resisted sending their daughters even to elementary school, following her 
graduation from the women’s high school she went to Zagreb where she attended a teacher’s 
school for women.  After finishing the Zagreb school and passing the teacher’s exam, the 
Austro-Hungarian authorities in Bosnia appointed her an assistant teacher at an elementary 
school in the small Herzegovinian town of Bileća.  According to yearly evaluations of her work 
in Bileća, Andromaha was “conscientious and very competent”41 in her teaching, but because of 
her “gentle physique”42 she could not keep her male students in line so she was transferred to an 
all-girls’ classroom.  The only critical observation came in the evaluation for the 1909-10 school 
year during which, according to the official, she was “not very inspired.”43  The lack of 
inspiration may have been due to her preparations for the teacher’s exam which she passed in 
1910 in Sarajevo.  This allowed her to obtain permanent employment, but this time in a place 
even smaller than Bileća, a central Bosnian village of Donji Vakuf.  Not even a year after she 
arrived in the village, she had fallen in love with the principal of the elementary school, Sabit 
Talić. 
   Andromaha Morait and Sabit Talić were an unlikely couple.  She was a gentle woman 
who had trouble controlling her male students.  He was a man who was described by school 
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officials as “pretentious, insubordinate, and quarrelsome, and…very crude.”44  But like 
Andromaha, Sabit was unusual when compared to his contemporaries because instead of 
attending the Islamic religious school (mekteb), like most Muslim boys, he attended a ruždije, a 
multi-confessional school which offered basic algebra and writing and was a legacy of the 
Ottoman attempt to expand the exclusively religious bent of the traditional mektebs.  Like 
Andromaha, he graduated from the Sarajevo teaching school when he was appointed an assistant 
teacher at an elementary school in the Herzegovinian town of Stolac.  But before he could be 
appointed to a permanent post he had to pass the teacher’s exam in Sarajevo, which he did with a 
D average at the end of 1902.  Despite some difficulty in passing the exam, he was appointed the 
principal of an elementary school in another Herzegovinian town where state officials observed 
“with pleasure, [his] success at that school.”45  It is not clear if he initiated the transfer, but in 
January 1911 he was appointed the principal of the elementary school in his hometown of Donji 
Vakuf.  Andromaha had already been teaching there for more than three months.   
 Andromaha and Sabit were an unlikely couple in another way: she was an Eastern 
Orthodox and he was a Muslim, a romance which in the words of a government official, was 
“the first such case amongst the teachers of Bosnia and Herzegovina.” Their marriage plans 
triggered a nine-month legal saga involving local and state authorities, the Eastern Orthodox 
Archbishopric of Sarajevo, the district and the Supreme Shari’a court. During the time it took for 
them to obtain a license and finally get married at the local Shari’a court, Andromaha would give 
birth to two children—Emina and Enver.   Because it was unusual enough to draw in all these 
social actors, the romance between Andromaha and Sabit offers a particularly poignant preface 
to our twentieth century history of mixed marriage in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
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When the Bugojno county government received Sabit Talić’s application for a marriage 
license on 19 December 1911, it had a reason to worry given the history of mixed marriage in 
Bosnia since the Austro-Hungarian occupation in 1878.  The explosive nature of mixed marriage 
conversions became evident in two cases that gripped the Herzegovinian countryside, and later 
the entire country, during the last two decades of the 19th century.  In 1881, a small village near 
Mostar was rocked by the news that a young Muslim woman by the name of Saja Čokić fled her 
father’s home, converted to Catholicism and married her Catholic boyfriend.  A local mufti 
organized a delegation, led by the girl’s outraged father, to the local Austro-Hungarian officials, 
demanding that the girl be returned home and conversion immediately annulled since she was a 
minor.  The mufti further argued that the whole operation had been concocted by the local 
Catholic priest and the girl’s Catholic in-laws.  The authorities were worried enough to summon 
the newlyweds to court where Saja defended her decision to convert to Catholicism, insisting 
that she had done so out of her own free will, and most remarkably, that she was not fifteen, as 
her father had claimed, but twenty-two.  It is not clear how, but the court eventually arrived at 
the “medical opinion” that the girl was indeed an adult and closed the case.  The father, however, 
continued to press the case at the district Shari’a court, which even arrested Saja for a brief 
period of time, but was then forced by state officials to release her.  Although the saga may have 
been traumatic for the girl—particularly given the possibility that she had to undergo a medical 
exam to determine her age—the controversy remained largely confined to the Mostar region and 
eventually petered out amidst a peasant rebellion which erupted in January 1882.46 
 Following this incident, the Austro-Hungarian authorities attempted to prevent another 
outbreak of communal unrest by more tightly regulating conversions, but another conversion 
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scandal erupted at the very turn of the century, threatening the very stability of the regime.  
Because many conversions were followed by accusations by representatives of all communities 
that the clergy of the opposing community had been actively involved in “stealing” the convert, 
the authorities engaged in extensive negotiations with the religious representatives of all 
communities in drafting a conversion law.  The conversion statute of 1891 allowed for all 
concerning parties to have unfettered access to the convert and mandated a waiting period for the 
conversion to take effect.47  Eight years later, when the news of Fata Omanović’s disappearance 
spread through another Muslim village in Herzegovina, the Mostar mufti gathered a delegation 
of over 1000 Muslims and marched on the local government offices, demanding government 
intervention.  The accusations were familiar enough: the unsuspecting Muslim girl had been 
kidnapped under the cover of the night by a group of nuns, ferried to a monastery, converted, and 
married off to a Habsburg officer, all under the watchful eye of the Sarajevo Archbishop Stadler.  
The authorities attempted to quell the unrest by arresting and exiling some of the Muslim leaders, 
but the effort backfired and within a year what had been a village based protest over the fate of a 
young woman escalated into a Bosnia-wide Muslim movement for religious autonomy.  The Fata 
Omanović affair sparked numerous delegations and petitions both to Pest and Vienna, forcing the 
regime to eventually issue the Autonomy Statute in 1910, granting the Muslim community a 
wide-ranging autonomy in the management of its religious, educational, and business affairs.48  
Fata eventually resurfaced almost forty-years later under the name of Darinka Prijatelj, a 
Slovenian living in Maribor, when she gave a newspaper interview in which she revealed that 
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she had left her village voluntarily with the help of nuns, worked at a Split monastery until 1910 
when she married a Slovenian officer, converted, and moved to Maribor.49  
 Given that Sabit’s petition came a little over a year after the Autonomy Statute, it is not 
surprising that despite the urgent nature of Sabit’s plea, some Austro-Hungarian officials 
expressed consternation at the possibility of this mixed marriage.  In his marriage license petition 
to the Bugojno county government Sabit made it clear that Andromaha had become pregnant and 
he begged for a quick approval of marriage so that he could “save the honor of my fiancée, my 
school, and the entire teaching corps.”50  In his own letter to the Sarajevo Regional Government, 
in which he urged a quick approval of Sabit’s marriage license, an Austro-Hungarian county 
government official still worried about the effect the marriage would have on the locals in Donji 
Vakuf: 
Finally, it is important to note that considering the unusual nature of such 
 marriages, it would not be appropriate to keep these teachers in Donji 
 Vakuf or any other small place, so the Regional Government is asked to 
 transfer them from Donji Vakuf to Sarajevo where this will not be as 
 noticeable as in smaller places.51   
 
 If there was any question of what might have happened if the couple was not transferred, 
the official clarified it a month later when he wrote to the Sarajevo government once again 
repeating his insistence that Andromaha and Sabit be transferred to Sarajevo because “in every 
other small place, this couple would be too noticeable and this could provoke different kinds of 
attacks.”52  When eight months later the marriage license or any response had not arrived from 
Sarajevo, the same official wrote yet another similarly alarming letter, this one marked 
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confidential, in which he informed the government that Sabit and Andromaha had moved in 
together and that “this, our people do not approve of, but take exception to.”53  Whether or not 
the locals were opposed to this arrangement because it was a mixed relationship or because they 
were living out of wedlock is unclear, but the official was equally concerned for the couple’s 
well being and asked once again that they be moved to a larger place, most ideally to Sarajevo. 
 In addition to his county government, Sabit also petitioned his local Shari’a court for a 
marriage license, revealing his confusion over who had jurisdiction over mixed marriage.  In his 
statement to the Shari’a court, which he made one day after filing his petition to the government, 
Sabit told a different story of his romance from the one he had told the government official in 
that in the later version he silenced the out-of-wedlock pregnancy and spoke of a long platonic 
friendship which had only gradually become sexual.  Describing Andromaha as “one of the best 
and the most reputable women especially in her moral life,”54 he insisted that he had taken her 
under his wing out of his professional duty as the school principal.  But serving as her protector 
had also been his “patriotic duty…because her father had entrusted [him] with it as a friend.”55  
While in his statement to the government he had admitted that the relationship had been intimate 
“for quite some time,” he told the Shari’a judge that after meeting Andromaha “love relations” 
had been far from his mind.   But because she had come to confide in him and had become so 
loyal that he eventually grew to “love her above anything else.”56  He asked the court to officiate 
a Shari’a marriage, allowing Andromaha to stay in her Eastern Orthodox faith, but stipulating 
that all of their future children be raised in accordance with Islam.  Sabit’s confusion over who 
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had the authority to grant a mixed marriage license could be forgiven since it was widespread 
even at higher levels. 
The jurisdictional ambiguity vis-à-vis mixed marriage stemmed from Austro-Hungarian 
legislation, declared soon after the empire’s occupation of Bosnia, which reaffirmed the reach of 
Shari’a over marriages in which both spouses were Muslim, but was silent on the issue of mixed 
marriages.57  The county official who forwarded Sabit’s statement to the Sarajevo Regional 
Government urged his superiors to grant him the license since “marriage laws do not forbid these 
kinds of marriages.”58  Acknowledging that this was the first mixed marriage amongst the 
teachers of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the official anticipated the petition would encounter resistance 
and urged the government not to “create any obstacles,” and to issue the permission as soon as 
possible.  The district Shari’a judge in Bugojno, where Sabit had submitted his petition, was 
equally hesitant in how to proceed and asked the Supreme Shari’a court in Sarajevo for advice on 
“whether and how this court would solemnize this marriage.”59  But even the highest Shari’a 
court in the land was uncertain on how to proceed and forwarded Sabit’s application to the 
Regional Government in Sarajevo, assuming that the marriage fell under state jurisdiction. 
 The Regional Government tried to expedite Sabit’s petition by clearing up the 
jurisdictional confusion, but to no avail.  It seems that besides Sabit’s case, the central 
government in Sarajevo had received other mixed marriage requests from the Supreme Shari’a 
court because when it finally did respond in late January 1912, it referenced three other mixed 
marriage cases.  Responding to these inquires, the Regional Government was unequivocal in its 
insistence that it had no jurisdiction whatsoever in the matter of mixed marriages: 
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“Solemnization of marriages in general has been done by the confessional communities in 
accordance with their particular marriage laws, so the regional government does not meddle in 
this.”60  It urged the Shari’a court to consider every case individually and notify individuals of 
proper procedures needed for a marriage to be solemnized in accordance with Shari’a.  In the 
letter, the Regional Government also indirectly admitted that it had been responsible for the legal 
confusion as it repealed its Directive No. 156194/III from 25 October 1907, which had “stated 
that solemnization of mixed marriages does not come under the jurisdiction of Shari’a courts.”61  
The unambiguous position of the Regional Government notwithstanding, the confusion persisted 
with a county official pleading with the government as late as August of 1912—some seven 
months after the legal obstacle had been supposedly removed—“to repeal the order which bans 
the solemnization of mixed marriages”62 and finally approve Sabit’s marriage license. 
 Another reason for the delay, in addition to the legal confusion, was the predictable 
hostility of religious authorities to the marriage. That the local Shari’a court immediately 
forwarded his petition to the Supreme Shari’a court, asking for guidance, was understandable in 
light of the jurisdictional limits of the Shari’a over such marriages, but also the state enforcement 
of such limits.  In May 1909, state authorities had hauled a district Shari’a judge in front of a 
disciplinary court for officiating over a mixed marriage by which he had violated the Article 10 
of the 1883 Directive, limiting the reach of the Shari’a only over marriages in which both 
spouses were Muslim.63  But, even seven months after the Regional Government had rescinded 
the ban on Shari’a judges officiating mixed marriages, the district Shari’a court in Bugojno was 
still refusing to solemnize the marriage.  Thus, on 6 August 1912, an Austro-Hungarian 
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municipal official from Bugojno wrote to his superior, the county official of Travnik, in which 
he notified him that “[t]he marriage between the school principal Talić and teacher Andromaha 
has not been concluded because the local Shari’a court refuses to officiate it without the approval 
of the Supreme Shari’a court...”64  The Travnik official forwarded the note—along with the 
confidential letter in which he asked the couple be transferred to a larger town for their own 
safety (discussed above)—to the Regional Government, asking them to notify the Bugojno court 
that the order banning Shari’a jurisdiction over mixed marriages had been revoked and that they 
could proceed with officiating Sabit’s marriage.65  It remains unclear, however, if the delay was 
due to the purposeful foot dragging on the part of the Bugojno Shari’a court or even the Supreme 
Shari’a court or if it was simply a matter of bureaucratic lethargy. 
 In the response of Orthodox Church officials to the marriage plans of Sabit and 
Andromaha, hesitancy gave way to hostility. A letter of the Regional Government to Orthodox 
Archbisphoric makes it clear that the Sarajevo based Orthodox court had written to the state 
authorities on 19 December 1911 regarding Sabit’s petition and had asked that the petition be 
denied.  The government informed the church that Shari’a courts in Bosnia straddled the 
boundary between the state and mosque since they were both, a part of the state judicial system, 
but were also responsible for adjudicating matters pertaining to the family matters of the 
country’s Muslims, including marriage.  In ruling on state matters they were bound by state law, 
but in religious matters—and marriage was one of these—they were authorized by the Reis-ul-
ulema, the head of Bosnia’s Muslim community.   The letter concluded by explicitly rejecting 
the church’s request: “Because of all of this, in the case the aforementioned individuals 
[Andromaha and Sabit] petitioned the relevant shari’a court, the regional government could not 
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block this.”66 The Archbishopric followed up on 1 September 1912 with another letter to the 
Regional Government, asking them to confirm if Andromaha had yet concluded a Shari’a 
sanctioned marriage with Sabit.  In a delayed response, the government notified the church 
official that indeed, on 12 September 1912, Andromaha and Sabit had wed in the district Shari’a 
court in Bugojno.67 
 Despite the anxiety of the state official over the mixed marriage, the legal confusion, and 
the hostility of the religious authorities, there is little evidence that the villagers of Donji Vakuf 
were in as much of an uproar as the elites.  The same county official who worried about the 
safety of the couple seemed to admit as much: “It would be best if this couple was moved to 
Sarajevo, and if this would not be possible right away, they should remain in Donji Vakuf where 
this [their romance] is a known fact amongst the locals, and they have so far been indifferent 
towards this.”68  The fact that they were not transferred out of the village until May 1915, more 
than two years after their wedding, and even then were assigned to a school in another small and 
religiously mixed village, Pećigrad, shows that their safety was not as threatened as the county 
official had feared.  
 Although it is clear that villagers’ concerns did not parrot those of the elites, it would be 
too rash to conclude that they were indifferent.  For example, just a few days after Andromaha 
had given birth to her first son, Enver, fifteen parents of her Orthodox students wrote a letter to 
the county government, asking for Andromaha’s replacement: 
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To the Honorable County Government, 
   
 By now you must be aware that the female teacher in our elementary  
 school Andromaha Morait has become pregnant...and we hear that she has 
 already given birth.   
 Because of this, we have been forced not to send our children to school 
 anymore for male teachers to teach them because we don’t send our 
 children to school just for the sake of school, but also because of 
 handiwork.  If the honorable government promises us that a new female 
 teacher will arrive, then fine.   
 Now there is no one to go with our children to the Holy Church and in the 
 last 15 days no one has come to them.  We hope the honorable 
 government will fulfill our justifiable demands… 
 
        Donji Vakuf, 2/1/1912.69 
  
 The statement makes it clear that the villagers were concerned with the more practical 
task of finding a female replacement for Andromaha, who could teach their daughters how to do 
handiwork, rather than the woman’s out of wedlock pregnancy with a Muslim man.  The two 
issues the letter identifies—the dearth of female teachers and the popularity of handiwork 
classes—point to the larger context of the Austro-Hungarian attempts to introduce obligatory 
public education in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The introduction of handiwork classes in state 
schools—established soon after the occupation in 1878—was meant to break the resistance of 
conservative parents to sending their daughters to schools.  In some Muslim schools the 
government provided sewing materials and took orders from parents as to what their daughters 
would make.  At the end of the school year, these products— usually rugs, pillows, wrapping 
cloth—would be exhibited at local and sometimes European-wide competitions: at the 1896 
Budapest exhibition three female Muslim students from Sarajevo had their handiwork products 
exhibited.  Handiwork classes were particularly popular at Orthodox schools where they were the 
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main subject in the 1860s.70  Andromaha’s maternity leave meant a suspension of the handiwork 
classes for the female students of the Donji Vakuf school, prompting the parents’ petition. 
 It is the last paragraph of the letter, however, that suggests a different subtext to the 
parents’ demand and reveals a more ideological motivation behind the petition.  The literature on 
the Austro-Hungarian educational reforms makes it clear that the empire’s efforts to secularize 
education in Bosnia encountered a determined resistance by the population which had been used 
to educating their (male) children in religious schools, if at all.  Upon their occupation of the 
province, the Austro-Hungarians found an educational system, if it could be described as such, 
fragmented along the confessional lines: Orthodox children went to schools funded by the 
Orthodox church, Catholic children attended schools run by Franciscan monks (and later nuns), 
and Muslim children went to mektebs.  Teaching plans in these schools consisted of religious 
subjects and relied on ineffective memorization and repetition.  The Ottoman attempt to 
introduce a more secular curriculum had been halfhearted, had come too late, and had been met 
with a lukewarm response by the populace who continued to send their children to religious 
schools.71  Introducing a secular, public education system thus became a part and parcel of the 
larger Austro-Hungarian campaign to, in the words of Bob Donia, spur “a cultural revival that 
would end the backwardness and particularism that they believed bedeviled Bosnia’s peoples.”72   
 Of course, in addition to this paternalistic attitude, the establishment of state schools, like 
the one where Andromaha and Sabit worked, was a strategic decision devised to weaken the 
influence of the Croat and Serb national activists who had been using Bosnia’s confessional 
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schools to turn Catholic and Orthodox students into conscious Croats and Serbs, respectively.  
Thus, state schools figured prominently in the campaign of Benjamin von Kallay—the energetic 
Austro-Hungarian Minister of Finance, an amateur historian, and the de facto ruler of Bosnia 
until his death in 1903—to create an overarching and multiconfessional identity of Bošnjašvo 
(Bosnianness) and weaken the influence of Croatia and particularly, Serbia.  In addition to 
introducing a curriculum that emphasized the history of Bosnia-Herzegovina as an organic 
whole, banning the use of “Croat” and “Serb” adjectives, and preventing the flow of nationalist 
literature from the surrounding states, Kallay’s campaign also included the establishment of the 
Bosnian Regional Museum in Sarajevo (Zemaljski muzej)—which became an important research 
institution that published works in anthropology, archeology, and history of BiH—and the 
publication of the journal Bošnjak, which was meant to articulate an ideological justification for 
the new identity.   
 Concomitant to the failure of the new identity to take root, save a few intellectuals, was 
the resistance of parents to sending their children to public schools: for example, in the 
Herzegovinian town of Trebinje a gendarmerie officer had to forcibly take thirty Orthodox and 
Muslim children to the newly opened state school.73  But even parents who did acquiesce to the 
state school system, like the parents of Andromaha’s students, demanded the government ensure 
that teachers accompany their children to religious services, forcing the government to pass a law 
in May 1912 which required that teachers do just that during religious holidays.74 
 In addition to forcing him to have two children out of wedlock—while he waited for his 
marriage license—his mixed marriage also may have been the factor behind the state’s 
surveillance of Sabit at the height of World War I.  On 17 July 1915, a school inspector in the 
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Bosnian town of Bihać wrote that the Regional Government had reported that Sabit had been a 
“Serbophile” while in Livno and Donji Vakuf.  Consequently, the local authorities were asked to 
“police [him] and report the observations.”75  It is important to note that this accusation came not 
from the locals, but the Austro-Hungarian Regional Government which at that time was engaged 
in a brutal war against Serbia.  The government’s request that Sabit be placed under surveillance 
was nothing unusual given the fact that the Austro-Hungarian regime in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
had, even before World War I, established an elaborate network of surveillance of all important 
citizens in order to pre-empt any possible resistance to the occupation.76   
 It is also possible that Sabit’s run in with the authorities stemmed from his notorious 
temper which had gotten him in trouble with school officials and the locals before and after the 
war.  As early as 1907, a school official in Livno—where Sabit taught before he was transffered 
to Donji Vakuf—remarked that he “gets easily upset so his work with children is not that 
calm.”77  Even though there are no specific remarks made in his file during his tenure in Donji 
Vakuf, by the time he was transferred to Peći-Grad in 1915 his temper had reportedly gotten him 
into conflict with the locals: 
 In the last few years, his nervousness has been less noticeable in school, 
 but has become more frequent in his life outside of school.  [Sabit] gets 
 very upset over the smallest matter so he has had small quarrels with the 
 citizenry and the officials, but they have all been sorted out fairly quickly.  
 Due to this irritability, Sabit has recently lived quietly…78 
 
 Sabit’s efforts at self-improvement, however, did not seem to be successful.  Once again, 
it is not clear if his problems were related to Andromaha’s ethnicity, but it is clear that after the 
couple had been transferred to yet another town in 1919, Sabit’s reputation “particularly amongst 
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the Muslims” had suffered due to his “provocative attitude,” according to a school official.  In 
his evaluation for the 1921-22 school year, Sabit was described by the same school official as 
“very pretentious, insubordinate, and quarrelsome, and can be very crude.”79  In the last 
evaluation of his work, written on 16 June 1923, the inspector noted that while Sabit had 
achieved good results in his teaching, he had the tendency to “provoke” and “quarrel, particularly 
with more reputable persons.”80  He died one month later.  He was forty-four years old. 
 After the death of her husband, Andromaha also ran afoul of the school authorities.  Soon 
after Sabit’s death, she was transferred to the city of Tuzla, the first time she had a chance to 
teach at a larger school and live in a city.  However, in 1926 school officials abruptly tried to 
transfer her to the small village of Skutovac and Andromaha refused, asking for an early 
retirement.  According to a school official, the reason for the transfer order was that Andromaha 
had begun a relationship with a married military officer who had abandoned his own wife and 
converted to Islam so that he could marry Andromaha.  Reportedly, Andromaha refused to 
transfer and instead, provided a doctor’s note in asking for an early retirement which was granted 
in January 1927.81  It is not clear if she ever married the officer.   
 Historicizing Mixedness  
  Although the dissertation is a history of mixed marriage during the life and death of 
Yugoslavia, the story of Andromaha and Sabit, like all good microhistories, allows us to begin a 
discussion of a phenomenon as complex as that of mixed marriage by illuminating patterns in the 
longue durée.  First, the legal confusion, surrounding the couple’s marriage, exemplified the 
jurisdictional competition over mixed marriage that persisted until after World War II when the 
Communists secularized marriage.  Secondly, the predictable hostility of the religious 
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institutions to mixed marriage would only grow more vociferous with the creation of first 
Yugoslavia, when religious monopoly over the institution made mixed marriage extremely 
difficult or impossible, especially for the Muslims in the late 1930s and the early 1940s.  While 
the anti-religious offensive of the Communists in the first few years following World War II 
made this hostility less visible, it is clear that many religious figures continued to criticize and 
condemn the practice behind the scenes.  Thirdly, the anxiety of the Austro-Hungarian officials 
regarding Andromaha and Sabit’s romance would be echoed by all the other twentieth century 
regimes, including the Communists.  The same fear that motivated an Austro-Hungarian official 
to write to his superiors and ask that the couple be moved to a bigger town for their own safety 
was the same anxiety that kept the first Yugoslav government from secularizing marriage, 
instead opting to enshrine the religious monopoly over the institution into the country’s 
Constitution.  Although the fear that mixed marriage might antagonize the populace may have 
been far from the minds of the Communists who secularized the institution in the early postwar 
years, the decline of their self-confidence by the late 1960s was accompanied by the 
reappearance of the anxiety vis-à-vis mixed marriage, but this time by the country’s leading 
Marxists who worried the practice fettered the healthy development of nations. The 
secularization of the fear over mixed marriage is the most surprising trend that this study has 
identified. 
 The discussion of villagers’ reactions to Andromaha and Sabit’s marriage introduces the 
second concern of this study: to explore the engagement of non-elites with mixed marriage.  In 
other words, besides illuminating the consternation of social and political forces that make mixed 
marriage visible, the dissertation gauges the popular reactions to the sudden politicization of this 
category.  To put it more concretely, investigating whether or not the Donji Vakuf villagers were 
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truly indifferent to the marriage, as the official described them, can help deciphering popular 
attitudes towards national identity and contribute to the studies of national indifference.  These 
studies, which have been mostly focused on the late nineteenth and early twentieth century 
Central and Eastern Europe, have argued that despite the ubiquity of nation-state in post-WWI 
Europe certain segments of populations have through various forms of national indifference—
intermarriage, bilingualism, national ambivalence—resisted their inclusion into the nation, 
frustrating nationalist activists and forcing them to better define the boundaries of national 
communities.  
 The most representative scholar in the field, Tara Zahra, has studied the German and 
Czech nation-building in the Bohemia during the early twentieth century by focusing on the 
struggle for the souls of bilingual children as Czech and German activists competed to erase any 
sign of bilingualism or national ambivalence.  Zahra argues that parents navigated these demands 
pragmatically often remaining on the sidelines in maximizing their own status and in the process 
illuminated a pattern of national indifference that has been overlooked in the studies of 
nationalism.82  In her most recent work, Zahra has gone even further and called for national 
indifference to be used as a category of analysis, arguing that “[i]ndifference was important to 
the development of modern nationalism, not only because nationalists reacted so strongly to it, 
but because it compelled nationalist movements to define the boundaries of the national 
community more precisely.”83  By focusing more precisely on the individuals who remained on 
the sidelines of national communities we can expose what Zahra terms “the outer limits of 
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nationalizing projects.”84  That national indifference was the precise term used by the Austro-
Hungarian official to describe the villagers’ reaction to Andromaha and Sabit’s marriage and that 
this term was used repeatedly by the Islamic elites of both, the 1930s and the early 1990s to 
describe mixed marriage Muslims, seems to warrant Zahra’s argument about the resistance, 
active or inadvertent, of ordinary people to national projects. 
 But the case of Andromaha and Sabit, and the others discussed in the following pages, 
tell a cautionary tale about Zahra’s methodology of adopting the ascriptive category of national 
indifference as the description of how these individuals truly felt at the time.  As the discussion 
above showed, the sources are equivocal as to the precise feelings of the villagers vis-à-vis the 
couple as they can be interpreted to show their preoccupation with more mundane things, but do 
not exclude other alternative interpretations: the parents’ petition for Adromaha’s replacement 
with someone who could chaperon their children to school reveals their suspicion of the 
woman’s Orthodox credentials; Sabit was branded a “Serbophile” by the Austro-Hungarian state 
due to his marriage to an Orthodox woman; his run-ins with the local Muslims in Travnik were 
related to his Serbian sympathies.  The ambivalence of sources regarding the feelings of ordinary 
people suggests a larger problem with Zahra’s insistence that national indifference be used as a 
category of analysis.  Alex Toshkov has described this problem when he pointed out that Zahra’s 
own subjects speak in the language of the nation, as illustrated by her example of the 300,000 
Czechs who became Germans during the occupation.  In the words of Toshkov, the example “is 
illustrative of an acute awareness of identity politics as well as a mastery of the role of being a 
national subject; that is the exact opposite of indifference to nationalism.”85  As this dissertation 
will show, the ideological rigidity of the elites certainly breaks down when translated amongst 
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the more pragmatic non-elites who nevertheless actively engage with the national projects 
whether through resisting, acquiescing, or gaming the system. 
 Although Zahra warns against “romanticiz[ing] or pathologiz[ing] nationally indifferent 
populations,”86 portraying the non-elites as simply responding to nationalism can have this very 
same effect.  In other words, pitting ordinary Bosnians against the overzealous nationalist elites 
obscures the complicated collaboration between the two and could potentially lead to the 
oversimplified view of mixed marriage as a form of anti-nationalist resistance, which has been so 
often repeated by journalists, sociologists, and even historians.87  As the following discussion 
will show, at times of ethnic polarization non-elites were almost as equally animated by concerns 
over indifference of their coreligionists as the elites.  For example, during the late 1930s 
Muslims from all over Yugoslavia wrote to their religious leader, Grand Mufti (Reis-ul-ulema), 
reexamining their own religious discipline, excoriating themselves for not being worthy of Islam, 
questioning their children’s friendship with Christians, and begging to be allowed to live in 
majority-Muslim areas of Bosnia.  A woman’s disgust with her son’s marriage to a Serb woman, 
and his consequent conversion to Eastern Orthodoxy, led her to petition local Islamic authorities 
for his excommunication.  Similarly, many mixed marriage couples who lived through the 
Bosnian wars of the 1990s adopted a biological understanding of ethnicity which echoed the 
views espoused by the very nationalist elites who had branded them abnormal.  More ominously, 
many war criminals currently awaiting trial at the Hague have a spouse of different ethnicity and 
some survivors of the Srebrenica genocide have spoken about men in mixed marriages 
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murdering their spouses to prove their loyalty to the national cause.88 In other words, rather than 
being only a product of nationalists’ “own paranoia,”89 as Zahra puts it, demands for national 
discipline can also come from the grassroots, prompting the elite to respond. 
 These caveats notwithstanding, Zahra’s argument that “national indifference appears 
most clearly in the archives at the moment that nationalists mobilized to extinguish it,”90 is the 
one that informs this dissertation’s focus on the specific moments in Yugoslavia’s history when 
mixed marriage became marked by different social actors.  The episodic character of mixedness 
has also been noted by the anthropologist Rogers Brubaker who his discussion of mixed 
marriages between the Hungarians and the Romanians in the Transylvanian city of Cluj, argues 
that while these marriages are nominally mixed, in that the spouses belong to different ethnic 
categories, they are experientially mixed only at certain moments in the couples’ lives as when 
they have to decide on their children’s names, whether to send them to Romanian or Hungarian 
schools, discuss the current polarized political situation in the city, or plan their wedding 
ceremonies.91  Although the Transylvanian case is certainly different from the Bosnian one, 
Brubaker’s emphasis on a “relational, processual, and dynamic understanding of ethnicity and 
nation”92 is useful because he observes the everyday life of the couples and allows for ethnic 
identity to emerge spontaneously from the interaction between the spouses rather than at the 
insistence of the researcher.  Although his emphasis on the episodic nature of ethnicity is not 
new, Brubaker’s focus on the process by which the ethnic episodes occur moves us beyond the 
purely structuralist approach of earlier nationalism studies.   
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It could be argued that the early pioneer of the structural approach to nationalism was the 
sociologist Fredrik Barth who in as early as 1969 argued that ethnic categories “may be of great 
relevance to behavior, but they need not be; they may pervade all social life or they may be 
relevant only in limited sectors of activity.”93  In his own study of ethnic conflict, Donald 
Horowitz has ascribed the flaws in our understanding of ethnicity to “the episodic character of 
ethnic conflict itself.”  According to Horowitz, scholars of ethnicity inevitably play catch up in 
explaining violent conflict because “[i]t comes and goes, suddenly shattering periods of apparent 
tranquility.”94 Explaining the reason why ethnicity is deadly only intermittently, Robert 
Hayden’s model of antagonistic tolerance argues that ethnicity turns into violence once 
equilibrium between ethnic groups is shaken.95  However, these studies have largely focused on 
the constellation of forces which maintain the inter-ethnic boundary, or the “social organization 
of culture difference,” as Barth puts it, without paying much attention to the content of this 
difference.  In the words of Robert Hayden “[a] basic premise of any structuralism is that the 
content of set items that are distinguished from each other is less important than the distinction 
itself.”96  Brubaker’s research acknowledges the stability of ethnic differences, the social forces 
maintaining these differences—such as, the historical legacies in Transylvania, Ceausescu’s 
policies, the demographics, the electoral politics of Cluj—but also refocuses the spotlight on the 
process through which these differences become salient in everyday life and the particular shape 
they take.  This dissertation applies this approach historically in that it focuses on the periods in 
Yugoslavia’s history during which mixed marriages became experientially mixed for both elites 
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and non-elites, but also teases out the specific routes ethnicity takes in emerging as the dominant 
form of identity. 
This dissertation argues that there are three moments in Yugoslavia’s history—the 1930s, 
the late 1960s, and the early 1990s—when mixed marriage became defined as a social problem 
that had to be prevented, quantified, and quarantined, respectively.  This argument does not 
assume that in the other periods not discussed here mixed marriage was universally accepted, but 
that the politicization of the practice was particularly acute at these precise moments due to a 
variety of factors.  I investigate the political, social, and cultural factors that lead to the 
politicization of mixedness in each of these periods and I illuminate the consequences it had for 
the everyday life of non-elites.   
The first part of the dissertation focuses on the 1930s when mixed marriage became a 
battleground for competing definitions of the Bosnian Muslim identity.  Finding themselves 
under a secular dictatorship, the institutionally fragmented Islamic elites groped for a consensus 
on how to employ the Shari’a in disciplining those they perceived as being religiously 
indifferent, particularly those who intermarried.  Whether they advocated a more intrusive reach 
of the Shari’a (traditionalists) or strove to integrate the Muslims more seamlessly into 
Yugoslavia (modernizers) they all articulated an increasingly secular understanding of Muslim 
identity.  I argue that the inherent flexibility of the Shari’a and its ambiguous interaction with the 
secular state law allowed for both camps to creatively tinker with it in carving out their visions of 
Muslim identity.  Thus, I aim to move beyond the purely structuralist approach to interethnic 
relations by exploring not only the actors who maintain the inter-ethnic boundary, but also “the 
cultural stuff that it encloses,”97 to borrow Fredrik Barth’s phrase.   
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In the second part of the dissertation, I focus on both, the late 1960s, in order to answer 
the question of why the Communists renewed the anxiety over mixed marriage, and the early 
1990s, in tracing the delayed effects of this anxiety on the identity of a single mixed family, my 
own.  The main theoretical thrust of this part is to discount the argument that mixed marriage 
was a trope the Communist regime actively used in promoting a Yugoslav identity by showing 
that by the 1960s, the regime’s ambivalence on the national question had given way to the retreat 
from one of the central promises of socialism, the creation of an overarching and less divisive 
identity.  The lowering of socialist expectations turned mixed marriage from a mere afterthought 
to a problem which could potentially harm the state.  The ideological neglect of mixed marriages 
meant that once the state collapsed in the early 1990s mixed families, as they were without any 
institutional support, were forced to engage in what I term identity acrobatics—a frantic telling 
of stories through which they rummaged through their own pasts, and assembled new identities.  
The fact that the storytelling was done exclusively on nationalist terms adds another caveat to 
Zahra’s insistence that ordinary people can remain anational in the face of nationalism’s 
escalating demands and echoes Toshkov’s observation that ordinary people “[i]n Bourdieuian 
terms, …operate exclusively within the ‘Field’ of the Nation.”98 
Chapter Summaries 
 Chapter I argues that during the first half of the 1930s the Bosnian Islamic clergy seized 
on mixed marriage as a symptom of religious indifference, turning the issue into a battleground 
of a larger war to define Muslim identity in a secular state.  I contend that the concerns over 
mixed marriage were inextricably bound up with the ambiguous and often precarious status of 
the Bosnian Muslims in the young state.  In particular, I look at the response to this campaign by 
the Sarajevo Supreme Shari’a Court headed by the reformist judge Abdulah Bušatlić in arguing 
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that the court’s resistance to policing mixed marriages, even when these explicitly contravened 
Shari’a marriage rules, was rooted in the reformist impulse to integrate the Muslims more 
smoothly into the Yugoslav homeland.  In arguing that this was an instance when perceived 
religious indifference was used as an occasion to make a nation (Yugoslavia) more coherent, I 
add a caveat to the studies of national indifference which have seen the latter as an obstacle to 
nation-building projects.  Finally, I also contend that although the traditionalists and 
conservatives may have disagreed over the need to police mixed marriage both camps articulated 
a secular understanding of Muslim identity.   
 Chapter II argues that Grand Mufti’s ban on mixed marriage in 1938 revealed the 
spiraling disintegration of the Yugoslav state and the consequent emergence of a Bosnian 
Muslim national identity.  I contend that the resurgence of religious conservatives amidst a 
political and social homogenization of the Sarajevo-based establishment meant a more intrusive 
Shari’a, particularly for Muslims who intermarried.  However, rather than being a simple top-to-
bottom mobilization of religious sentiment, the campaign against religious indifference 
empowered many ordinary people who strove to impose religious discipline on their own lives.  
Although despite efforts to enforce religious discipline individuals continued to punch holes 
through the inter-confessional boundary, this occasional “osmosis of personnel”99 to borrow 
Barth’s term, did not mean the erasure of the boundary. 
 Chapter III investigates why some of the chief Communist theoreticians and politicians in 
Yugoslavia began to define mixed marriage as a problem in the late 1960s.  Analyzing the 
regime’s nationality policy, and in particular the postwar efforts to secularize the society, I argue 
that the re-emergence of the anxiety vis-à-vis mixed marriage during the second half of the 
decade was inextricably bound up with the re-definition of the socialist Yugoslavia’s raison 
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d’être in the wake of nationalism’s resurgence.  The Communists responded to the challenges of 
the sixties by lowering socialist expectations and abandoning the Marxist premise that socialism 
would lead to the emergence of a more inclusive identity.  The abandonment of Yugoslav 
identity was at odds with some of the leading sociologists who argued that mixed marriage was 
inevitably leading towards the ethno-biological homogenization.  In particular, the chapter 
discusses the mixed marriage studies by the sociologist Ruža Petrović in arguing that the 
disconnect between her hope in a Yugoslav future and the regime’s embrace of nationalism 
reveals the stranded position into which mixed marriages were placed as the country became 
more ambivalent about its identity. 
 Chapter IV returns the story back to the opening anecdote in that it is an autobiographical 
exploration of my own family’s displacement during the breakup of Yugoslavia with the purpose 
of describing how it felt to be mixed at this particular moment in history.  Using my own diary as 
the main source, in addition to family memories, I trace the precise ways in which we invented 
new stories in adjusting our Yugoslav identities to a post-Yugoslav reality.  Following my own 
memory’s fragmentary recall, in addition to my diary and family stores, I describe not only a 
family’s experience of the wars, but strive to re-assemble the mosaic of stories we told about 
ourselves at the conjectures of several futures that we faced during our refugee life.  The 
theoretical thrust of this chapter is not only to suggest a new way of exploring mixedness, but 
also to argue for the inclusion of autobiography in the study of history.100 
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 Thus, the dissertation is a suggestion that a longue durée approach can help us move the 
discussion of mixed marriages beyond the (still) polarizing debate over the precise nature, 
causes, and consequences of Yugoslavia’s violent disintegration.  The focus on specific moments 
when mixed marriage became socially salient allows us to study both, the constellation of social 
forces which politicize ethnicity and the effects of this on everyday life of non-elites on terms of 
the historical moment in which they occur rather than those of our present moment (as much as 
this is possible).  The diversity of sources which are available for each historical moment 
necessitates the use of diverse methodologies, including autobiography.  The methodological 
innovation is the other contribution the dissertation hopes to bring to the study of mixed 
marriage. 
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Chapter I 
Bosnian Muslims into Yugoslavs? 
Shari’a and the Surveillance of Religious Indifference 
 
 
Introduction   
 “If you do not leave me alone, I will renounce Islam.  I do not agree with some specifics 
of Islam anyway.  I have written about this before.”101  This is how Ibro Bijavica from the 
Bosnian town of Prozor addressed his district Shari’a court in a 1933 letter, which eventually 
found its way to the Supreme Shari’a Court in Sarajevo (VŠS).  He would write again almost a 
year later, this time renouncing not Islam, but his previous intention to leave his faith.  However, 
he was still unequivocal in his insistence that he be left alone: “With this letter I renounce all my 
previous statements regarding my religious character.  Thus, I am a consummate 
Muhammedinian.  However, I beg of you to leave me alone.  Otherwise, I might be forced to 
embark on some stupid adventure, including going on a hunger strike.”102   
 Ibro’s shouts against his local Shari’a authorities are as significant for their blunt tone as 
they are for their timing in that they are an echo of the contentious struggle to define the Muslim 
identity in the early 1930s Bosnia-Herzegovina, the struggle which is at the center of this 
chapter.  Although the exact cause of Ibro’s exasperation is not known, the letters are stashed in 
a file overflowing with complaints by clergy about Muslims who were seen as indifferent to their 
religious obligations, mostly those who intermarried with Bosnians of other faiths.  During the 
early 1930s, the Supreme Shari’a court received numerous pleas from district Shari’a judges and 
all levels of the clerical establishment, from the local hodža to the Grand Mufti, to brand those 
Muslims who violated the Shari’a as murtads, or those who committed the sin of apostasy, and to 
set firm parameters of permissible Muslim behavior.  Stranded in an ambiguous position between 
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the mosque and state, the Supreme Shari’a court rebuffed these pleas and, as if having heard 
Ibro’s words of exasperation, urged greater sensitivity in treatment of religiously indifferent 
Muslims.  In particular, the court’s chief justice Abdulah Bušatlić tweaked the rougher edges of 
some Shari’a rules in an attempt to integrate more smoothly the specificity of Muslims into the 
cultural mosaic that was the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.  Through his decisions while on the bench 
and in writings predating his tenure, Bušatlić articulated a more secular, that is, national, 
understanding of Muslim identity that was in keeping with the prevalent mood in the nation 
obsessed interwar Europe. 
 Although the perceived indifference of Ibro and others like him was religious, the 
authorities noticed it at a time when Islam’s relationship to national identity was being 
contentiously negotiated, making this story an important caveat to the study of national 
indifference in Europe.  The overarching argument of these studies is that while in the post-WWI 
Europe of nation-states indifference to national identity became exceedingly difficult for 
individuals, instances of non-national behavior were numerous and politically consequential 
enough to revise our understanding of non-elites as uniformly self-identifying with their 
purported nations.  In what is arguably the most representative work in this nascent field, Tara 
Zahra’s study of nationalism in the Bohemian lands in the early 20th century traces the 
difficulties Czech and German nationalists had in persuading parents to choose unambiguous 
national identities for their children.  Whether they were nationally indifferent, bilingual, or 
simply unwilling to organize their daily lives according to the demands of their purported 
national identities, Zahra argues that these individuals illuminate a pattern of national 
indifference that has been largely ignored in most major works dealing with nationalism.103  
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Other scholars have also located instances of individuals on the margins of their national 
communities who, in the words of Tara Zahra, “remained aloof to the nation’s appeal.”104   
 In the cases Zahra and others have identified, national indifference was designated by 
activists as an obstacle to the nation-building project, but in the following story perceived 
religious indifference was an occasion to make the nation more coherent.  Zahra herself has 
rightly observed that “Yugoslavism shared the exclusionary logic of the nation-state” in that it 
excluded the non-Slavs,105 but because the nation was very much a work in progress its architects 
had much more creative freedom to tinker with its boundaries.  While in the case of Bohemia the 
Czech and German nationalists had largely worked out the contents of their nations, in interwar 
Yugoslavia the Muslims would become a symbol of the country’s ambiguous identity.   
 The institutionally fragmented Muslim elites groped for a consensus on how to integrate 
Islam into the supranational state, but by the late 1920s this effort had degenerated into a cultural 
civil war with the Shari’a as the primary battleground.  The clergy-led conservatives seized on 
mixed marriage as a symptom of religious indifference, accusing its practitioners of harming the 
Muslim community, and pleaded with the Sarajevo Supreme Shari’a Court to be vigilant in 
enforcing Shari’a marriage laws.  Speaking from its unique position between the mosque and 
state, the Supreme Shari’a Court—and in particular, its chief justice Abdulah Bušatlić—rebuffed 
the attempts to police mixed marriages, revealing a readiness to tone down the aspects of the 
Shari’a which could exacerbate the already tense inter-confessional relations in the country.  
Bušatlić’s opinions on mixed marriage were a part of his larger effort to adjust the Shari’a in 
anchoring the Bosnian Muslims more firmly into Yugoslavia.  Since in interwar Europe 
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nationhood was the mark of civilization to be proudly worn on one’s sleeve, by giving the 
Muslims a multi-religious nation-state Bušatlić strove to bring them into the European cultural 
space.   
 Abdulah Bušatlić may have sought to make the Muslims a part of the Yugoslav nation, 
but in pushing the boundaries of permissible Muslim behavior he revealed the emergence of a 
secular sensibility vis-a-vis Muslimness.  Countering the efforts of the conservative clergy to 
police individuals’ adherence to Islamic rituals and the laws of the Shari’a, Bušatlić and other 
reformers gave precedence to the need of the Muslims to equip themselves with the tools of 
modernity: education, literacy, activism, and national self-determination.  Thus, the reformist 
jurist imagined a Muslimness that was a birthright and not necessarily bound up with the 
individual’s belief in the tenets of Islam.  Once the failure of the Yugoslav project became 
imminent in the second half of the 1930s, the primordialist view of Muslim identity could be 
picked up by the resurgent traditionalists who would dominate the newly homogenized Muslim 
elites. 
 Not everyone reacted to the intrusion of the religious police as bluntly as Ibro, but those 
Muslims who trespassed across the inter-religious boundary pushed the elites to more boldly 
define the content and the boundaries of Muslim identity.  As Zahra argues, “[i]ndifference was 
important to the development of modern nationalism, not only because nationalists reacted so 
strongly to it, but because it compelled nationalist movements to define the boundaries of the 
national community more precisely.”106  In the case Zahra studies religion was less relevant than 
language in defining this boundary, but by the early 20th century, religion had become an 
important, if not the main, marker of ethnic identity in the region that at the end of 1918, would 
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become Yugoslavia. Consequently, the contentious debate over the Shari’a tells an important 
story about the role of religion in the emergence of a secular national identity. 
Between the Mosque and State: The Supreme Shari’a Court in Sarajevo 
 Shari’a courts cannot but be political and bound up with the destinies of the states under 
whose tutorship they operate.  As Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na’im argues, the Shari’a represents 
God’s will, the revelation that illuminates the path Muslims should take in order to achieve 
salvation.  Given that daily adherence to God’s will has to be voluntary the enforcement of the 
Shari’a by a state “is a logical contradiction that cannot be rectified through repeated efforts 
under any conditions.”107  The rapid expansion of the Islamic empire coupled with the vagueness 
of the Qur’an regarding many issues and its silence on many others necessitated the development 
of methodologies through which scholars could interpret God’s will: consensus (ijma), reasoning 
by analogy (qiyas), juridical reasoning (ijtihad).  During the 2nd and 3rd centuries after 
Muhammad, using these methodologies, groups of scholars wrote more detailed opinions on 
many issues not sufficiently explained in the holy texts and “closing the gate of ijtihad,” 
excluded any other possible interpretations.108  This process led to the emergence of the four 
main schools of thought named after their founding scholars and used in different regions of the 
world with the Hanafi school becoming the most prominent in Sunni Islam and the one imported 
to the Balkans by the conquering Ottomans at the end of the 15th century. 
 In the early Islamic states the interpretation of the Shari’a was under the jurisdiction of 
the independent mufti who issued opinions, which were then carried out by a judge (qadi).  
However, over time many muftis would become embraced by the state as it was the case in the 
Ottoman empire where the Hanafi school of the Shari’a became state law and in the 16th century, 
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a part of the Kanun, administrative law drafted by the Sultan himself.  In other words, muftis 
became state officials, appointed and deposed by the will of the Sultan.  During the Tanzimat 
reforms, starting in the first half of the 19th century, the Shari’a took on many aspects of Western 
law and in particular, the distinction between criminal and family law with the former being 
adjudicated by “regular courts,” and the latter coming under the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Shari’a.109  In 1878, on the heels of this major restructuring the Shari’a courts in Bosnia-
Herzegovina would face an unprecedented challenge: to retain their jurisdiction under the 
sponsorship of a Christian empire, the Austro-Hungarians. 
 In Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was the Christian Austro-Hungarian Empire that established 
the Supreme Shari’a Court in Sarajevo and laid the foundations for the entire Shari’a 
infrastructure, which would later be mapped onto the entire country of Yugoslavia.  Founded in 
1883, five years after the Austro-Hungarians assumed control of the province, the Supreme 
Shari’a court in Sarajevo was a part of the empire’s larger effort to channel the country’s local 
legal traditions into the loyalty to its rule.  In this, the Austro-Hungarians replicated the practice 
of other European colonial powers—such as the French in Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia, and the 
British in India, to name a few—who after conquering Muslim lands allowed for the continuing 
jurisdiction of the Shari’a in family affairs albeit under the surveillance of the imperial state.  
However, the Austro-Hungarians did not go as far as the British in India who in 1773 established 
British courts to implement the Shari’a—leading to a rather flawed judicial process as the British 
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jurists had to base their rulings on translated texts and triggered a backlash by the local 
ulema110—but fostered the emergence of the native Shari’a judiciary.   
 The court was staffed by locals who were educated either at Islamic universities abroad, 
mostly in Istanbul and Cairo, or after 1887 at the school for Shari’a judges in Sarajevo.  The 
greatest innovation the Austro-Hungarians brought was the Supreme Court’s very existence as 
Shari’a courts had always been single-instance courts without the right of appeal.111  The 
Supreme Shari’a court was presided over by three justices who were to hold closed hearings on 
appeals to decisions from district Shari’a courts.  In a nod to the multi-confessional composition 
of the country, the occupying authorities also mandated that three non-Muslim judges be present 
at all hearings.  After many Shari’a jurists complained that this was an unwarranted intrusion by 
Christians into Muslim affairs in 1913 the requirement was amended to mandate the presence of 
one non-Muslim judge who would be present only at hearings, which discussed inter-
confessional relations.112  Although Shari’a judges were respected Muslim scholars and symbols 
of Islamic piety they were culturally distinct from the clergy whose institutional framework was 
also set up by the Austro-Hungarians. 
 The Austro-Hungarian authorities established the Supreme Shari’a court in order to 
Europeanize the country’s judicial system, but their tampering with clerical institutions may have 
had more to do with blunting the clergy’s intense hostility towards the occupation.  The 
country’s Muslim clerics had supported the armed resistance to the occupation and after its 
failure, led a massive exodus of Bosnian Muslims to Turkey.  Some historians have argued that 
the Austro-Hungarians established the position of Reis-ul-ulema (Grand Mufti) in 1882 in order 
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to disrupt the spiritual and political ties between the Bosnian Muslims and the Ottoman sultan 
who was also the Caliph, the head of the Islamic community and the symbolic successor to the 
Prophet.  The Reis-ul-ulema was the spiritual leader of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Muslims and the 
chief executive of the Ulema medžlis, the highest administrative organ of the Muslim 
community.  Although in a concession to the local demands, the nomination of the first Reis in 
1882 had to be approved by the Istanbul mufti, by the time the second Reis assumed tenure in 
1893 the authorities ignored this provision and he was appointed by the Austro-Hungarian 
Emperor without consulting with the Porte.113  In addition, the Reis and the Ulema medžlis—or 
the Rijaset as they were collectively known—remained largely independent from the Shari’a 
judiciary and the relationship between the two was tenuous at best and contentious at worst.  
Beyond the qualifying exams prospective judges had to take in front of the Reis, the latter had 
very little control over the nominations and the work of the Shari’a jurists who nevertheless 
issued opinions on the matters directly related to the work of the clergy.  Besides the institutional 
divisions, there emerged a cultural gap between the two branches.  As the most highly educated 
segment of the population at a time of rampant illiteracy, Shari’a judges enjoyed great respect 
amongst the people.  In addition, as state employees they often appeared in public with state 
officials adding to their social gravitas.  For their part, the clerics, and in particular local hodžas, 
were often poorly educated, but more tightly integrated into the everyday life of their local 
community.114  Thus, the Bosnian Muslim elites greeted the end of World War I and the 
establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes institutionally and culturally 
fragmented. 
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  Following World War I, the disintegration of the Ottoman and the Austro-Hungarian 
empires, and the creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, Shari’a courts became 
the center of a contentious debate, which echoed much deeper anxieties about the identity of 
Yugoslavia in general and the Bosnian Muslims in particular.  Euphoric pronouncements that 
accompanied the creation of the first Yugoslav state, promising the long delayed liberation of 
South Slav peoples from the imperial yoke, belied deep ethnic divisions, which sporadically 
erupted in violence throughout the country.  Even before the frail Serbian King Peter 
Karadjordjević declared the birth of the parliamentary monarchy on 1 December 1918, the most 
popular Croat politician Stjepan Radić challenged the constitutionality of the unification and 
warned about the trampling of Croat individuality by the Serbian monarchy.  The Bosnian 
countryside was ravaged by reprisals of Serb paramilitaries, the Chetniks, against the Muslims 
for the latter’s role in the feared Austrian Schutzkorps in wartime massacres of Serb civilians.  
Some Serb-majority municipalities in Bosnia declared unilateral succession and opted to unify 
with Serbia even before the unification.  While some intellectuals and politicians predicted that 
the supposedly backward “tribes” would give way to a Yugoslav nation—much like the 
unification of Germany in 1871 had led to the creation of the German nation—the political life of 
the new country was organized almost exclusively along the “tribal” lines.  The Muslims of 
Bosnia were simultaneously lobbied by Croat and Serb nationalist activists to identify with their 
national groups and suspected of disloyalty to the young Kingdom due to their supposed Turkish 
sympathies.115  For their part, the Bosnian Muslim elites were institutionally spread out between 
the clergy, organized around the Grand Mufti (Reis-ul-ulema) and Ulema medžlis, Shari’a jurists, 
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headed by the three justices of the Sarajevo Supreme Shari’a court, and politicians many of 
whom were landowners and were members of the recently established Yugoslav Muslim 
Organization (JMO).116  Despite this institutional fragmentation, however, all sectors of the elite 
agreed that the preservation of the Shari’a in the regulation of Muslim family affairs was 
essential to the survival of the Muslims in the new multi-confessional state. 
 The contentious role of the Shari’a courts, and by extension of Muslims, in Yugoslavia 
became evident during the debates on the country’s Constitution, which was to be written by the 
Constituent Assembly and was eventually adopted in 1921.  The debates reveal a yawning gap 
between the parties’ different conceptions of the country.  Spurred by the heroic performance of 
the Serbian military during World War I Serb parties, led by the Radicals, continuously 
emphasized the sacrifice the Serbian people had made in the liberation of the South Slavs and 
advocated a centralized state that would eventually lead to the erasure of differences between the 
South Slav nations estranged by centuries of foreign rule.  At a meeting of the Constitutional 
Committee in February 1921, the Serbian politician and the former Prime Minister of Yugoslavia 
Milenko Vesnić reminded the other parties that the Serbs had given up countless lives, their flag, 
and their calendar all for the sake of the unified Yugoslavia.  Insisting that the Constitution 
should create a strong state, which should be “one personality,” he implored “our brothers from 
other regions to take to their hearts, as we believe they have up to now, our common fatherland 
and not to give comfort to the weak ones among us to regret that.”117  The Slovene and Croat 
representatives at the meeting, however, warned that the centralization of the state would be 
tantamount to Serbian hegemony and advocated a more decentralized state, which would 
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recognize cultural differences between the nations.  At a later meeting, the debate degenerated 
into a shouting match between the government representative Marko Trifković and the Slovenian 
representative Anton Sušnik with the former accusing the Slovenians of undermining the new 
state with their demands for autonomy and the latter reminding the government of Slovenian 
sacrifices for Yugoslavia.118  The Communist Party representative Sima Marković blamed the 
rancor on the lack of consciousness amongst the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes that they are one 
nation and accused the Serbian and Croatian ruling bourgeoisie of failing to “spiritually prepare” 
the people for unification.119 The constitutional debates were thus nothing short of a contentious 
search for the identity of the new country: was Yugoslavia a nation-state in the making whose 
purpose was to erase the historic differences between its different ethnic groups, or was it a 
multinational state which would allow for the unfettered development of each distinct group?  
The status of Yugoslavia’s Muslims depended on the answer to this question. 
 Because they were largely seen as a religious, rather than national, group the Bosnian 
Muslims became a template upon which different political groups projected their incompatible 
visions of Yugoslavia.  The distinctiveness of Muslims, in particular their adherence to the 
Shari’a, made bare the dilemma that was at the center of Yugoslavia’s problem: how to integrate 
cultural difference into the fabric of a country that purportedly strove to unify its constituent 
peoples?  Serb activists and politicians who adhered to this unitarist vision of Yugoslavia 
claimed that Muslims were descendants of Serbs who had converted to Islam while others openly 
described them as Turks and called for their expulsion. For example, at one of the Constituent 
Assembly meetings in June 1921, the Muslim (JMO) representative Sakib Korkut complained 
that Serb peasants had expelled Muslims from some eastern Bosnian villages, prompting the 
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Serbian Radical Party representative Nikola Divljan to shout: “They were right to do so!”120  
Croat parties also courted the Muslims and according to Ivo Banac, due to the more tolerant 
approach of Croat nationalists towards the Muslims, they had more success in winning over 
some educated Muslims.  While some Muslim intellectuals declared themselves as Serbs or 
Croats, Banac argues that “the overwhelming majority of ordinary Muslim masses shunned any 
process of ‘nationalization,’” knowing that this would have torn the territory of Bosnia between 
Serbia and Croatia.121  Muslims were also courted by the bourgeoning Yugoslav movement—
represented by some of the country’s prominent intellectuals and artists and supported abroad by 
influential historians like Seaton Watson—which saw them as the kernel of the soon-to-emerge 
Yugoslav identity.  This view was espoused by one of JMO’s representatives to the Constituent 
Assembly, Sakib Korkut, who in June 1921 insisted that the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina had 
remained unspoiled by divisive allegiance to tribes (Croats, Serbs, etc) and thus had come to 
“accept Yugoslavness because that is the name of the future.”122  Despite remaining agnostic on 
the question of Muslims’ national identity, the fragmented Bosnian Muslim elites were still 
unified in their demand that Shari’a courts be preserved in the Yugoslav state.123 
 Shari’a courts were preserved in the new state precisely because of the disputes between 
government-backed Serb parties on the one hand, and Croat and Slovene opposition on the other 
over the identity of Yugoslavia.  Because it did not have enough votes to pass the centralized 
version of the Constitution through the Constituent Assembly, the government, led by the 
Serbian Radicals, conceded to the JMO demands to include in the Constitution a clause that 
would preserve the jurisdiction of Shari’a courts over family affairs of the country’s Muslims.  
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The controversial Article 109 stated: “family and inheritance matters of Muslims are to be 
adjudicated by state Shari’a judges.”124  The government’s inclusion of this article stirred a 
passionate debate of the Constituent Assembly with the Socialist representative Milan Korun 
calling it “a medieval currency used to buy the Muslim vote for the Constitution” and warning 
that the preservation of the Shari’a could lead to the development of a separate Muslim nation 
sarcastically proposing the name of the new country to be the Kingdom of Muslims, Serbs, 
Croats, and Slovenes.125  The Serbian Radical Party deputy Todor Lazarević also protested the 
proposed article reminding the delegates that rather than being religious institutions, Shari’a 
courts were the remnants of Austro-Hungarian colonialism and should therefore be dismantled.  
The Agricultural Club representative Vojislav Lazić objected to the Shari’a on the grounds that 
the country needed to have a unified legal system under which all citizens would be equal 
regardless of their religion.  The government’s representative at the debates, the Minister of 
Justice Marko Djuričić shared the concerns of the non-Muslim delegates, but insisted the 
government had no choice but to preserve the courts in respecting the needs of the Muslims, but 
indicated that the measure would be temporary, expressing hope that the courts would disappear 
over time.  The JMO representative Sakib Korkut passionately defended the right of the Muslims 
to religious autonomy enumerating the acts of violence against the Muslims, inviting hackles and 
boos from the Serbian Radical Party representatives.126 
 The Shari’a scholar Fikret Karčić argues that another reason the Yugoslav state preserved 
the Shari’a courts was because of the minority protection treaty the young country signed with 
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the Entente powers after World War I.127 Atif Purivatra has argued that the insistence of the 
international community for the young state to sign the treaty came after the French journalist 
from Le Temps Charles Rivet published an article in April 1919 in which he described the 
difficult position of the Muslims in Yugoslavia along with the appeal of the Reis-ul-ulema for the 
Western powers to protect their individual and collective rights.  Despite its initial resistance to 
the agreement, out of concerns that it violated the country’s sovereignty, the Yugoslav 
government signed the San Germaine Treaty on 5 December 1919, pledging to protect its 
minorities.  Specifically, the article 10 of the treaty mandated that the state ensure the 
autonomous administration of Muslim religious institutions and the use of Muslim customs in 
the regulation of their family and personal affairs.  Fikret Karčić notes that “[t]his agreement 
treated the entire Muslim population in Yugoslavia (Muslims, members of the Albanian and 
Turkish nationality, Roma, etc) as a single religious minority.”128  Nevertheless, he argues, the 
San Germaine treaty did not necessarily mean the obligatory applicability of the Shari’a because 
the government could have allowed the country’s Muslims a choice between civil and Shari’a 
courts in the adjudication of their affairs.  After all, there was precedence in allowing the 
voluntary applicability of the Shari’a.  As the legal scholar Milan Bartoš argued in 1936, the 
French had set up a similar judicial system in Algeria where Muslims had the choice of choosing 
Shari’a or civil courts to adjudicate their family matters.  Bartoš insisted that the same 
arrangement was necessary in Yugoslavia in order to allow the Muslims of “liberal persuasions” 
to enjoy the equal protection of the law and for the purposes of “national unity.”129  However, 
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due to JMO’s influence in ensuring the passage of the government’s Constitution, Shari’a courts 
became obligatorily applicable in family affairs of Yugoslavia’s Muslims.130 
 Although the Muslims of Yugoslavia were treated as a unified religious community the 
reality was that they had lived under separate legal systems for centuries and unifying them into 
a single Shari’a system would prove an insurmountable challenge for the Yugoslav government.  
According to the legal scholar Dragutin Tomac, the territory that came to comprise Yugoslavia 
in 1918 was composed of six different legal traditions, a legal nightmare “if one takes into 
account…the immense diversity of marriage laws which remained in effect in different areas of 
the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes even after the unification.”131  Although the 
majority of Muslims lived in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there were pockets of Muslim population 
spread throughout the country that had had little or no interaction with the Bosnia-based Shari’a 
judiciary.  In Croatia and Slavonia, where according to the 1922 census Muslims numbered some 
2495 people, there were no Shari’a courts until 1929 and although the imam of Zagreb was 
promoted to the rank of mufti in 1922 and authorized to officiate Muslim marriages132, his 
relationship with Sarajevo remained tenuous and at times contentious.133  Dalmatia had no 
Shari’a courts and the few Muslims who lived there were under the jurisdiction of civil courts.  
Finally, in the southern Serbian region, the Muslims resolved their family matters in Shari’a 
courts run by muftis who in 1922 were subordinated to the Belgrade mufti.  Karčić argues that 
many muftis were poorly educated and often unfamiliar with the Shari’a.134  It was because of the 
dearth of Shari’a institutions in these areas that the countrywide Shari’a judiciary was to be 
heavily based on the Bosnian model. 
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 Although the Vidovdan constitution was adopted in 1921, the government would attempt 
to create a countrywide Shari’a system only in 1929 when King Aleksandar Karadjordjević 
abolished parliamentary democracy and proclaimed dictatorship.  The implementation of Article 
109, mandating the creation of such courts, went hand in hand with King’s attempt to centralize 
his power in order to end a decade-long parliamentary gridlock, which culminated with the 
assassination of the Croat Peasant Party leader Stjepan Radić in 1928 on the floor of the 
Yugoslav Assembly.  The “Law on the Organization of Shari’a courts and Shari’a judges,” (ZŠS) 
of 21. III 1929 was heavily based on the 1883 Austro-Hungarian Directive which had legitimized 
the jurisdiction of the Shari’a over the Muslims, but this time, this jurisdiction would be 
extended to all of Yugoslavia’s Muslims.  The law created district Shari’a courts in every 
municipality with at least 5,000 Muslims.  Each district Shari’a court would be under the 
jurisdiction of one of the two Supreme Shari’a courts—in Sarajevo and Skoplje—which would 
serve as the appellate courts for all the cases disputed at the local level.  The Supreme Shari’a 
courts would have at least three judges who would have the authority to issue opinions on the 
appeals to cases decided at district courts and inspect the work of district Shari’a judges.  All 
Shari’a judges were nominated by the Minister of Justice and confirmed by the King and as such 
their opinions were always issued “in the name of the King,” which was highly unusual given 
that the Shari’a was seen as Revelation rather than human law and judges had always ruled “in 
the name of Allah.”  In addition, Shari’a judges were state officials and were paid by the state’s 
Treasury.   
 At the same time, however, Shari’a courts were far from secular: they operated according 
to Islamic jurisprudence (kitab fiqh) of the Hanafi school of thought, they had the jurisdiction 
over marriage and inheritance matters of Muslims only and were entrusted with regulating 
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Muslim endowments (waqfs).  Because Shari’a law was extremely specialized, decisions of 
Shari’a judges could not be reviewed by secular state judges who were still obligated to carry 
them out because it was the civil courts who were authorized to implement the decisions of the 
Shari’a courts.  The ambiguous role of the Shari’a in the new state reflected the tension between 
King’s desire to centralize political power and set the ground for the emergence of a Yugoslav 
nationality on the one hand, and his acknowledgment of the Shari’a legacy among the Muslim 
population on the other.135  In the words of the Shari’a scholar Mehmed Begović, “our state 
could adopt neither the system of separation of religion from the state or the merging of one 
religion with the state, but it has instead determined to have each religious community 
independently administer its own affairs under the supervision of the state.”136 
 By the time the cases that are discussed below reached the Sarajevo Supreme Shari’a 
court in the early 1930s, the Muslim establishment—the Shari’a judiciary, the Islamic clergy, 
and the JMO politicians—was still largely based in Bosnia.  The Sarajevo Supreme Shari’a court 
was run by two influential Bosnian Shari’a judges, Ibrahim Šarić and Abdullah Bušatlić both of 
whom were appointed by the King in 1929, replacing two previous justices whom the King did 
not consider sufficiently loyal to the Yugoslav state.137  Further, every Reis-ul-ulema appointed 
during the interwar period, including the most influential one Džemaludin Čaušević, hailed from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.  In addition, most of the founding members and representatives of the JMO 
were Bosnian, including its president Mehmed Spaho.  The Bosnian orientation of the JMO was 
evident in their negotiations with the Serbian Radicals in 1921 when besides demanding the 
preservation of the Shari’a, the JMO also insisted that the administrative division of Yugoslavia 
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not violate the territorial contiguity of Bosnia-Herzegovina.138  The historian of the JMO Atif 
Purivatra has argued that the party spoke mostly on behalf of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s Muslims, 
fought for their equal treatment in relation to the other ethnic groups, and strove to preserve the 
territorial indivisibility of Bosnia’s historic borders.  Purivatra claims that JMO’s activities 
encouraged “the entrenchment of Muslim national specificity.”139  As the Yugoslav state 
weakened following King Aleksandar’s assassination in 1934 and the disillusionment with the 
Yugoslav project became widespread amongst the Muslim elites, the Shari’a courts were 
mobilized by these elites to draw the contours of the Bosnian Muslim national identity. 
Policing Religious Indifference, Imagining a Nation 
 During the first half of the 1930s, the Supreme Shari’a court in Sarajevo (VŠS) became 
embroiled in a contentious dispute with the rest of the Islamic community—the clergy, lower 
level Shari’a judges, Ulema medžlis and Reis-ul-ulema—over the extent to which the behavior of 
Muslims, whom they perceived to be religiously indifferent, should be policed.   Religious 
officials mostly from mixed areas in Bosnia and Croatia petitioned the highest court to intervene 
in those mixed marriages where Muslims had shown indifference to the wellbeing of their 
community by violating Shari’a rules.  The identity of children in mixed marriages and the 
increasing practice of Muslims intermarrying in churches alarmed these officials because they 
saw them as representative of a larger crisis of Muslim identity.  Insisting that Muslim identity 
was threatened in the multi-confessional environment of Yugoslavia, these petitions pled with 
the highest Shari’a court to set firmer parameters of permissible behavior for ordinary Muslims.  
As it was presided over by the regime loyalist and influential Shari’a scholar Abdulah Bušatlić, 
the court not only refused to get involved, citing lack of jurisdiction, but it scolded the lower 
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level officials for being too intrusive.  In his responses, Bušatlić ignored the aspects of the 
Shari’a which the individuals had violated and instead gave precedence to state law in 
maintaining inter-confessional peace in the country.  His laissez faire attitude toward mixed 
marriage coupled with his activities as a member of the circle of religious reformers, which 
Fikret Karčić has termed “religious modernists,”140 reveals the emergence of a more secular 
understanding of what it meant to be Muslim. 
 Although mixed marriage remained rare throughout the interwar period, by the early 
1930s there was a consensus amongst most of the Islamic elites that the practice had been 
growing, particularly in areas where Muslims were a minority.  According to a study by the 
demographer Vera Urlich, in 1931 in the region under the jurisdiction of the Sarajevo Ulema 
medžlis there were 8,166 Muslim marriages and only 102 mixed marriages all of which were 
between Muslim men and non-Muslim women.141  However, according to Zlatko Hasanbegović 
in areas like the Croatian capital of Zagreb, where there was a significant Muslim minority 
population, until 1940 mixed marriages comprised more than half of all Muslim marriages.142  
Even though the 1921 Vidovdan Constitution mandated that all Muslim marriages in the region 
be officiated in accordance with Shari’a, Hasanbegović argues that many Muslims in the Zagreb 
region intermarried in Catholic churches and had their children registered as Catholics.143   
 By 1937, mixed marriages had become common enough in the Herzegovina region to 
prompt the Trebinje Shari’a judge Abdulah Škaljić to write a letter to the Association of Shari’a 
judges, warning that the cases of Muslim men marrying non-Muslim women were “multiplying 
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rapidly” particularly among the Muslim intelligentsia.144  The judge claimed that in ninety 
percent of these marriages children were baptized at the insistence of their Christian mothers and 
the acquiescence of their Muslim fathers.  Because the state law circumscribed the jurisdiction of 
Shari’a courts over mixed marriage children the mothers could raise them as Christians if the 
fathers agreed and most often, the judge insisted, they did.  Consequently, in most of these 
marriages the men had become “indifferent towards Islam and estranged from the Muslim 
community…”145 Even more ominously, the judge warned, some mixed marriages were actually 
ways for Christians to proselytize and thus represented a “gloved assault” on Islam.  Škaljić 
insisted that mixed marriage was becoming more common even amongst educated Muslim 
women who were encouraged by the Shari’a tolerance of such practice amongst their male 
counterparts.  Stating that “with our indifference towards these practices we are making a big 
mistake,” Škaljić urged his colleagues to find some basis in Shari’a jurisprudence for banning all 
types of mixed marriage.146  Škaljić’s plea against the indifference of the Shari’a establishment 
came on the heels of a protracted resistance of the Sarajevo Supreme Shari’a court (VŠS) to the 
calls by lower level religious officials to intervene in mixed marriage cases. 
 The campaign against religious indifference started with the letter the Sarajevo Ulema 
medžlis passed on to the VŠS in December 1933, detailing complaints by a local imam regarding 
the identity of mixed marriage children in his town.  The imam from the Bosnian town of 
Bosanska Dubica, bordering Croatia, had written to the Zagreb mufti some two years earlier, 
asking for instructions on how to register the newborn from the marriage of Mehmed Ajvaz from 
Bosanska Dubica and Alojzija Černel from Zagreb who had wed in a Catholic church.  In 
another mixed marriage from the same town, the Muslim father had baptized his daughter Nela 
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who had continued to attend Catholic catechism classes even after the passing of her Catholic 
mother.  These cases proved alarming to the Zagreb mufti because he passed the letter to Ulema 
medžlis of Sarajevo, which in turn forwarded it to the Supreme Court.  In contrast to the alarmed 
tone of the religious officials at all levels, the highest Shari’a court refused to get involved.  In its 
opinion, dated 13 January 1934, the justices argued that both of these cases dealt with the proper 
upkeep of Islamic birth records, an area that was out of the court’s jurisdiction.  In terms of 
determining the validity of the church-officiated marriage between Mehmed and Alojzija, the 
court instructed the imam to conduct a hearing, but only if the husband insisted and “not at the 
order of this court as it is assumed.”147 The decision thus seemed to suggest that the applicability 
of the Shari’a was voluntary. 
 The issue was far from settled.  Not even two months after the court had rebuffed the plea 
of the Bosanska Dubica imam, it received a letter from a Shari’a judge in the Herzegovinian 
town of Trebinje.  The letter by judge Kulenović, originally addressed to the Zagreb mufti, 
concerned a local Muslim woman by the name of Almasa who had married a Catholic in a 
Zagreb church.  The judge wondered if by marrying in accordance with Catholic rituals Almasa 
had not committed apostasy.  The question of her identity became particularly important after her 
father Zaim had passed away and, because he had been married to a Serb woman who had no 
inheritance rights, she stood to inherit his property.  The mufti of Zagreb, under whose 
jurisdiction the marriage was officiated, could not confirm that Almasa had left Islam, but he 
insisted that the Supreme Shari’a court had to clarify whether or not Muslim women who 
violated Shari’a marriage rules by marrying non-Muslim men could still be considered Muslim.  
Acknowledging that this type of marriage was still rare, the mufti branded it “a great sin because 
they subject themselves to a non-Islamic ritual and willingly accept to baptize their 
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children…”148 Considering the matter urgent he passed on the case to the Sarajevo Ulema 
medžlis, ensuring that it would reach the Supreme court.  Following the precedent set by the 
earlier decision, the Supreme Court once again refused to get involved, but this time criticized 
the petitioner, judge Kulenović, for failing to hold a hearing, which would determine Almasa’s 
inheritance rights: 
 If there was ever a question of Almasa’s right to inherit the property of Zaim 
 Šehović from Trebinje and it was stated that she may have converted to another 
 faith, as it is suggested by these letters, why did this court fail to follow the 
 proper procedure (inheritance dispute hearing) and give an opinion on the basis 
 of this procedure, but has incorrectly petitioned the aforementioned authorities 
 instead of asking this court for instructions?149 
 
 But the reason judge Kulenović did not hold an inheritance hearing was because there 
was no dispute to be resolved.  As he admitted in his response to the court’s opinion, “Almasa 
did not ask for inheritance of her father Šehović Zaim nor did the other inheritors contest her 
right and because of this there was no inheritance hearing as there was no dispute.”150  Instead, 
the judge began to investigate the matter “out of [his] own interest,” and the Zagreb mufti had 
confirmed that there were no procedures in place to deal with such cases.  The court’s continuing 
refusal to get involved further inflamed the tempers of the clergy, triggering an intervention of 
the Reis-ul-ulema himself. 
 The indifference of the Supreme Shari’a court prompted the Ulema medžlis to write to the 
Grand Mufti, Reis-ul-ulema Ibrahim Maglajlić, in which they urged him to appeal to the 
Supreme Court to intervene more forcefully in such marriages. Medžlis justified the concerns of 
the Zagreb mufti regarding the increasing practice of Muslim women intermarrying with Catholic 
men by reminding the Grand Mufti that “…marriage is one of the most important Islamic 
                                                 
148 Ibid., 2. 
149 VŠS, 167/1934, emphasis mine. 
150 VŠS , 49/1933. 
 
 
 
61
institutions because it also gives direction to entire religious communities and because these 
kinds of marriages could become much more widespread, which is not in the interest of the 
Islamic community…”151 In preventing this domino effect, the Zagreb mufti suggested that there 
was precedent in Islam for punishing these women by treating them as bandits (eskije) and 
refusing them a proper Islamic burial, effectively excommunicating them posthumously.  
Because the Sarajevo medžlis dealt with at least ten percent of such cases, the refusal of both 
Supreme Shari’a courts, in Sarajevo and Skoplje, “to give any opinion whatsoever on the merit 
of [mufti’s] proposal,”152 could lead the clergy to issue opinions that were at odds with those of 
Shari’a courts.  
 The decisions of the Sarajevo and Skoplje Supreme Shari’a courts—which the Ulema 
medžlis passed on to the Grand Mufti—reveal the delicate balance the jurists had to maintain 
between their roles as state employees, who were obligated to uphold the state law, and Shari’a 
judges entrusted with ensuring the implementation of Allah’s law.  The Skoplje court argued that 
because the mufti’s request that Almasa be excommunicated was of “a purely religious 
character,” it could not issue opinions on the matter because it was a state court.  The Sarajevo 
Supreme court went even further in arguing that it would be up to relevant district Shari’a courts 
to deal with all the cases outlined by the mufti on the basis of precedent set by Islamic 
jurisprudence (kitab fiqh), which sufficiently covered the issues raised.  For its part, the court 
could not issue a blanket opinion on either the Muslim identity of these individuals or the 
validity of their church officiated marriages because it had no jurisdiction in these matters.  Both 
Sarajevo and Skoplje courts referenced the Article 2, s.1 of the “Law on the Organization of 
Shari’a courts,” (1929) which stated that Shari’a courts had jurisdiction only over those 
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marriages in which both husband and wife were Muslim or if the marriage had been concluded in 
front of a Shari’a judge or a person authorized by a Shari’a court.  Implying that it may agree 
with the mufti’s concern regarding these marriages, the Sarajevo court suggested that the Ulema 
could lobby the government for a law that would authorize Shari’a judges to declare church-
officiated marriages of Muslims null and void.  But until that became the state law, there was 
nothing else to be done.153    
However, after it received a personal appeal of the Reis-ul-ulema to change its ruling in 
this case, the Sarajevo court wrote a blistering opinion which showed a much more profound 
disagreement between the judges and the clergy over the extent to which the Shari’a could police 
mixed marriages.  In its response, dated 21 June 1934, the Sarajevo Supreme Shari’a court 
reiterated its previous stance that it had no jurisdiction in this matter and for the first time, it 
explicitly stated that church-officiated marriages of Muslims were not necessarily invalid: 
This court stands by its original opinion because the marriages which Muslim 
men conclude with non-Muslim women in churches, as well as the so-called civil 
marriages, are not automatically legally invalid because the legality of a marriage 
is determined not by the place where it is concluded or what kind of religious 
ceremony marks it but whether or not they [the spouses] meet the suprutun and 
erkani nikah.154 
 
 Thus, the legality of a Muslim marriage was not determined by where it was concluded, 
but rather if the material (suprutun) and formal (erkani) conditions were met.  The material 
conditions the judges outlined were: the spouses have to be of the opposite sex and cannot be 
related; the woman has to be single at the time of marriage and if she has been divorced she has 
to wait for the period of three menstruation cycles in order to be eligible for another marriage 
(iddet); at the time of his marriage, the husband may already have up to three wives as Shari’a 
allows for the maximum of four wives; they both have to be of good moral standing.   The erkani 
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nikah are the formalities surrounding the marriage ceremony: both spouses have to declare their 
voluntary intent to marry; they have to present the presiding Shari’a judge with their ilmi haber, 
or personal information sheet issued by their local imam155; marriage has to be concluded in the 
presence of two witnesses; the husband has to agree to the amount of dowry (mehr) he offers his 
wife; and the marriage has to be concluded in front of a Shari’a judge who has to register the 
marriage in the Islamic marriage registry of the district in which the newlyweds reside.  The last 
condition is not expressly required by the Shari’a, and marriage can be concluded without the 
presence of a judge, but the Sarajevo Supreme Shari’a court ruling of 20 February 1919 
mandated that Shari’a judges preside over marriages, which then had to be officially 
registered.156  What the opinion curiously did not mention, however, was that the difference in 
the religion of the spouses could be a potential obstacle to a Muslim marriage. 
 The court’s silence on this issue is particularly surprising if one takes into account 
Shari’a’s unfavorable view of mixed marriage.  The Shari’a scholar Ibrahim Džananović states 
that the consensus (ijtihad) of all the schools of the Shari’a is unequivocal in forbidding Muslim 
women from intermarrying, but does allow Muslim men to intermarry with women who belong 
to one of the Judeo-Christian religions and are thus considered to be the “people of the book.”  In 
fact, some Shari’a jurists, such as Wahbah Al-Zuhayli, argued that Muslim women who married 
non-Muslim men automatically committed apostasy, a sin punishable by death.157  The court’s 
statement made no mention of these types of mixed marriages despite the fact that these were at 
the heart of mufti’s concerns.  Instead, the court focused only on the mixed marriages Islam 
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allows, those between Muslim men and Christian women.  Some scholars like Džananović have 
suggested that even those mixed marriages Islam tolerates it does so grudgingly.  For example, 
some Shari’a jurists looked at the behavior of Second Caliph Umar ibn al-Khattab (ruled from 
590-644) who excoriated his followers for marrying Christian and Jewish women to argue that 
this type of mixed marriage, while not a sin, is still makruh, an act that is seen as repulsive.158  
That the decision showed the Shari’a court’s deference to the state is not as surprising as the fact 
that by the second half of the decade the court would show much more boldness in giving 
precedence to the Shari’a over state law. 
 For now, however, the unusual bluntness of the Sarajevo court in refusing to intrude into 
the daily life of Muslims revealed a fundamental disagreement between the jurists and the clergy 
over Muslim identity.  In the same letter to Reis Maglajlić the court dismissed mufti’s concerns 
about the baptism of children from mixed marriage arguing that it “has no importance 
whatsoever because [the Muslim father] can petition the relevant Shari’a court to register his 
children into the Muslim registry.”159  That is, if these children happened to have already been 
registered in the baptismal records of the Catholic church, the father could petition the court and 
have them deleted and their names entered into Muslim records because Shari’a courts—and by 
extension, the state—would consider the father to be the children’s main guardian.  In other 
words, the courts should not meddle into the private lives of Muslims unless individuals 
themselves petitioned for arbitration.  The sharpest rebuke of the clergy’s concerns came in the 
court’s response to the mufti’s suggestion that Muslim women who intermarried could be treated 
as bandits and denied Islamic burials.  After providing several passages in Arabic to prove 
mufti’s claims were not based in Islamic jurisprudence, the Supreme justices ended the letter 
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with a blunt warning to treat fellow Muslims with greater care: “Thus, not having established 
that irtidad [apostasy] had occurred [in these cases] one cannot simply tell a Muslim he is no 
longer a Muslim and treat him like a murtad [one who has left Islam].  In fact, in these cases a 
great caution is necessary.”160  Curiously, these last two sentences were crossed out possibly 
because of their unusually sharp tone, but are still legible.  These sentences represent the 
culmination of the tension between the clergy and the jurists over mixed marriage, dating back to 
at least the beginning of the decade. 
 It is my contention that the sharp rebuke of the Sarajevo Supreme Shari’a court to the 
clergy was rooted in the fundamental disagreement between the chief justice of the court 
Abdulah Bušatlić and the clerical establishment in Bosnia over Muslim identity.  Although the 
historian Zlatko Hasanbegović ascribes this dispute to the jurisdictional competition of the courts 
and the disagreement over the Shari’a marriage rules,161 the unequivocal stance of the latter 
towards mixed marriage points to a much more profound cultural gap between the two branches 
of the Muslim establishment.   
 Born in the small Bosnian town of Vlasenica in 1871, Abdulah Bušatlić graduated from 
the school for Shari’a judges in Sarajevo and served as a district judge in Sanski Most, Foča, and 
Sarajevo before becoming nominated to the Supreme Shari’a court by King Aleksandar 
Karadjordjević in 1929.162  It will be remembered that Bušatlić was appointed to the bench in the 
wake of King’s proclamation of dictatorship in January 1929 as a part of the judicial team, which 
the King considered unwaveringly loyal to the Yugoslav state.163  By the time he assumed this 
prestigious post he had earned a reputation as a respected Shari’a scholar and a member of the 
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reformist circle, which Fikret Karčić has termed “religious modernists.”  According to Karčić, 
the religious modernists occupied a middle ground in the growing cultural war in the interwar 
Bosnia between the liberal pro-Western Muslim intelligentsia (secular modernists) and the 
conservative clerics or the ulema (the traditionalists).  The cultural war escalated during the 
interwar period as the secular modernists clamored for reforming the religious life of Bosnia’s 
Muslims with the purpose of ridding them of supposedly backward characteristics and 
integrating them into the Yugoslav and European society.  Inspired by Kemal Ataturk’s 
transformation of Turkey, and overlooking the fact that Ataturk had completely replaced the 
Shari’a with the Swiss Civil Code, the secularists argued that the Shari’a had to be reinterpreted 
in accommodating the needs of modern Muslim society and they advocated a series of reforms 
that would stir the Muslims out of their stagnation: the unveiling and education of Muslim 
women, the spread of literacy amongst Muslims, and a “national awakening” of the Muslims so 
that they saw Yugoslavia as their homeland.164  On the other side of the cultural spectrum were 
the religious traditionalists, mostly represented by the clergy, who branded their secularist 
opponents Kemalists and Communists and saw the unveiling and education of women or any 
meddling with the immutable Shari’a law as an assault on Islam.165  Karčić claims that the 
religious modernists represented the middle way in this cultural war, but I argue that the writings 
and decisions of Abdullah Bušatlić—one of their most known representatives—reveal the 
emergence of a more secular understanding of Muslim identity even amongst Shari’a officials. 
 Bušatlić’s blunt reprimand of the clerical establishment echoed his more general 
disillusionment with the clergy whom he blamed for the cultural stagnation of the Muslims.  
Before he became the chief justice of the Sarajevo Shari’a court, Bušatlić threw himself 
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passionately into the reformist campaign to wrestle the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina out of 
their supposed backwardness.  In his 1928 manifesto of the program for the prosperity of the 
Muslims he stated the root cause of this backwardness: “The Muslims of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina are wandering around without a compass or a specific path towards prosperous life.  
Excessive conservatism layered with fanaticism keeps us from going forward.”166  He was 
unequivocal as to who should be blamed for this state of affairs: “Hodžas are most responsible 
for our backwardness because in all of our long history they have not been able to understand 
their heavy responsibilities of providing modern education to our people.”167  According to 
Bušatlić, because the hodžas lacked modern education and even what they knew they taught in 
Turkish and Arabic, instead of the native language, they left ordinary Muslims unable to 
understand even the basic tenets of Islam.  For their lack of higher education, the clerics—or the 
ulema—often compensated by disseminating all kinds of superstitions, which were based on 
their instincts rather than Islamic teaching.  As a result, the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
remained conservative and resistant to change.  Bušatlić also placed some blame on “our 
Western educated intelligentsia,” who instead of “teaching us what we need to do in order to 
move forward with the rest of the West” had become estranged from the people, too prone to 
alcoholism and too quick to enter into mixed marriages.168  This brief criticism of the 
intelligentsia notwithstanding, it was the clerical establishment of Bosnia-Herzegovina who took 
the brunt of Bušatlić’s withering criticism. 
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 That Bušatlić’s main target were the clerics is clear because the occasion for him writing 
the pamphlet was a clash that had erupted between Reis-ul-ulema Džemaludin Čaušević and the 
conservative clerics a few months earlier.  Even though in his position as the Reis, Čaušević was 
the head of the entire clerical establishment he was one of the most prominent religious 
reformers who ever since coming to the position in 1914 had campaigned for the education of all 
Muslims, including women, and the teaching of Islam in the native language, the undertaking 
which culminated with his translation of the Qur’an in 1937.169   
 The controversy erupted when upon his return from Turkey in 1927, the Reis gave a 
speech to a gathering of Muslim intellectuals in the Gajret newspaper offices and later to the 
daily Politika in which he praised Kemal Ataturk’s reforms, suggesting that the changes in the 
Muslim way of life Ataturk had instituted could also be adopted in Yugoslavia.  In particular, he 
argued that the Shari’a was not opposed to the unveiling of women or the donning of the felt hats 
by Muslim men and he called for the changes in the ways the vakufs (Muslim charity 
endowments) were administered.  He declared that it would have been better if Muslim women 
were allowed to work in public spaces than to stay closed up at home under the veil.  Although 
he also criticized the Muslim Western-educated intelligentsia for becoming estranged from the 
people, his statement provoked a fury from the clerics and approvals from the intellectuals.  In a 
series of publications following the speech, many respected traditionalists criticized the Reis for 
overstepping the boundaries of his position and for ignoring the sacred Islamic texts, which 
according to them, unequivocally mandated the veiling of women.   
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The reaction of the traditionalists culminated with the demand of the Sarajevo medžlis 
and the JMO (Yugoslav Muslim Organization) that the Reis either withdraw his statements or 
resign.  In order to quiet the storm, the Islamic election council (Islamska izborna kurija) issued 
a declaration which, signed by twenty-nine Islamic scholars from Bosnia-Herzegovina, was to 
present a unified stance of the Islamic establishment on the matter.  The declaration warned the 
Muslims to live their lives in accordance with the Shari’a, as interpreted by the original jurists, 
excoriated Čaušević for expressing his personal opinion while in his public role as the Reis-ul-
ulema and rejected his plea to reform the vakuf administration.  On the particular issue of the 
unveiling of Muslim women, the council took what Karčić argues was “a partially compromising 
stance,” in allowing women to uncover their faces and wrists in front of strangers only if they 
could be sure that this would not stir up passions in which case the Shari’a mandated that they 
completely cover themselves.  Reis Čaušević accepted the declaration, noting that it did not 
contradict his initial claim that the Shari’a did not mandate the veiling of women.170  For 
Bušatlić, who was one of the first Shari’a jurists to stand by Čaušević, the declaration did not 
settle the matter and he felt compelled to write his manifesto titled On the Question of the 
Muslim advancement in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Regarding the well-known statements by Reis-
ul-ulema and the others (A few honest and straightforward words).   
 In the manifesto, Bušatlić made it clear that the religious revival of the Bosnian Muslims 
was inextricably bound up with their national revival, a point suggested by the title, which makes 
explicit the fact that Bušatlić’s concern was not with the Muslims as a (worldwide) religious 
community, but with the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The program for the spiritual and 
material betterment of the Muslims included: the general education of young men and women 
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“in accordance with the spirit of the times,”171; the religious education of men and women but in 
accordance with “sound reason and the spirit of the times,”; the eradication of superstitions, bad 
habits, and customs that “impeded progress,”; the extinction of laziness amongst the youth; the 
fight against alcohol and lewd behaviors; the promotion of modest lifestyle; and lastly, “work 
towards nationalizing our people to convince them that they are an indigenous element in these 
regions in order to steer them into the circle of the civilized world where they can be dedicated to 
their own progress in their national fatherland…”172  That Bušatlić’s program of religious revival 
included nationalization of the Bosnian Muslims was in keeping with “the spirit of the times” 
when Wilsonian national self-determination became the litmus test of progress.  In the aftermath 
of World War I the “circle of the civilized world” into which Bušatlić wanted to steer his people 
had been rearranged from empires into nation-states and to join, one had to become a citizen of a 
national homeland.  Judging from his appointment by the Yugoslav King to the Supreme Court 
just a year after he wrote this, when he spoke of a national fatherland Bušatlić probably had 
Yugoslavia in mind.  During his tenure as the supreme justice of the Sarajevo Shari’a court, 
Bušatlić would tweak the Shari’a law in making the Muslims fit into this fatherland.   
 Smoothing the edges of the Shari’a in fitting the Muslim identity into a secular state 
motivated Bušatlić’s opinions on some of the most controversial questions surrounding the status 
of the Muslims in Yugoslavia.  In his forceful defense of Reis Čaušević’s statements Bušatlić 
cited the famous Egyptian Islamic reformist Mufti Muhammad Abduh to argue that the sacred 
texts, the Qur’an and the Hadith, did not mandate the wearing of the feredža, a full veil, for 
women and the fez for men, but that these were customs made obligatory by ancient scholars.  
Insisting that “[l]aws change according to the spirit of the times,” Bušatlić agreed with the Reis 
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that the Muslim women of Bosnia-Herzegovina should be allowed to work without the veil in 
public places while men could wear the felt hat.173  Although in this case the specific religious 
obligations were truly contested by Shari’a scholars, even on issues where Shari’a laws and the 
sacred texts were clearer Bušatlić often gave precedence to the state law.   
 For example, a few years earlier he had weighed in on the increasing practice of the so-
called speculative conversions whereby non-Muslim men converted to Islam in order to either 
obtain a divorce or marry more than one wife.  Acknowledging that the Shari’a marriage rules 
clearly mandated that a non-Muslim marriage in which one spouse converted to Islam and the 
other refused would immediately become null and void, he argued that these rules had to be 
readjusted in a multi-confessional state such as Yugoslavia.  He argued that Shari’a judges could 
safely ignore these rules and refuse to annul these marriages for the sake of stability:  
Because it is far more important to maintain religious tolerance between the 
citizens of the multi-confessional state like ours than allow certain individuals to 
stir up religious antagonism and hatred by converting from one faith to another all 
with the purpose of dissolving or entering into marriages.174   
 
 In regards to polygamy, another controversial question plaguing the young country, 
Bušatlić once again argued that it was acceptable for judges to ignore the Shari’a rule, which 
allowed Muslim men to have up to four wives, and refuse to approve polygamous marriages 
because “this is a very uncomfortable matter.”175  Finally, during the debate on how to reform the 
practice of the talaq—the right of a husband to initiate divorce without having to provide a 
reason—Bušatlić pointed to the Shari’a reform in Egypt in suggesting that this right be extended 
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to women who wanted to escape unbearable marriages, a proposal that never became the law.176  
A prominent voice in advocating the preservation of Shari’a courts in Yugoslavia he nevertheless 
acknowledged the limits of their jurisdiction in the secular state.  Thus, he warned the Shari’a 
courts to always “be careful of their jurisdiction and as soon as they determine their lack of 
jurisdiction in a certain case they need to immediately issue a directive and never take into 
consideration cases that do not come under their jurisdiction.”177  But as his opinions on 
polygamy, speculative conversions, and talaq show he was also ready to limit this jurisdiction 
for the sake of the inter-religious harmony in the country.  For Bušatlić the Shari’a was not an 
immutable, universal law that could be applied equally across societies, but rather a constantly 
evolving system that had to be continuously readjusted to fit the specific national circumstances 
and “the spirit of the times.” 
  It is my contention that in the process of tweaking the Shari’a in order to fit the Muslims 
more comfortably into the Yugoslav state Bušatlić articulated an increasingly secular 
understanding of Muslim identity. His blunt warning to the Zagreb mufti and the Sarajevo Ulema 
medžlis to treat Muslims with care suggested that Muslimness was something that could not be 
taken away from an individual just because they violated a Shari’a rule.  More specifically, the 
Muslim women who married Catholic men in Catholic ceremonies, which included the 
acceptance of the Holy Trinity, could not have their Muslimness revoked by a court.  That 
Bušatlić did not consider the individual’s knowledge of his religious obligations as the 
determining factor of his identity becomes clear in his 1931 reprimand of the Travnik district 
court for testing Muslims on their knowledge of certain prayers before granting them marriage 
licenses: “For a marriage to be legal it is enough for a spouse to present himself to the court with 
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the statement that he is a Muslim because every, even the most sinful Muslim still believes in 
God, the Prophet, etc even though he doesn’t know how to recite the prayers…Therefore, the 
court is urged not to create unnecessary difficulties for petitioners.”178  The assumption that even 
the most sinful Muslim would still believe in God and the Prophet was quite remarkable because 
it suggested Muslimness as one’s birthright rather than a voluntary identity expressed and 
maintained through a highly structured and ritualized adherence to the tenets of Islam.  In short, 
it suggested a secular as opposed to religious identity. 
 Abdulah Bušatlić’s resistance to policing religious indifference did not reflect the views 
of the entire Shari’a judiciary as the writings of his predecessor on the Sarajevo Supreme Shari’a 
Court, Ali Riza Prohić, confirm.  A prominent voice among the traditionalists, Ali Riza Prohić 
was removed from the bench in the wake of King’s dictatorship in 1929 and replaced by Bušatlić 
who was considered more loyal to the royalist regime.179  Writing two years after his 
replacement and at the time of the campaign against mixed marriage and in response to the 
proposals of Mehmed Begović, another prominent reformer, to reform the institutions of talaq 
and polygamy, Ali Riza Prohić insisted that the family life of Muslims “belonged under the 
category of unchangeable Muslim institutions.”180 Accusing Begović of erroneously translating 
the Qur’anic excerpts to support his blasphemous meddling with sacred Shari’a, Prohić argued 
that both talaq and polygamy were sacred Shari’a institutions that could not be changed.  In 
addition to pointing out that in the entire Hanafi jurisprudence there was no single instance 
where the right of divorce had been extended to the woman, he also defended polygamy stating 
that this was “the rational way in which marriage is allowed to fulfill its main duty: 
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reproduction.”181  He insisted that neither the Qur’an or the hadith supported Begović’s claim 
that the Shari’a allowed women to participate in public life, and even become judges, but instead 
mandated that they remain in the private sphere.  On the issue of the veil, Prohić listed the 
Qur’anic verses which, in his view, unequivocally required women to cover their entire bodies 
with the exception of their face and fists.  In speculating about the motive behind Begović’s 
reform proposals Prohić echoed the anxiety of other traditionalists who felt Islam to be under 
assault in Europe: 
I would like to believe that my acquaintance Dr. Begović is simply naïve and that 
he hasn’t gotten so corrupted that he would use the methods of Jesuits and 
Christian missionaries.  The latter peddle to our Muslims all kinds of books and 
journals in all languages in which they praise certain Islamic principles and 
institutions while inserting something to undermine the very foundations of 
Islam.182 
 
 While conceding that the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina belonged in Europe, Prohić 
criticized Begović and the intelligentsia for wanting to indiscriminately assimilate into the 
European cultural space, ignoring the fact that “the Muslim has a special mentality that stems 
from the very food which he eats.”183  Excoriating the Muslim intelligentsia for meddling in 
religious matters he warned against the corrupting influence of the same Europe that had 
supposedly produced nihilism, anarchism, socialism, and Communism.  Instead of Islam needing 
Europe, it was the European civilization that had to learn from Islam, according to Prohić: the 
spread of the institution of civil marriage in Europe, which resembled that of Shari’a marriage, 
the blossoming of the European temperance movement, and the need for morality education in 
European schools was all evidence that the Europe obsessed Muslim intelligentsia had gotten it 
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backwards.  He insisted that by wanting to uncritically adjust Islam to the European tradition of 
the Enlightenment the intelligentsia had exhibited a great deal of hubris:  
You have been mesmerized by the artificial sparkle of the European, or as some 
call it Christian civilization.  Those of you who have studied the works of 
European thinkers and philosophers like Schopenhauer, Goethe, Rousseau, 
Voltaire, etc have convinced yourselves that you have swallowed the wisdom of 
the entire world.  In the same way some have convinced themselves to know 
Islamic faith and have falsely given the impression that faith is reason…If for 
man’s salvation reason would be enough, the Qur’an would be unnecessary and 
those European scholars who think Muhammad was only a man with a great mind 
would be correct.184 
  
 The unique mentality of the Bosnian Muslims notwithstanding Prohić shared the 
reformers’ conviction that they could be integrated into the Yugoslav nation, but via a path that 
was quite different from the one proposed by judge Bušatlić: while the latter smoothed the edges 
of the Shari’a marriage rules to minimize inter-religious friction Prohić saw it essential that these 
edges be sharpened not only to ensure the survival of Islam, but also because it was Islam that 
made the Bosnian Muslims ideal candidates for Yugoslavia.  Responding to the oft-repeated 
accusation of Muslims’ extraterritorial loyalty to Turkey, Ali Riza Prohić reminded the critics 
that the Muslims had fought against the Turks whilst preserving their native “Yugoslav 
language,” and later joined the Serbs in resisting the Austro-Hungarian occupation.  The shared 
legacy of resistance against the common enemies showed the existence “of a strong feeling of 
bond between the brothers of two faiths and this feeling stems from one blood out of which 
comes nationality.”185  Expressing regret that the spread of Croat and Serb identities had stranded 
the Muslims between two unacceptable options, Prohić praised the King’s attempts to create a 
Yugoslav nation by fiat: 
Once they started propagating Serbianness and Croatianness you could hear on 
both sides the claims that one cannot be a good Serb if he is not an Eastern 
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Orthodox or a Croat without being a Catholic.  If you told even to the simplest 
Muslim that he is a turkuša…or an Arab he would get upset because he is a 
Bošnjak which is but a branch of Yugoslavism.  In the same manner he did not 
accept to be called either Serb or Croat because those words have a religious 
meaning.  Today I can safely claim that 80% of Muslims are undeclared regarding 
either of the two tribes.  This is why they feel so lucky that His Majesty 
proclaimed his wise Manifesto on 6 January 1929 in which he declares the 
ideology of Yugoslavism and renames the country Yugoslavia.186 
 
 While it may have been partially a nod to King’s censors at the height of his dictatorship, 
particularly given Prohić’s uneasy relationship with the regime, this unequivocal support for 
Yugoslavism revealed the consensus that had emerged between the different ideological 
spectrums of the Bosnian Muslim elites over the acceptability of Yugoslavia as a nation-state 
that could offer a shelter to the Muslims and protect them from being assimilated into the Serb or 
Croat identities.  His insistence that the Bosnian Muslims and Serbs shared the same blood 
echoed the view of his ideological opponent Bušatlić who as early as 1924 wrote of the Muslims 
as “one part of our people.”187  Prohić’s suggestion that the Bosnian Muslims were the kernel of 
the Yugoslav nation was similar to the one made by the JMO representative Sakib Korkut at a 
meeting of the Yugoslav Constitutional Assembly back in 1921 when he claimed that the 
Muslims had adopted Yugoslavism because they “have kept the marks of clean nationalism 
without being aware of their tribal name.”188  In other words, untarnished by the divisive Croat or 
Serb identities the Muslims were the ones most likely to accept Yugoslavia as their national 
homeland. 
 The consensus over Yugoslavia notwithstanding, it is clear that by the early 1930s there 
was a widespread agreement that the Bosnian Muslims constituted a distinct culturally specific 
group, making their relationship to the Yugoslav state tentative.  In other words, at the height of 
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King’s dictatorship, at the center of which was the creation of the Yugoslav nation, the reformers 
like Abdulah Bušatlić could use the perceived religious indifference of ordinary Muslims to 
smooth their way into the nation-state.  Aware of the Western gaze Bušatlić implored his 
conservative colleagues not to “act embarrassingly in front of the civilized world” but to resolve 
the social ills through reasoned debate and hard work.189  His readiness to tone down some 
aspects of the Shari’a in adjusting the social life of the Bosnian Muslims to the secular Yugoslav 
state unearthed the more secular understanding of Muslimness that was shared by his 
conservative detractors.  The latter ostensibly shared his allegiance to the state, but strove to 
police Muslims’ everyday allegiance to the Shari’a lest their specificity melt away in the 
multicultural environment that was Kingdom of Yugoslavia.  Once the state began to unravel 
during the second half of the 1930s the traditionalists gained the upper hand in their struggle with 
the reformers, seizing the Supreme Shari’a court in their effort to police religious discipline of 
Muslims. 
Conclusion 
 Rather than examining the extent to which mixed marriage was indeed a symptom of 
religious indifference, this chapter explored how this relatively marginal phenomenon became a 
center of the larger debate to define the Muslim identity in the early 1930s Bosnia-Herzegovina.  
In particular, the reluctance of the Supreme Shari’a Court in Sarajevo to more vigilantly police 
mixed marriage echoed the deeper institutional and ideological divisions within the Bosnian 
Muslim elites.  Anxious about being a part of a multi-religious and ostensibly secular country 
headed by a Serbian King, particularly given the ambivalent status of the Muslims in that 
country, the clerics and some local Shari’a judges saw the Shari’a as the safeguard of Muslim 
specificity.  Headed by a religious reformer and a regime loyalist, the Sarajevo Supreme Shari’a 
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Court shared the anxieties of the conservatives, but settled on a different remedy for smoothing 
the transition of Muslims into the new country.  Adopting the Orientalist language of 
backwardness the reformers strove to preserve Muslim specificity by adapting the Shari’a to the 
increasingly secular European space and by equipping the Muslims with the tools of European 
modernity.  But whether the safeguarding of Muslim specificity lay in the cementing or the 
loosening of the inter-confessional boundary, in their debate both reformers and conservatives 
delineated the existence of a biological Muslim specificity that echoed the national 
understanding of identity prevalent in interwar Europe. 
 However, as the discussion in the next chapter will show, while religious indifference 
may have been the charge levied against the Muslims in mixed marriages by religious 
authorities, pragmatism describes much more aptly their attitude towards the demands of 
nationhood.  As the Yugoslav state slowly unraveled following King Aleksandar’s assassination 
in 1934 the religious conservatives who had been previously out of favor with the royalist regime 
took over the Supreme Shari’a Court.  Amidst the mobilization of the elites of the other ethnic 
groups, the historic fragmentation of the Bosnian Muslim establishment gave way to greater 
homogenization, which allowed Islamic traditionalists to enforce their vision of Islamic identity.  
But the attitude of ordinary people to the sudden intrusion of Shari’a into their lives was anything 
but indifferent.  They resisted, acquiesced, evaded, and sometimes enthusiastically embraced the 
ideological script written by activists.  In short, at the time of general inter-ethnic polarization on 
the eve of World War II ordinary people could ill afford to stand “outside or on the margins”190 
of their community, to borrow Zahra’s phrase. 
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Chapter II 
The Ban on Mixed Marriage and the Unmaking of Yugoslavia 
 
“My father prostrates himself, my mother crosses herself, while I am turning into stone.” 
(Otac klanja, majka se krsti, a ja se kamenim) 
A Bosnian peasant saying 
Introduction  
 On 14 April 1938, Husein Kulenović Busovača, from the small northwestern Bosnian 
town of Bosanski Petrovac, was summoned to his district Shari’a court to answer for being 
indifferent to his religious obligations.  The presiding judge Ibišević later wrote to his superiors 
at the Supreme Shari’a court in Sarajevo that according to the “news spreading through the 
town,” and based on the testimony of “reliable persons,” after the death of his Catholic wife 
Sava, Husein had given up the custody over his three small children to his mother-in-law who 
was now raising them in the Catholic faith.  Reportedly, Husein had personally walked his 
children to the local parish where he had them converted to Catholicism.  The children were now 
living with their grandmother and their stepsister Mila, Sava’s daughter from her previous 
marriage to another Muslim, a man by the name of Muharem Vaizović.  Muharem seems to have 
been as careless about Islamic upbringing of his children as Husein having agreed with his wife 
to raise Mila as a Catholic.  As if to emphasize the tentative nature of Mila’s Christian identity, 
the judge used quotation marks around her name.  What especially concerned the judge was the 
sense that Husein and Muharem’s carelessness regarding their religious obligations seems to 
have been shared by many other inhabitants of Bosanski Petrovac. 
 Presenting the case as a symptom of widespread religious indifference in the town, the 
judge wrote of another instance in which Muslim children were baptized after the death of a 
parent.  Thus, after the passing of her Muslim husband, a Muslim woman by the name of Džehva 
took her two daughters, aged six and two, and moved in with an Eastern Orthodox (Serb) man.  
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Living as Slavko’s concubine, Džehva had given birth to his children while her two daughters 
from her previous marriage had become his servants.  What prompted the judge to write the 
letter was that everyone who had been aware of these cases “coldly got over it”: 
For all of the above mentioned sad and regrettable cases this court as soon as it 
found out, took all the necessary measures to negotiate with the citizens for these 
mistakes to be remedied to some extent, but given the fact that nobody, not even 
the relatives of these minors, wants to do anything about these cases, not even the 
office of the Imam, who knows about every case, so this court cannot undertake 
any remedy until it receives instructions. 
 
 At the hearing, Husein responded belligerently to what he saw as the court’s unjustified 
intrusion in his life and explained that his actions were motivated by pragmatism and not 
indifference.  According to the judge, Husein insisted that as a legitimate father of his children he 
“could raise them in any way he wants, that he does not have to answer for this to anyone given 
the fact that religion for him is a secondary matter…”  As to why he had given up his custody 
over them, Husein informed the court that by the time he married Sava he was already married 
with a Muslim woman by the name of Hašima with whom he had five children over the years.  
Even while Sava was alive her children lived with their maternal grandmother because Sava 
worked as an elementary school teacher in another village and lived separately from Husein.  
Thus, turning over the custody of these children to his former mother-in-law ensured that these 
children “would be raised well and at the same time, spare me huge expenses.”  Hinting that 
Hašima’s opposition to raising Sava’s children might have also influenced his decision, Husein 
insisted that if Sava’s children lived in his house “they could not be raised well because they do 
not come from the same mother.”  Asked where he would register the name of his youngest 
child, who was not even a month old at the time, Husein said that would depend upon his 
agreement with the mother-in-law who was insisting that he register all of his children with the 
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Catholic parish.191  For Husein religion might have been of “secondary importance,” but his 
former mother-in-law seems to have taken her religious obligations quite seriously. 
 Prior to the case of Husein Kulenović Busovača, the Sarajevo Supreme Shari’a court had 
received similar complaints from district Shari’a judges and local clergy about the reported 
religious apathy of Muslims, but this was the first time it agreed to intervene in such a matter.  In 
its ruling, issued on 29 May 1938, the Supreme Court instructed the Sarajevo Ulema-medžlis 
office—the main executive body of the Islamic community—to find a respectable Muslim 
citizen who could serve as a tutor to the children and to whom the children would be entrusted.  
After filing a lawsuit against the father, presumably for negligence, the tutor would then be 
authorized by the court to take the custody of Husein’s children and raise them in accordance 
with Islam.  Despite the acknowledgment that “it is doubtful if it is possible to find someone who 
would be willing to accept the responsibility of the aforementioned tutorship,”192 the court 
instructed the imam of Bosanski Petrovac to search for a suitable tutor who would then wrestle 
the children out of their grandmother’s custody via a custody lawsuit at the local court.  The 
Supreme Court warned, however, that the proper legal procedure had to be followed in order to 
avoid inflaming the inter-religious relations in the town. The opinion was a clear acceptance of 
Ibišević’s concern that Husein’s transgression of the inter-religious boundary between Bosanski 
Petrovac’s communities represented not an isolated obstinacy of one individual or even one 
family, but that it was rather a symptom of a town-wide religious apathy and as such, a threat to 
the cohesiveness of the Muslim community. 
 What makes this case an illustrative prologue to the following story is that it pithily 
encapsulates the sudden intrusion of the Shari’a into everyday life during the second half of the 
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1930s.  That the district judge was concerned about the religious apathy of the local Muslim 
population, and Husein Kulenović’s mixed marriage in particular, is not as remarkable as the 
Supreme Shari’a Court’s agreement with his alarming assessment and the consequent 
intervention in Husein’s family matters.  As the previous chapter has shown, during the early 
part of the decade, the Sarajevo Supreme Shari’a Court had been inundated with similar requests 
by local clerics and jurists to police religiously irreverent behavior of Muslims, but had refused 
to intervene.  Once its refusal triggered the intervention of the higher religious officials, 
including the Reis-ul-ulema, the Supreme Court’s initial justification for not getting involved on 
jurisdictional grounds gave way to a much more profound disagreement with the clerics over the 
extent to which the Shari’a should be used to police religious devoutness.  By the time Husein’s 
case reached the court in 1938, however, the court had undergone an ideological transformation 
as the reformist justices were replaced by conservatives who would prove willing to use the 
Shari’a in a more muscular manner to ensure that the Muslims did not trespass across the 
increasingly rigid (and national) inter-confessional boundary.  The greater intrusion into mixed 
marriages was a symptom of the homogenization of the Bosnian Islamic elites—most evident in 
the smoothing of the historic tension between the clergy and the jurists—amidst the more general 
deterioration of interethnic relations in Bosnia on the eve of World War II.  Just as the reformers 
had ignored some aspects of Shari’a jurisprudence in order to mold the Muslims into Yugoslav 
citizens, the conservatives would also tinker with the Shari’a, but for quite the opposite reason: 
to wrestle the Bosnian Muslims out of the embrace of the disintegrating Yugoslav state.   
 The opening anecdote also illustrates that religious devoutness was not endemic to the 
elites.  For Husein religion was “of secondary importance,” as he put it, but his Catholic mother-
in-law’s insistence that his children be baptized and the misgivings of his Muslim wife about 
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raising the children he had with Sava suggest that Husein’s religious apathy may have been 
rather unusual.  Elaborating on this point, the second part of the chapter argues that concerns 
about religious indifference animated many ordinary Muslims at the time of mufti’s ban on 
mixed marriage in late 1938.  While there is no doubt that religious identity had played a 
significant role in social life of Bosnians for centuries, the late 1930s witnessed a flurry of frantic 
attempts to reorganize daily life around religious obligations.  In the letters they wrote to the 
Reis-ul-ulema many Bosnians agonized over their failure to live up to the standards Islam had set 
for them and asked for assistance in becoming better Muslims.  After spending years of living 
amongst Christians many Muslims, most of who were state officials, begged the mufti to use his 
influence in getting them transferred to Muslim areas of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Living in a 
Christian town had become tantamount to “a life of silence” for one woman while a railway clerk 
confessed to having fallen into “an emotional depression” from having to watch his frail mother 
remain holed up in her home.  Religious devoutness also energized many parents to investigate 
the social life of their more religiously apathetic children sometimes even asking for police 
intervention in preventing mixed relationships.  Although the stories were often cleverly 
designed to stir the Reis-ul-ulema into action, they were no less “real” as they offered non-elites 
a loudspeaker through which they could communicate with authority and more importantly, be 
heard.   
 The third part of the argument is that the stories ordinary Muslims told echoed the 
narrative of Muslim victimhood which had a powerful resonance in the late 1930s Yugoslavia 
and not only amongst Muslims.  A particularly widespread strand of this narrative portrayed 
Muslim men as unwitting victims of conniving women whose selfishness, disregard for morality, 
and treachery harmed not only those individual men but the larger community as well.  Whether 
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they were Austrian Jewish women reportedly taking advantage of the Shari’a to escape Hitler, 
sexually adventurous women supposedly flirting with non-Muslim men, or Christian women 
baptizing their children after the deaths of their Muslim husbands, they all fed the perception of 
Muslim male pride under siege in the increasingly volatile state that was the late 1930s 
Yugoslavia.  That the defense of male pride became part and parcel of nation-building is not 
surprising given the consensus of the ample gender literature that nations are imagined by men, 
inextricably bound up with their concerns, and based on institutionalized gender inequality.  In 
the words of Anne McClintock, “Not only are the needs of the nation here identified with the 
frustrations and aspirations of men, but the representation of male national power depends on 
construction of gender difference.”193  In the late 1930s Bosnia-Herzegovina, the exclusively 
male Shari’a establishment tinkered with the Islamic law in cementing a national boundary.  
The Ban on Mixed Marriage and the Retreat from Yugoslavia 
 Reis-ul-ulema’s 1938 ban on mixed marriage was a direct result of the failure of King 
Alexander’s efforts to create a Yugoslav nation by fiat and the consequent emergence of a more 
conservative and emboldened Bosnian Muslim elite.  After abolishing parliamentary democracy 
and declaring dictatorship in January 1929, King Alexander swiftly proceeded to centralize 
power in a bid to create an overarching Yugoslav identity, an effort that necessitated state control 
of religious institutions.  Because they enjoyed significant autonomy vis-à-vis the state, 
Sarajevo-based Muslim institutions bore the brunt of this heavy-handed centralization.  The 
King-sponsored Constitution of the Islamic Religious Community (IVZ—Islamska vjerska 
zajednica), inaugurated in 1930, deliberately undermined the status of Sarajevo as the seat of 
Muslim political power: both, the Supreme Shari’a Court and the Ulema medžlis saw their power 
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curtailed with the addition of their respective branches in Skoplje, with the transfer of Reis’ 
residence from Sarajevo to Belgrade, and with the requirement that the appointment of all 
religious and judicial Muslim officials be supervised by the Minister of Justice Milan Srškić, a 
man widely known for his unapologetic unitarist views.  In addition, the already fragile 
relationship between the Islamic clergy and the Shari’a judiciary became even more tentative 
with the Reis-ul-ulema losing the power to issue opinions on important religious questions, 
which would have been binding on Shari’a courts.  Shari’a judges were to be appointed by the 
King and although they still had to obtain a murasela from the Reis, an oath of office of sorts, 
those judges already appointed were exempt from this requirement.  The requirement that 
candidates for Shari’a judgeships take their exams in front of the Reis-ul-ulema was also 
scrapped and this role was entrusted to district Shari’a courts.194   
The state’s smothering embrace of Muslim institutions also meant a change of personnel: 
refusing to relocate his residency to Belgrade the outspoken reformist Reis-ul-ulema Džemaludin 
Čaušević retired and was succeeded by the regime loyalist Ibrahim Maglajlić while the Sarajevo 
Supreme Shari’a Court witnessed the replacement of conservative justices Salih Mutapčić and 
Ali Riza Prohić with the regime loyalists, reformers Abdulah Bušatlić and Ibrahim Sarić.195  As 
the previous chapter has shown these efforts were successful in that they ensured that the Shari’a 
would be used to integrate the Muslims more smoothly into the nascent Yugoslav nation. 
 King Alexander Karadjordjević’s dying words “take care of my Yugoslavia” reflected the 
anxieties about the future of a country, which had become inextricable from the person of the 
King and his often repressive rule.  The events following his assassination in Marseilles in 
October 1934 would turn King’s dying wish into a prophecy: the bullet fired by a Macedonian 
                                                 
194 Karčić, Šerijatski sudovi, 83-87. 
195 Ibid., 95-96. 
 
 
 
86
separatist tore the fabric of the country which began to unravel almost immediately following the 
King’s death.  His assassination made the radical rearrangement of the country not only possible, 
but very likely.  The dismantling of the dictatorship included messy negotiations between the 
hastily resurrected political parties which had been previously banned by the King.  For our 
purposes the most important development in these negotiations was the entry of the main Muslim 
party (JMO) into the ruling coalition, which would become known as the Yugoslav Radical 
Community (JRZ) to be led by the pseudo-fascist Serbian Prime Minister Milan Stojadinović.  
The rightward shift of the country’s political life was in keeping with most of Europe at the time, 
but with one important difference: while rightwing rule meant greater centralization in most 
countries, in Yugoslavia the JRZ coalition presided over a slow disintegration of the country into 
ethnically based and increasingly independent regions.  JMO’s President Mehmed Spaho 
conditioned the entry of his party into the governing coalition on the restoration of autonomy to 
Muslim institutions.   
 As a result of these changes, Sarajevo once again became the seat of Muslim political 
power: relocated from Belgrade back to Sarajevo, the Reis-ul-ulema was granted uncontested 
supervisory role over the newly consolidated Sarajevo-based Ulema medžlis office, and achieved 
unprecedented control over the Supreme Shari’a Court via the power to issue binding opinions 
on important religious questions which had previously been under the jurisdiction of a Belgrade 
controlled committee.  JMO’s entry into the government was also accompanied by the purge of 
former regime loyalists from important Muslims institutions: the reformist justices from the 
Supreme Court Abdulah Bušatlić and Ibrahim Sarić were both retired with the former returning 
to private life and the latter becoming the mayor of Sarajevo for a brief period of time.  They 
were replaced by the JMO loyalists Fehim Spaho, the brother of JMO President Mehmed Spaho, 
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and Hasan Besirević.  Fehim Spaho’s rise from retirement to the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Shari’a Court and finally to the position of the Reis-ul-ulema in April 1938 was evidence not 
only of JMO’s monopoly over Muslim political life, but also of Bosnian Muslims’ institutional 
retreat from Yugoslavia. 
 The JMO’s control over the Islamic institutions, however, was far from uncontested as it 
came under heavy criticism from some segments of the clergy, who feared the new leadership 
was too secular, as well as from the pro-Serbian Muslim organizations, which accused the Spaho 
brothers of stoking religious hatred for political purposes.  The JMO historian Atif Purivatra 
argues that the party quite unapologetically eliminated its political opponents from the Vakuf-
mearif committees infuriating the local hodžas who lost the control over their communities’ 
purse strings.196  That some members of the clergy did not consider Fehim Spaho to be religious 
enough became evident on the eve of his confirmation as the Reis-ul-ulema in June 1938 when 
the Disciplinary Committee for the Election of the Reis received a letter from three Islamic 
officials accusing Spaho of inappropriate behavior during his tenure as the Naib, a largely 
ceremonial post that was normally seen as a transition to the Reis.  The letter alluded to Spaho’s 
trip around Montenegro and his stay at a Cetinje hotel where, according to the press reports from 
1937, he “drank alcohol, partied, and entertained himself in a vulgar way with the female staff of 
the hotel,” and warned that the election of such a man to the position of the Reis was creating 
“friction and disunity among the Muslims.”197   
Opposition to the Spaho brothers was also centered around the pro-Serb Muslim 
Yugoslav People’s Party (Jugoslovenska narodna stranka—JNS), a splinter of the JMO, which 
held a conference on 28 November 1938—some five months after Spaho’s election as the Reis—
                                                 
196 Purivatra, 382. 
197 Historijski arhiv Sarajevo (HAS).  Ostavština Fehim Spaho Reis-ul-ulema (SF), Kutija br. 1.  SF-283. 
 
 
 
88
at which the party’s deputy Mustafa Mulalić blasted both Spaho brothers for using Islam to gain 
personal political and material advantages.  He argued that the JMO’s refusal to cooperate with 
the previous government led by the Serbian Radical Party and their chameleon-like turn-around 
in joining the Yugoslav Radical Community of Milan Stojadinović was orchestrated in order to 
save the personal property and privileges of the Spaho brothers.  In responding to Spahos’ 
reports of anti-Muslim violence, Mulalić ascribed this to the political maneuvering of Mehmed 
Spaho: “Whenever he finds his position to be shaking, Dr. Mehmed Spaho pulls out of his sleeve 
the paroles about the dangers facing the Din [Islam]…”198 That the criticisms may have been 
motivated by political reasons is obvious, but the accusations also point to the successful 
takeover of the religious institutions by secular politicians who would prove much more willing 
to employ the Shari’a for the purposes of national mobilization. 
 Fehim Spaho’s eventual ban on mixed marriage—in December 1938—could be seen as a 
concession to the resurgent Islamic traditionalists, or conservatives, who had been marginalized 
during King’s dictatorship.  During the 1920s Spaho had been a close ally of the reformists, 
including their unofficial leader Reis-ul-ulema Džemaludin Čaušević, advocating for a flexible 
interpretation of the Shari’a that would take into account specific Yugoslav circumstances.  He 
collaborated with Čaušević with the establishment of the reformist mouthpiece Novi Behar, 
accompanied him on his visit to Kemal Ataturk’s Turkey, and stood by the beleaguered Reis 
after he came under fire from the traditionalists for his comments regarding the veiling of 
women, the donning of felt hats by Muslim men, and the reform of vakufs.199  However, as 
Xavier Bougarel has pointed out, the 1930s witnessed a gradual resurgence of the revivalists, or 
traditionalists to use Karčić’s term, who were gathered around the figure of Mehmed Handžić, a 
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respected scholar of the Shari’a and an admirer of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood the 
ideology of which he imbibed during his studies in Cairo.200  He became much more politically 
active during the second half of the 1930s and following JMO’s entry into the JRZ coalition, 
founded El Hidaje in 1936, a journal that would become a mouthpiece of religious conservatives.  
The journal soon took up the campaign against religious indifference in general and mixed 
marriage in particular, which during the early part of the decade had been mostly confined to 
petitions of local clergymen to the disinterested Supreme Shari’a Court.   
 In February 1937, the respected conservative Mehmed Ali Ćerimović wrote an article in 
El Hidaje, attacking mixed marriage as the practice that seriously threatened the very survival of 
the Islamic community.  For his assertion that mixed marriage had become quite common in 
postwar years, Ćerimović blamed not the Muslim masses, who had supposedly remained 
concerned about it, but “our religious authorities…who have indifferently observed this practice 
for more than fifty years and watched it take on ever greater proportions.”201  According to 
Ćerimović, while it was true that the consensus of the Hanafi school was that Islam allowed 
Muslim men to marry non-Muslim women as long as the latter belonged to one of the Judeo-
Christian religions there were early Shari’a jurists like Ibn-Omer who interpreted the Qur’anic 
ban on marriage with “idolatrous” women as including all non-Muslims.202  But even if the 
Qur’an allowed for mixed marriage, Ćerimović insisted that this permission was conditional 
upon the obligation to preserve Muslim identity of mixed marriage children, but which due to the 
religious devotion of non-Muslim women could not be guaranteed in Yugoslavia.  Repeating 
what would become a common theme in anti-mixed marriage campaigns, he insisted that in most 
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mixed marriages the Christian mother would almost always insist on baptizing the supposedly 
Muslim child, celebrating Christian holidays, and on eating food prohibited by Islam.  While not 
calling for an all out ban on mixed marriage, Ćerimović appealed to the Muslims throughout the 
country to consider the well-being of their community at large when choosing their life partner 
and proposed that every non-Muslim woman entering into a marriage with a Muslim be required 
to sign a contract which would obligate her to raise her children in Islamic faith and 
acknowledge that in case of divorce the children would belong to the Muslim father.203  
Although non-Muslim women entering mixed marriages with Muslim men had already been 
required to sign such statements, Ćerimović’s proposal reflected the mistrust of women that was 
pervasive among opponents of mixed marriage. 
 Fehim Spaho may have sparred with the traditionalists in the past and would do so on a 
few more occasions in the future, but on the issue of mixed marriage the two would become 
allies.  In an article which amounted to a declaration of war against mixed marriage, the future 
Reis Fehim Spaho, who at the time was the chief justice of the Sarajevo Supreme Shari’a court, 
branded mixed marriage “the cancer of the body of our religious community and our family life” 
and called for a “radical cure,”204 meaning a complete ban on mixed marriage.  Writing in the 
mouthpiece of the Islamic establishment in January 1938, he admitted that the Shari’a allowed 
Muslim men to intermarry with Christian and Jewish women, but insisted that such practice 
could be safely tolerated only in purely Islamic countries where the jurisdiction of Shari’a courts 
was not as restricted as it was the case in Yugoslavia.  The most destructive consequence of 
mixed marriage were said to be its children who, it was said, in 95% of the cases were lost to the 
Islamic community mostly due to the treachery of their Christian mothers who would baptize 
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them after the death of their fathers.  The peasants, who had supposedly remained untouched by 
this cancer and were, in Spaho’s words, “the main source of our strength,”205 had long ago 
pithily summarized the dire position of mixed marriage children with their proverb: “My father 
prostrates himself, my mother crosses herself, while I am turning into stone.”206  To illustrate the 
attrition of mixed marriage children from the Islamic community, Spaho mentioned the case of 
Emin Alibegović from Konjic whose Christian Orthodox mother Milka had him baptized 
immediately after the death of his father Osman, renaming him Milan.  In order to avoid the 
jurisdiction of Bosnian Shari’a courts—which mandated that the child remain Muslim—Milka 
had taken her son to Slavonski Brod in Croatia where the law allowed parents to change the 
religious affiliation of their minor children.  Despite the appeal of child’s paternal grandfather 
and legal custodian, the Appellate Court in Belgrade had ruled in favor of the mother, forever 
wrestling Milan out of Shari’a jurisdiction.  In another case, after the death of a Muslim official 
his Catholic wife did not even wait for him to be buried before she could be seen sipping wine 
with her Christian friends.  Spaho called on all members of the Islamic community—religious 
officials, newspapers, cultural societies, and ordinary Muslims—to “stigmatize” mixed marriage 
and police young people to ensure they would not intermarry.  In case this failed to eradicate it, 
Spaho went even further than El-Hidaje’s Mehmed Ali Ćermiović in calling for a comprehensive 
ban on mixed marriage.   
As if responding to the warnings of his reformist colleagues, discussed in the previous 
chapter, about the need to treat religiously indifferent Muslims with care, Spaho argued that the 
danger of the ban forcing Muslims to intermarry in churches should be ignored because “what is 
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rotten let it fall off immediately.”207  Echoing the primordialist view of Muslim identity shared 
by his reformist colleagues Spaho suggested that mixed marriage children “could never be good 
Muslims no matter what their upbringing was like.”208  In arguing for the surveillance of the 
inter-confessional boundary, Spaho pointed with admiration to the attempts of the Catholic and 
Orthodox communities to police their own identities: the Catholic Church had grudgingly 
tolerated mixed marriages between Orthodox and Catholics, but had almost always forbidden 
Catholics to intermarry with Muslims; the Orthodox Church had in 1933 declared difference in 
religion as an “obstacle” to marriage.209  Spaho’s anxiety regarding mixing unveiled a deeply 
rooted sense of alienation from the Christian Yugoslavs who were seen as selfishly guarding 
their own identity at the expense of Islam. 
 Given Spaho’s hostility to interfaith mixing it was not surprising that he would enact a 
comprehensive ban on mixed marriage barely six months after he was officially confirmed as the 
Reis-ul-ulema, a decision which reflected the institutionalization of the Bosnian Muslim national 
movement on the eve of World War II.  Invoking his right to issue opinions on important 
religious issues, granted to him by the revamped 1936 Constitution of the Islamic Religious 
Community, at the meeting his High Council on 26 December 1938 Reis Spaho issued the 
Declaration No. 2111: “The High Council proclaims that mixed marriages between Muslim men 
and non-Muslim women are banned in principle.  In exceptional cases of Muslims living in areas 
where they represent a significant minority, the Reis-ul-ulema may, at the urgings of district 
Shari’a courts, approve marriages between Muslim men and non-Muslim women.”210  What was 
extraordinary about this decision was that it was a blunt rebuttal of a Shari’a consensus (ijtihad) 
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based on a fairly unambiguous passage in the Qur’an: Muslim men were allowed to marry non-
Muslim women who belonged to one of the Judeo-Christian monotheistic faiths, which the 
Qur’an referred to as “the people of the Book.”  The verse 5 of Sura 5 (Al-Maidah), often cited 
as the foundation for this consensus, states: “This day are all things good and pure made lawful 
unto you.  The food of the People of the Book is lawful unto you and yours is lawful unto them.  
Lawful unto you in marriage are not only chaste women who are believers, but chaste women 
among the People of the Book…” Although he acknowledged this consensus in his article 
against mixed marriage in January of the same year, Fehim Spaho insisted that the specific 
national circumstance in Yugoslavia necessitated the tinkering with the Shari’a if Islamic identity 
was to be protected in the multinational environment.  At the same meeting, Spaho’s Council 
also went against the precedence set by the reformist-run Supreme Shari’a court from earlier in 
the decade regarding the Muslims who intermarried in churches: “For the Muslims who conclude 
a marriage in a church or in accordance with rituals of another faith that marriage cannot be 
legalized by the Shari’a and such Muslims are no longer considered members of the Islamic 
religious community.”211  Excommunicating the Muslims who trespassed across the interfaith 
boundary was an abrupt shift away from the flexible attitude of the Supreme Shari’a Court under 
chief justice Bušatlić whose warning to treat such Muslims with care was a part of the effort to 
integrate them more smoothly into the Yugoslav nation-state.  In short, Spaho’s ban on mixed 
marriage was as much as an attempt to discipline religious indifference as it was a call to the 
Muslims to retreat from Yugoslavia.    
 That the place into which the Muslims were to retreat was Bosnia-Herzegovina becomes 
clear not only from Spaho’s rootedness in Bosnian Muslim political establishment, but also in 
the direction from which the criticism of this decision came.  In addition to Fehim Spaho’s close 
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relationship with the Bosnian-based JMO, headed by his brother Mehmed, the ban on mixed 
marriage came under criticism mostly from the voices outside of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Some 
three months after the mixed marriage ban, a persistent and vociferous critic of Spaho, Hasan 
Rebac wrote an article in the journal Naš Dom in which he complained that under Spaho’s 
leadership the Shari’a had become a casualty of political opportunism as evident by the practice 
of “opportunistically allowing what the Qur’an and the Hadith expressly forbid and vice versa, 
forbidding what the Qur’an and the Hadith expressly allow.”212 The criticism must have 
infuriated Spaho because a few days later he sued Rebac for libel ultimately losing his case even 
after the Minister of Justice had intervened.213  Undeterred, Rebac used his position as a member 
of the Vakuf-Mearif Sabor, the highest administrative body overseeing the administration of 
charitable endowments (vakufs), to launch disciplinary action against Spaho at the body’s 
gathering in Sarajevo in April 1940.  In addition to accusing Spaho of mismanaging the vakufs in 
the Skoplje region, which he was representing, Rebac argued that the Reis had overstepped his 
authority by first banning mixed marriage in principle, but then arbitrarily approving marriages 
at his own discretion.   
If Rebac’s criticism was politically motivated—as he was known as an outspoken 
Serbophile who as early as 1925 wrote that Muslims were the Serbs of Islamic faith who had 
unfortunately become detached from their true nationality214—the Zagreb Shari’a judge Kamarić 
also challenged Spaho’s ban and continued to officiate over mixed marriages, insisting that 
Shari’a jurisprudence did not recognize the mufti’s authority in the matter.215  Spaho’s ban may 
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not have found many supporters outside of the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina because it was 
inextricably linked to the emergence of Bosnian Muslim national consciousness. 
 The need to protect Muslim cultural distinctiveness, which was Spaho’s main 
justification for banning mixed marriage, came at the time when the Yugoslav state was 
unraveling and the status of Muslims becoming ever more precarious.  The countrywide election 
of December 1938, held just a few days before Fehim Spaho’s Council would ban mixed 
marriage, empowered political forces which, believing that the country’s political impasse was 
mostly due to the dispute between Serbian and Croatian parties, proved willing to radically 
rearrange the country’s internal structure without consulting the Muslim parties.  Thus, the 
Sporazum (Agreement) of August 1939 was an effort by the Serbian Prime Minister Dragiša 
Cvetković and the leader of the Croat Peasant Party Vladko Maček to preserve a semblance of 
the Yugoslav state amidst escalating Croat demands for greater autonomy at a time when another 
world war seemed inevitable.  The Sporazum turned Yugoslavia into a de facto confederation by 
creating an autonomous banovina Croatia, which comprised one quarter of the Yugoslav 
territory, including 13 Croat-majority precincts in Bosnia-Herzegovina, siphoning off almost a 
quarter of Bosnian territory.  The agreement entrusted the new Croatian entity with jurisdiction 
over interior affairs, education, justice, health, trade, industry, agriculture among other areas, 
while the Yugoslav state was left in control of trade, foreign affairs, defense, public security, 
customs, and finance.216  
Amidst the contentious negotiations leading to the Sporazum and sensing Muslim 
opposition to any deal that might jeopardize the territorial contiguity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 
“society of Bosnian-Herzegovinian Croats in Zagreb” wrote a letter to Spaho in June 1939 
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urging him to work towards reversing the division, which had emerged between the Croats of 
Islamic and Catholic faiths.  Reminding the mufti that the Bosnian Muslims “are a branch of the 
Croatian tree, pure blood of our ancestors, descendants of Croatian tribes of the 7th and 8th 
century” the majority of whom “are not aware of their national belonging,” the society asked 
Spaho to use his influence in closing the ranks between Croats and Muslims in the struggle 
against Serb attempts to divide Bosnia.  In what could also be read as a warning, the letter vowed 
that the Croats would regard every part of Bosnian territory as their own and resist Serbian 
attempts to divide the country.  Resistance to Serbian encroachments on Bosnia would not be 
possible, the society argued, if “the Croats were torn apart into two opposing camps, Catholics 
and Muslims, each a minority that could not protect its interests…”217   
If the letter was meant to pre-empt Muslim resistance to an agreement between Croats 
and Serbs that could impact the status of Muslims, it failed because following the Sporazum 
Fehim Spaho threw his unequivocal support behind the JMO’s demand for Bosnian autonomy.  
Thus, while appeasing the major Croat parties, the Sporazum infuriated the Yugoslav Muslim 
Organization (JMO) whose leader Džafer Kulenović—who had replaced the late Mehmed 
Spaho—demanded that Bosnia-Herzegovina also be granted autonomy in order to preserve its 
“historical borders.”  A gathering of distinguished political and religious Muslim representatives 
in Sarajevo in November 1939 issued a strongly worded statement in support of Kulenović’s 
demand for Bosnian autonomy, insisting that the JMO leader echoed the “demand of all Muslims 
of Bosnia-Herzegovina.”218  By December 30, the statement of support had coalesced into the 
Movement for the Autonomy of Bosnia-Herzegovina with Mehmed Handžić, the conservative 
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founder of El Hidaje, as one of its prominent members.219  The inclusion of parts of Bosnia-
Herzegovina into banovina Croatia seemed to confirm the fear of many Muslim supporters of 
Yugoslavia that their efforts at assimilating into a Yugoslav nation had been seriously misguided. 
 The retreat from an overarching Yugoslav into a religiously based national identity 
became clear in the estrangement of Suljaga Salihagić from the Yugoslav nation.  A prominent 
figure in the Bosnian Muslim establishment, who had identified himself as a Serb, Salihagić was 
an important ally to King Alexander’s efforts to build a Yugoslav nation through dictatorship, an 
alliance which he reiterated while serving as the King-appointed President of the Vakuf Mearif 
Sabor when he officiated the inauguration of the pro-regime Reis-ul-ulema Maglajlić in Belgrade 
in 1930. Writing just a few months after the Sporazum was signed, Salihagić acknowledged that 
the Bosnian Muslims had voluntarily avoided becoming classified as a separate nation “out of 
inclusiveness so that we do not segregate ourselves from our national brothers of different 
faiths.”  Given the treatment of the Muslims at the hands of these brothers, however, Salihagić 
concluded that their refusal to embrace their own nationality “had been a mistake because we 
really are one national unit, which speaks with one language regardless of what we decide to call 
it.”220  Angry about the inclusion of a substantial chunk of Bosnia’s territory into banovina 
Croatia, Salihagić defended the demands of the JMO for Bosnian autonomy, reaching into the 
medieval past to argue that Bosnia-Herzegovina had had a long history of statehood: the 
medieval Bosnian state had had its own alphabet (bosančica), its own religion (bogumilstvo), and 
its own national name (bosansko).  Aware of the stigma attached to Islam, Salihagić sounded a 
cheerleading note when he urged his readers not to be “ashamed of our past” because Islam had 
been voluntarily embraced by the Bosnians and had led to a system of tolerance that was 
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unmatched in the Christian world.  Responding to oft-repeated claims about the anational 
character of the Muslims, he pointed to the Bosnians’ resistance against Sultan’s centralizing 
reforms, starting in the mid 18th century, as evidence of a national awakening, which predated 
that of the Serbs and the Croats.  Despite the existence of this distinct national consciousness, 
Salihagić argued, the Bosnian Muslims had warmly embraced Yugoslavia only to be rebuffed as 
foreigners.   
 To illustrate this argument, he remembered walking through the Serbian town of Kosjerić 
in 1915, wearing a fez and an Austrian uniform.  Upon encountering a Serbian peasant woman 
he warmly greeted her at which she complimented his Serbian.  When he informed her that he 
was after all a Serb, she became confused and asked why he was wearing a fez.  He then 
explained that he was a Serb of Islamic faith, but she insisted that he was a Turk.  Despite 
swearing that he spoke no word of Turkish she demanded that he return to the faith of his 
ancestors (Orthodoxy) if he wanted to be a Serb.  “When you first return to the faith of your 
ancestors, before Christianity, then I will do the same,” he reportedly responded.  Whether true 
or not, Salihagić’s anecdote can be read as a trope for how he viewed the treatment of the 
Muslims in interwar Yugoslavia: genuine efforts to become a part of the nation had been met 
with hostile demands to convert to Orthodoxy. As much it revealed the treatment of Muslims in 
Yugoslavia, the anecdote also betrayed Salihagić’s primordial understanding of nationality as 
being based on birth rather than voluntary acceptance.  Salihagić himself echoed this 
understanding when he said:  
 The sons of one and the same people, one and the same country, one and the same 
religion, one and the same culture, and what’s more, brothers of one and the same 
mother and still one is a Serb and the other a Croat!  Is this scientifically and 
objectively possible and is this not absurd from the standpoint of the theory about 
race and nation?!  This is only a product of our misguided national orientation, 
our subjective feeling…We firmly believe that our nationalism lies in the first 
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place in the preservation of our race, the preservation of our language through 
centuries, especially under the Turks, in our wonderful folk customs, in our love 
for our country…221 
 
In other words, the Bosnian Muslims may have hoped to become a part of a more inclusive 
Yugoslav nation, but they could no longer deny their biological, racial, distinctiveness that had 
been preserved through centuries especially under foreign occupation.  In a Europe obsessed 
with race and riddled with failed democratic states, belonging to one’s nation was no longer a 
matter of political choice, but a biological necessity proven by science and reason.  Having 
flirted with the multinational Yugoslavia, the Bosnian Muslims were now being urged to catch 
up with Europe and embrace their own nation-state. 
Feeling Under Siege in Multireligious Yugoslavia: Muslim Petitions to Reis Spaho 
 The emergence of the Bosnian Muslim national identity during the late 1930s was 
evident not only in the institutional retreat of the Bosnian Muslim elites from the Yugoslav state, 
but also in the alienation of many Muslims from their Christian neighbors. Almost as soon as he 
came into office, Reis Fehim Spaho was inundated with letters of Muslim state officials, serving 
in areas with Christian majorities, pleading to be transferred to Muslim towns of Bosnia-
Herzegovina.  Many Muslims who petitioned the Reis for a transfer did so because they were 
concerned that their children were becoming indifferent to Islam.  Writing in May 1938 Ahmed 
Begović, employed with the Yugoslav Army’s 23rd Artillery Division in the Croatian town of 
Knin, pled with the mufti to be transferred to “any place as long as I am among Muslims” so that 
he could send his children to mekteb.  Since there were no Muslims living in Dalmatia and “our 
Muslim customs do not in any way coincide with the local population,” Ahmed had been forced 
to send his wife and children to Mostar, the nearest town with a Muslim population, where they 
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could get proper Islamic education.222  It is not clear if the wife eventually returned to Knin but a 
letter which she wrote to the mufti a few months later makes it seem as if they were all still 
living in Knin.  Their oldest son had already been enrolled in the first grade at the local 
elementary school where he had no opportunity to attend religious classes.  She emphasized that 
the main reason they would be moving was so that they could “show our children the right path,” 
reminding the mufti that they needed his assistance “as much for ourselves as for the progress of 
entire Islam.”223  
In 1939, an official with the state railway service in the Croatian village of Križevci 
asked to be moved to a Muslim town because not only could he not send his children to mekteb, 
but their peers had been “teaching them how to cross themselves and say their prayers.”  After 
noticing this he prohibited his children from associating with their Catholic friends, but finally 
decided, as he could not keep them locked inside forever, to ask for a transfer.224  That same 
year, the widow of a respected hodža from Mostar wrote to the Reis on behalf of her son Mustafa 
Spahić, who was an employee with the state tax agency in the Croatian town of Ston, asking that 
he be transferred to “any place in Bosnia and Herzegovina where Muslim folks live.”  Worried 
that Mustafa’s cohabitation with Christians was pushing him and his family further into 
“džihalet,” a state of religious ignorance and apathy, she begged the mufti to intervene with the 
state authorities in the matter, reminding him that her husband had been a prominent cleric in 
Mostar.225   
That Mustafa and his wife may had already fallen into the state of džihalet becomes 
evident in his own letter to the mufti, some three months after his mother’s, in which he 
                                                 
222 SF, 863 
223 SF, 1056 
224 SF, 1536 
225 SF, 1565 
 
 
 
101
acknowledged that neither he nor his wife could teach their children about “all the religious 
obligations because as you must know children are hardly fearful enough of their parents to learn 
anything from them.”226  A police officer from Split (Croatia) also admitted in his letter to the 
mufti that the religious instruction his wife had given to his six children had not been enough.  In 
addition, he had also been “tortured” by his failure to have his two sons circumcised.227 A wife 
of a police officer stationed near the central Croatian town of Karlovac raised the similar issue in 
her petition when she insisted that despite her best efforts to educate her children about their 
Islamic obligations it had been “impossible because a child forgets everything as soon as he goes 
outside,” where he “takes in everything from the other children.”228  Another police officer, from 
the Vojvodina city of Novi Sad, asked to be transferred to Sarajevo where he had already moved 
his wife and children out of concern that had they stayed in the city a few more months, “despite 
my best efforts they would not have known to which faith they belonged...”229 Besides revealing 
the failure of the state to ensure the religious instruction for the children of Muslim officials, 
these letters also suggest that these officials experienced profound estrangement from the 
Christian communities in which they resided. 
 The state officials who petitioned the mufti to be transferred to Muslim areas of the 
country portrayed themselves as devout members of the Islamic community who, due to their 
adherence to Islam had become isolated from their Christian neighbors.  A sergeant serving in 
the 47th Regiment in the Croatian town of Sinj urged the Reis to “protect my Islamic feelings and 
help me live in accordance with the Islamic faith” by transferring him to his hometown of 
Banjaluka.  Because there were no Islamic houses of worship in Sinj Husein, they could not 
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attend daily prayers.  In addition, the food he ate at the army canteen regularly contained pork, an 
issue which he had raised with his commanding officer only to be told that there were no cows in 
the Sinj area.  Husein’s detachment from his community is clear in his statement that even had he 
not been required as an officer to eat in the army canteen he would still be forced to do so 
because he was a “foreigner” who lived in the dormitories and survived on the army’s meager 
pay.  Aware that his request could be misconstrued as a sign of disloyalty to the state, Husein 
asked “that this request not be interpreted in any other way than as my desire to live in 
accordance with my faith and I would like to repeat that I am proud to serve the King and my 
Fatherland as an officer in the reserves.”230  A corporal serving in Slovenia informed the mufti 
that because of his adherence to Islam his comrades had come to look at him as the black 
sheep231 and some had verbally abused him.  Citing his constitutional right to freedom of 
worship he pled with the mufti to intervene in the matter and arrange his transfer.232  Black sheep 
was the term another petitioner used in his letter, this one a Bosnian born day laborer stationed in 
Dalmatia, who described his colleagues’ “unbearable reprimands” for his religious devoutness.233  
In her petition for a transfer, the wife of the police officer in Croatia who wrote about the bad 
influence her children’s friends had on their Islamic upbringing also complained of being 
misunderstood by her Christian neighbors to whom she had to continuously justify her Islamic 
lifestyle.  To be forced to remain in the small Croatian town would be tantamount to a life of 
“silence” and a “perpetual feeling of slavery.”234  The life of isolation had led Džemal Alendar, a 
railway clerk in Slovenia, to fall into a deep “emotional depression, bordering on desperation as I 
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watch my sixty year old mother and my wife holed up in the house for 15 continuous months and 
see my four children become further distanced from wonderful Islam.”235   
 Some parents wrote to the mufti to intervene in mixed relationships their religiously 
indifferent children had thrown themselves into, bringing shame to the family.  A sixty-eight 
year old man despaired at the prospect of his son converting to Catholicism in order to marry his 
Catholic girlfriend with whom he had had a child out of wedlock.  The young woman had 
already filed a petition to convert to Islam, but as the Ulema medžlis had not responded for two 
months, the old man was “terrified that they will do something rash, that is that he will convert to 
her faith, and they will enter into a civil marriage or get married in a church, which would inflict 
a terrible wound on me for the rest of my life.”  Begging the mufti to intervene with the Sarajevo 
medžlis in getting the woman’s petition approved, the old man gave voice to the intense religious 
polarization of the late 1930s Bosnia declaring that “I would rather see him dead than convert to 
Catholicism.”236  A woman from Banjaluka by the name of Almasa asked the mufti to arrange 
for the police to escort her nineteen-year old daughter back home from Sarajevo where she was 
hiding in a house of her Catholic boyfriend who was already married with three children.  She 
begged the Reis to deny his petition to convert to Islam “because he is a cheat who wants to ruin 
me.”  It is not clear on what grounds the police intervened, but in the post-script to the letter, 
Almasa informed the Reis that her daughter had been brought to Banjaluka under a police escort 
but was still refusing to come home and was instead hiding in the house of another Catholic.  She 
once again asked for police intervention, prompting the Reis to write to the district’s chief of 
police asking for the girl “to be forcibly returned to her mother.”237  The letters suggest that 
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religious devoutness sometimes split across generational lines, a harbinger of intermarriage 
patterns after World War II.    
 The stories of Muslims struggling to live their lives in accordance with the Shari’a 
resonated with Reis Spaho and he intervened for almost every petitioner, writing to various 
government officials, including his brother’s successor as the head of the JMO Džafer 
Kulenović, pleading that they be transferred to Muslim areas.  After the 1939 Sporazum between 
the Croatian and Serbian parties effectively ended the attempts to create a Yugoslav nation and 
reorganized the country along ethnic lines, including the autonomous Banovina Croatia, Spaho 
wrote to the Croatian Ban complaining that Muslims working for the state had been assigned to 
purely Catholic areas without any regard for their religious obligations.  Reminding the Ban that 
this practice had “caused dissatisfaction among Muslims and does not contribute to good 
relations between Muslims and Catholics,” he asked that in future the state take into account 
their religious needs.238  In October 1939, just two months after the Sporazum, Spaho wrote to 
the JMO president Kulenović, who at the time was a Minister of Forests and Mines, on behalf of 
a poverty-stricken Muslim who “remained in one Muslim oasis in the sea of Catholicism in 
Banovina Croatia” and asked that he be given a job in an area populated by Muslims.239          
 Throughout his tenure Spaho remained vigilant about the religious discipline of Muslims 
and was at times pro-active in that he intervened for wavering Muslims who had not petitioned 
for a transfer.  For example, in August 1940 he wrote to the chief commander of the 
Gendarmerie in Belgrade, Milutin Stefanović, asking that the police sergeant Mustafa Ćejvan, 
serving in the Croatian village of Velika Gorica, be transferred to a Muslim town because “the 
environment and the Catholic propaganda have had their desired effect and he has already asked 
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to leave Islam.”240  While it is not clear if Mustafa was ever transferred, it seems that Spaho’s 
interventions were often fruitful: Mustafa Spahić, the son of a respected Mostar hodža, was 
eventually transferred from Ston to the eastern Bosnian town of Foča; mufti’s letter on behalf of 
police officer Mehmed Sarajlija, serving in Novi Sad, resulted in Kulenović’s intervention with 
the Minister of Internal Affairs; and according to a report, in the Novi Sad police station alone 
between 6-7 Muslim officers were transferred to the Sarajevo branch during Spaho’s tenure.241  
The frequency and urgency of Spaho’s interventions on behalf of these Muslims, responding to 
each petition only days after receiving them, was a symptom of the wider ethno-religious 
polarization of the Yugoslav society. 
 Of course, given Spaho’s position within the Muslim political establishment and his 
campaign to preserve Muslim specificity the stories the petitioners told him may have been 
strategically designed narratives meant to stir the Reis into action on their behalf and arrange 
their transfer.  As it has been mentioned, many petitioners asked to be transferred to a specific 
place, most often their hometown, and their motivation may have been a desire to reunite with 
relatives and friends.  For example, a soldier from the artillery division in Sinj wanted to be 
transferred to his hometown of Banjaluka where he could attend the mosque and eat the food 
Islam allowed.242  Prior to contacting the Reis some officials had already arranged to switch 
places with their Christian colleagues: for example, Hakija Karadža was a clerk working in the 
small Serbian town of Ćuprija who wanted to be transferred to Sarajevo to take the place of a 
Serbian clerk who was born in Ćuprija and was looking to come back to his hometown.  
Although Hakija mentioned the difficulty of living a religiously disciplined life as the main 
motivation for the transfer petition, he admitted that his desire to live in Sarajevo was motivated 
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by much more practical concerns: he could be near his parents and finish the last year of high 
school so that he could get a promotion at his job.243  In asking that his son-in-law be transferred 
from Serbia, where he was working as a land surveyor, to Bosnia, Mahmud Zubčević mentioned 
the religious upbringing of his grandchildren only at the end of his letter, which he began by 
complaining how the climate in Serbia had poorly affected the health of his daughter and her 
husband.244  It is curious that his son-in-law had worked in Serbia for ten years before asking for 
a transfer, a circumstance that was shared by many other petitioners: the corporal from Slovenia 
admitted serving for over seven years before writing the petition,245 the police officer who 
confessed to feeling “tortured” over his failure to circumcise his children had lived in Split for 
nine years before he decided to sound alarm over the religious education of his children, the 
oldest of whom was sixteen at the time.246   
 The timing of their petitions may have been influenced by the election of Spaho as the 
Reis-ul-ulema in April 1938 who had the reputation of being more vigilant than his predecessor 
about the supposed threat to Islam, the reputation he proved credible with his decision to ban 
mixed marriage in December 1938. Reis Džemaludin Čaušević’s skirmishes with the 
conservatives during the late 1920s, over the veiling of women, donning of felt hats by men, and 
the administration of vakufs, had led some in the Muslim community to consider Spaho’s 
predecessor as weak on defending Islam.  Thus, in a letter praising Spaho for his decision to ban 
mixed marriage, a man who purported to be speaking on behalf of the Muslims of Banjaluka 
declared that “never has any Muslim ruler even in a Muslim state acted like you have,” and 
quoted an anonymous Muslim officer as having distinguished Spaho from his apathetic 
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predecessor: “So you see there are better and wiser heads than your Čaušević whom you loved so 
much and who had not done anything despite promising much.”247  In other words, the election 
of Fehim Spaho as the Reis-ul-ulema of the Yugoslav Muslim community made the victimhood 
narrative a much more suitable framework through which ordinary Muslims could speak to 
authority. 
 However, the pleas for the protection of Islam are not as remarkable for the fact that they 
are bound up with the more mundane concerns of Muslims as they are for the narrative plotlines 
in which they are made, a gendered process which reveals the hardening of the interethnic 
boundary in the late 1930s Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Thus, the calls for enforcing religious 
discipline were often indistinguishable from protests about perceived assaults on male pride.  A 
particularly poignant example of this grievance, which in this instance bordered on rage, is a 
letter Reis Spaho received in September 1939 from a Muslim man by the name of Ibro Bojičić.  
Claiming that he was speaking on behalf of the Muslims of Brčko, a mixed town on Bosnia’s 
northern border with Croatia, Ibro urged the Reis to discipline the unacceptable behavior of local 
Muslim women who paraded themselves in the city at night, unveiled, inviting sexual advances 
from the Vlahs, a pejorative term that referred to the Serb population.  This sexually provocative 
attitude often escalated into relations with the Vlahs that were prohibited by the Shari’a and as a 
result, this “infection” had now spread to the local villages.  Thus, interethnic mixing was no 
better than purposefully spreading venereal disease, a menace which Ibro consciously evoked by 
using the word zaraza (contagion).  The town’s Vlahs had become so brazen that they had started 
taking off the veils of Muslim women right in the street, an act which, in Ibro’s mind, was 
tantamount to rape.   
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 As if these transgressions were not bad enough, the greatest insult to Muslim men was the 
fact “that you can no longer say anything to your lawfully wedded wife because she immediately 
reports you to the police who then beat you…” That this seeming non sequitur—which could 
only imply that Ibro’s wife was herself one of the transgressors—was his central concern is 
evident by the fact that this was the only underlined sentence in the entire handwritten letter.  
The anger had reportedly reached such a boiling point that if Reis and the King failed to put a 
stop to these practices “we the peasants will gather and extinguish everything that is against 
Islam even at the price of our lives and we will not let this evil spread further.”248  Although the 
letter’s author may have been hard to locate despite Spaho’s efforts, the grievance over wounded 
male pride he so passionately conveyed was ubiquitous in the late 1930s Yugoslavia. 
 The angry letter complaining about the humiliation of Muslim men came on the heels of 
a highly publicized campaign against the explosion of the so-called speculative marriages 
between Jewish women fleeing Hitler’s Austria and destitute Muslims of Zagreb.  According to a 
historian of the Zagreb Muslims, Zlatko Hasanbegović, following Hitler’s annexation of Austria 
in March 1938 there were fourteen marriages concluded in the Zagreb Shari’a court between 
Austrian-born Jewish women and Muslim men all of whom were of a purely practical nature in 
that they allowed the brides to seek asylum in Yugoslavia, escaping the anti-Semitic laws of 
Hitler’s Reich.  That many local Muslims saw these marriages as exploitative of Muslim men 
becomes clear in a letter a group of Zagreb Muslims sent to the Sarajevo Supreme Shari’a court 
in August 1938 in which they informed the judges that a Muslim man by the name of Husein 
Hukić had married a Jewish woman he had never even seen, all for 1000 dinars.  If the court 
failed to put a stop to such marriages the petitioners vowed to “make public the things being 
done to the Zagreb Muslims as some snatch naïve people without means, get them married to the 
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exiled Jews for little money so that the latter get residency in Yugoslavia and then they get them 
divorced.”249  Upon conducting an investigation and finding out that there was merit to the 
complaint, the court banned marriages between Muslim men and foreign women, but failed to 
put out the flames of the brewing controversy.   
 A month after the court received the complaint Zagreb’s daily Novosti ran a sarcastic 
story about a dim-witted Muslim from Bosnia who had been taken advantage of by a rich 
Viennese Jewish woman.  Meho Šabanović was a twenty-seven year old unemployed driver who 
had emigrated from Bosnia to Zagreb in search of work but had fallen on hard times.  His friends 
had urged him to marry and settle down, but he asked himself “who would want him as he was 
so miserable and unemployed.”  Because it was no secret in Zagreb that one could profit by 
marrying a foreign Jewish woman Meho figured that this way he could improve his financial 
situation without taking on “the additional burden—the wife.”  Choosing a wife turned out to be 
a fairly smooth process: Meho walked into a lawyer’s office, expressed his intent to marry and 
was given the name of his future wife, Josefina Weiss.  After haggling with the lawyer over the 
price for his services—during which Meho had to lower his initial demand from 5000 to 1500 
dinars—he went back to his village in Bosnia, obtained his birth certificate, and appeared in front 
of a Shari’a judge along with the lawyer who represented his wife-to-be.  Suggesting that Meho 
was a simpleton, the reporter described the scene in the courtroom where after being asked if he 
took her to be his lawfully wedded wife Meho shot back a confused “her who?” following which 
the exasperated judge explained that the lawyer was representing Josefina.   
 Almost immediately after uttering his consent Meho was then presented with divorce 
papers, which he had to sign in order to receive the payment.  Speaking to the reporter at a café 
frequented by Muslims Meho acknowledged that the matter would have been over had he not 
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been shown a photograph of his now ex wife that caused him to fall in love.  He confessed that 
as he saw her picture for the first time “I felt something squeeze my heart and since that day I 
have only been dreaming about her.”  In what sounded almost like a threat, Meho warned that he 
“would not let her off that easily and would keep looking for her even if I reach the end of the 
earth.”  The first location he reached, however, was the local police station where he alerted a 
detective about the matter, triggering an investigation, which, as the reporter lamented, could not 
result in much as the law protected people like Josefina.  The description of Meho as a “young 
man of 27 years with thick blond hair, tall and strapping, in short an ideal type of man who 
would be wanted by many women today” right next to an image showing a balding man 
considerably older than twenty-seven could be seen as appropriate to the entire article’s sarcastic 
tone or as suggestive of the trope quite common in the late 1930s Europe, of an Aryan type being 
exploited by a cunning, wealthy Jewish woman.250  The article was forwarded to the Sarajevo 
Supreme Shari’a court during its investigation of the matter along with other materials which 
showed that these types of marriages had not been confined to Zagreb. 
 The story in the Zagreb daily closely followed the script of a case reported by its 
Belgrade rival Politika two months earlier in which a destitute Sarajevo man, a newspaper 
carrier, had entered into a short-lived marriage with a wealthy Viennese woman by the name of 
Karolina Fridberg.  The article, which in its subtitle reported that “these types of weddings 
happen in great numbers in Sarajevo,” was similarly sarcastic about the “sensation” that broke 
out after the locals discovered that poor Mujo Nuhić had married the wealthy, foreign Jewish 
woman.  The locals had initially ascribed the marriage to the woman’s “eccentricity or her desire 
for an adventure,” while some still believing that it was the matter of true love, but soon found 
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out that the marriage had been of a purely “speculative nature.”  Acknowledging that the “new 
regime in Austria had placed the Jews into a difficult position” forcing some to leave everything 
behind to save themselves, some, like Karolina, had been able to save their property as well.  
Making use of her relatives in Sarajevo and flexible Shari’a marriage procedures—which 
allowed the woman to be represented by a man at the ceremony—Karolina had divorced her 
husband in Vienna and married Mujo.  Even though the report stated that the woman had never 
been seen, it described Karolina, in tongue and cheek manner, as a “cunning” Viennese “belle” 
who had saved her immense wealth by exploiting the Shari’a loopholes.251  These newspaper 
stories perpetuated the narrative of wounded male Muslim pride at the hands of deceitful women. 
 The letters Fehim Spaho received also reveal that Muslims living in mixed areas often 
had more than their pride hurt as many complained of being victims of intimidation and violence 
perpetrated by their Serb and Croat neighbors.  In early 1940, a Muslim peasant from the 
predominantly Croat-Catholic Bosnian village of Kreševo, a center of the Franciscan 
missionaries, notified the Reis that during that year’s celebration marking the Muslim holiday 
Eid al-Adha a group of drunk Catholic peasants stood in front of a popular café, hurling insults at 
Islam and challenging the Muslims to a fight.  Although there were reportedly over 30 Muslims 
in the cafe, “reason and patience prevailed” and no one went outside, prompting the rabble 
rousers to move on to the center of the town where they were witnessed spitting at the mosque.  
The Muslims reported the incident to the local police, which determined that the culprit behind 
the incident was mayor’s brother.  The peasant begged Spaho to intervene with the Ban of 
Croatia—as this part of Bosnia had come under banovina Croatia jurisdiction—ominously 
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warning him “that one moment major disturbances may break out.”252 In February 1939 there 
was reportedly “a bloody settling of scores” between the Muslim inhabits of Teočak, in 
northeastern Bosnia, and the Orthodox Serbs of a nearby village.  The author of the letter 
complained that the local police commander, a Slovene, had no understanding for the plight of 
the local Muslims and asked the Reis to intervene and have their former, Muslim, police 
commander reinstated.253   
 It seems that even Sarajevo was not a safe haven for some Muslims.  In his letter to the 
Reis, a shoe repairer Ramiz Arnautović from Sarajevo asked that he be given a job as a security 
guard because he had been left disabled after an attack by a group of Serbs, one of whom hit his 
right hand with a spike, making it impossible for him to ever repair shoes again.254  Some 
peasants expressed surprise that ethnically motivated violence had disrupted their previously 
harmonious relationship with the Serb neighbors: a group of peasants around the Herzegovinian 
village of Ravno begged the Reis “to take us, as your most loyal sheep… into protection” by 
having the local police commander replaced with the previous commander whom they had 
trusted to keep them safe “even if [he] was not Muslim.”  Although they were a considerable 
minority in a Serb area, the peasants acknowledged that they had survived for a century because 
they had good relations with their Serb neighbors.  However, due to the presence of “certain evil 
individuals,” including the new police commander, this existence had become imperiled.255  
These reports of sporadic ethno-religious violence in the Bosnian countryside were the harbinger 
of bloodletting of almost apocalyptic proportions, which was to visit these villages barely a year 
later, during World War II. 
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Spaho’s Willing Collaborators: The Case of the Čordić Family  
 In addition to the alienation of many Muslims in mixed areas, the letters to Reis Fehim 
Spaho also spoke of tragic and occasionally deadly family feuds, which were at least partially 
inspired by religious animosity.  The inheritance dispute that erupted within the Čordić family 
from the Bosnian town of Sanski Most as early as the 1920s illustrates the way in which Spaho’s 
1938 ban on mixed marriage seeped into the everyday life of a family, turning a mundane 
inheritance dispute into an existential debate over the confessional identity of individual family 
members, turning some into exemplary Muslims and excommunicating others.  The repercussion 
of this passionate debate—which played out in the minutes of Shari’a courts’ proceedings, letters 
of family members to the Reis Spaho, and petition letters to the district and Supreme Shari’a 
courts—was not only financial, but more importantly, was over what it meant to be a Muslim: 
Could a Muslim marry someone of another faith and in accordance with the ritual of that faith 
and still be considered a Muslim?; Who had the authority to declare an individual a (non) 
Muslim and if so what were the consequences of this excommunication?;  What was the 
relationship of a Muslim who committed apostasy to his community? These were the questions 
at the heart of the Čordić family dispute which reached the Supreme Shari’a Court in 1938, but 
which had originated in the 1920s and became particularly heated after the death of the family 
patriarch Hasan Čordić in October 1934.  While the questions the case raised were hardly new, 
as the Sarajevo court had dealt with these exact issues in the early 1930s and even before, the 
Čordić case illustrated the way in which ordinary Muslims could pragmatically adopt the 
narrative of their family dispute to suit the clerical establishment’s concern over the supposedly 
beleaguered Muslim identity in Yugoslavia.    
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 There seems to have been an unusual amount of acrimony within the Čordić family as 
early as the 1920s when the patriarch of the house Hasan Čordić sued his brother Muhamed, his 
mother Arifa, and his own son Ilijas, for conspiracy to murder him in his own courtyard. In his 
undated letter to the Sanski Most Shari’a court, which must have been written sometime between 
1920 and 1927256, Hasan recounts the day when his brother Muhamed with his nephew Ilijas 
attacked him as he was entering the house.  Muhamed came up behind him and started beating 
him with a stake while his son came from the other side and started pounding him with a 
bludgeon. After he fell down, Ilijas and Muhamed—his son and brother, respectively—rained 
down a tempest of punches and kicks in his ribs and his head.  Startled by the noise, Hasan’s 
wife Nejra ran out into the courtyard and tried to push the two away from her battered husband, 
but she was soon pushed back as Ilijas hit her over the head with the bludgeon and Muhamed 
punched her in the chest, knocking her over.  The attackers were finally scared away when Nejra 
managed to crawl to the gate, unlock it, and call for help.  In the letter Hasan claims that the 
attack was a part of a conspiracy concocted by his brother Muhamed and his mother Arifa, who 
at the time of the attack was conspicuously absent from the house, to murder Hasan in order to 
get the house and the surrounding land that their father—Arifa’s husband—left to the family 
after his death.  Muhamed had sued Hasan for this property but while the case was pending he 
was living on the bottom floor of the house where Hasan’s son Ilijas also moved after Hasan 
asked him to leave the home due to his unruly behavior and the supposedly bad company he had 
kept.  Hasan’s story is thus one of betrayal in that his entire family, including his son Ilijas, 
reportedly conspired to murder him over inheritance.   
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 Four years after his death, Hasan’s story of betrayal encountered the Reis’ ban on mixed 
marriage and was transformed into an existential battle over Islamic identity.  Hasan’s story is 
thus interesting not only in itself, but also for the moment in which it emerges in the archive: 
Hasan’s original letter recounting the story was attached to a petition by Hasan’s daughter 
Mensura to the Reis Spaho, dated 24 April 1939 (some four months after the ban on mixed 
marriage), in which Mensura begged the Reis to intervene with the local Shari’a court regarding 
her and her mother Nejra’s suit against Ilijas in which they wanted the Shari’a court to declare 
the latter a non-Muslim and strip him of his inheritance rights to his deceased father’s property.  
In her letter, Mensura urged the Reis to expedite the case which, in her mind, had dragged on for 
far too long and which had been triggered after the death of Hasan on 2 October 1934 when 
Nejra petitioned the Sanski Most Shari’a court to excommunicate her son Ilijas who had in the 
meantime moved to Serbia, married a Serbian woman, and converted to Orthodoxy.  Because he 
had kissed the Orthodox cross during his wedding ceremony in 1927 and in 1936 officially 
converted, changing his name to Ilija, Mensura and her mother argued that their brother and son, 
respectively, was no longer a Muslim and as such had no claim to the house and the surrounding 
land left by late Hasan.  According to Mensura, her brother had moved to the Serbian port town 
of Kladovo where he married a Serbian woman in September 1927 and officially converted to 
Orthodoxy in 1936.  It is not clear from the letters if it was Ilijas’ conversion in 1936 or Hasan’s 
death in 1934 that spurred Nejra, the mother, to initiate excommunication proceedings, but on 29 
March 1938 the Sanski Most Shari’a court ruled in favor of Nejra and declared Ilija (formerly 
Ilijas) a non-Muslim, automatically stripping him of inheritance rights.  The reason Mensura 
wrote two urgent letters to the Reis Spaho in January and April of 1939 was because the 
Supreme Shari’a Court in Sarajevo had overturned the ruling of the Sanski Most court, ordering 
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an inheritance proceeding to be conducted before a ruling could be made on the confessional 
identity of Ilijas (Ilija).  It was during the time when the Sanski Most court was attempting to 
arrange a hearing, which Ilija had repeatedly refused to attend, that Mensura and her mother 
Nejra drafted the letters to the Reis, urging him to intervene with the Supreme court on their 
behalf.  In her January 1939 letter, after pointing to the enclosed marriage certificate of Ilija, 
which proved that he had married in an Orthodox church in 1927, Mensura thanked the Reis 
Spaho for banning mixed marriage:  
My mother and I offer you the deepest gratitude for coming up with the law on 
marriage, that is, for banning marriage between Muslims and non-Muslims as the 
time has finally come for these evils to end, but unfortunately my brother and my 
uncle have already left Islam regardless of having been raised in Islam and when I 
think of what they have done I become ashamed of myself, but I have renounced 
all my ties to them.257 
 
 The letter was a clever way of embedding the past of a family feud into the contemporary 
narrative of Muslim victimization and it seems that in this, Mensura and Nejra had gotten 
considerable help from local clerics.  Nejra herself admitted as much in her letter from 2 October 
1938 to the Supreme Shari’a Court in Sarajevo in which she urged the highest court to reject 
Ilija’s appeal to the ruling of the Sanski Most court.  Pleading with the judge to rule in the favor 
of the “two poor women who have no one else,” Nejra reminded the court that Ilija had 
abandoned not only his family, but the entire Islamic community: “Even if you did not want to 
consider our position [when deciding the case], in front of you, you have a man who does not 
serve as a good example for the Islamic religious community and as such can lead others 
astray..”258  In helping her tell the story through the more sophisticated lens of the Shari’a 
inheritance law, Nejra admitted having consulted with the muderis of Brčko, who in turn 
consulted with a local Shari’a judge, after which they both had instructed her to tell the qadi 
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(Shari’a judge) that as it stands in both “Mejelle and Ludelei-Feraizu…it is not possible for a 
non-Muslim to inherit after a Muslim.”259  As it is highly improbable that most Muslims would 
be able to describe the inheritance procedures of the Shari’a in such technical terms, it is clear 
that Mejra had been through what it seems like a crash-course on the Shari’a inheritance law.  
Mensura’s letters to the Reis Spaho after the ban on mixed marriage and the law ordering 
excommunication of all Muslims who married in accordance with the rituals of another faith 
further buttressed the portrayal of Nejra and Mensura as poor Muslim women abandoned not 
only by a disloyal son, but by a murtad, a Muslim who had committed the mortal sin of apostasy. 
 In its ruling on 23 December 1939, the Sanski Most Shari’a court reaffirmed its earlier 
ruling, once again accepting the arguments of Nejra and Mensura that Ilijas had ceased to be a 
Muslim the moment he married in an Orthodox Church in 1927—some seven years before the 
death of his father—and as such had no inheritance rights to Muslim-owned property.  The ruling 
pointed to the marriage certificate issued by the Orthodox church in Kladovo, and provided by 
Nejra, as uncontestable evidence that Ilijas had left Islam by marrying in an Orthodox ritual 
which necessitated that both spouses accept the secret of the Holy Trinity.260  The ruling’s 
unequivocal designation of Ilijas (now Ilija) as a murtad ignored the Sarajevo Supreme Shari’a 
court ruling in 1934, discussed in the previous chapter, which had stated that the place at which 
the marriage was conducted and the rituals which were performed during the ceremony did not 
determine the validity of such marriage and could not be used as arguments to excommunicate 
Muslims.   
 In his appeal to the Sanski Most ruling, Ilija forcefully challenged the authority of the 
court to legislate his confessional identity echoing the arguments of many legal scholars—
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including reformist Shari’a jurists—that exposing oneself to marriage rituals of another faith did 
not constitute an act of apostasy.   Arguing that “[t]here is not a single law which would 
authorize a Shari’a court to declare that someone is a Muslim or that he belongs to a different 
confession,”261 Ilijas claimed that this jurisdiction belonged to the local office of the imam who 
had in the meantime confirmed that he was a Muslim.  Cleverly exploiting the chronic 
jurisdictional competition between different branches of the Islamic hierarchy, Ilijas pointed to a 
1939 order by the imam of Sanski Most, which had instructed him to legalize his marriage by 
conducting a Shari’a marriage ceremony at the local court: “And what does this mean?  It means 
that in the eyes [of the Sanski Most imam] I was still a Muslim at that moment and had I 
registered my marriage with the local Shari’a court, I would continue being a Muslim.”262  In 
other words, the Sanski Most Shari’a court could not excommunicate him at the same time the 
Sanski Most imam was (inadvertently) acknowledging his continuing membership in the Islamic 
religious community.  In addition, Ilijas pointed to the baptismal records of the Kladovo 
Orthodox Church, which showed the date of his baptism to be 27 August 1936, almost two years 
after his father’s death, in insisting that he was still a Muslim at the time of his father’s death in 
October 1934.  Thus, his appeal of the Sanski Most Shari’a court ruling went beyond a simple 
jurisdictional challenge of the court in that it echoed the long-standing argument of the reformers 
that entering a mixed marriage under the auspices of church or secular authority did not 
constitute apostasy. 
 Ilija’s appeal also challenged the professional objectivity of the Sanski Most Shari’a court 
and in this, it seemed to confirm that in the crafting of the narrative of her lawsuit, Nejra had 
been in large part driven by a behind-the-scenes lobbying effort by a local (Sanski Most) Shari’a 
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judge that was in part helped by the intervention of the Reis himself.  In the appeal letter, Ilija 
reminded the Supreme Shari’a justices that during the entire case the Sanski Most court had 
acted not as an impartial judge, but rather as a passionate advocate for Nejra and Mensura.  In 
particular, Ilijas remembered that it was the court officials who investigated his baptismal and 
marriage records in the Kladovo Orthodox church and not Nejra’s lawyers as the law prescribed.  
Ilijas had used the similar argument in his earlier letter to the court in which he had pointed to 
the friendship between the wife of a Sanski Most Shari’a judge and Nejra and called for 
inheritance proceedings to be held under the auspices of another, objective, Shari’a court.263  The 
criticism was significant as it prompted the same Sanski Most judge (whose name is 
unintelligible in the document) to write to the Sarajevo Supreme Shari’a Court on 24 April 1939 
and defend his professionalism.  Acknowledging that Nejra did spend a considerable amount of 
time visiting with his wife, the judge protested Ilijas’ insinuations that this could somehow cloud 
his objectivity in the case: “As it is customary for women to visit one another Nejra Čordić also 
comes over to visit my family, but because I spend most of the day outside of the house it is rare 
that I see Nejra Čordić in my house, but even when I do see her, I never utter a single word about 
her case because I do not usually discuss office matters with anyone.”264  In what is either the 
evidence of much broader cooperation between the Sanski Most judge and Nejra or a stunning 
coincidence, the same day the Sanski Most judge wrote to the Sarajevo Supreme Court, 
defending his professional reputation, Nejra’s daughter Mensura wrote a letter to the Reis Spaho 
responding to the same charge by Ilija that the judge had been unprofessionally meddling in the 
case and encouraging Nejra to pursue the case.  Begging the Reis to intervene with the court and 
deny Ilijas’ demand to move the proceedings to another district because this would mean 
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additional costs for her and her mother, Mensura insisted that by leaving Islam Ilija had lost his 
rights: “We are already struggling to deal with the mounting legal debt and there is no way we 
could go to another district, so I kiss your hand Reis-effendi and beg of you to tell the Supreme 
Shari’a Court to end this matter already, that is, for them to excommunicate Ilija…is it just that 
because of these trivial matters the whole case drag on, and to meet the demands of a pseudo-
Vlah265, while our interest rates are climbing…?”266  That the Reis Spaho did intervene on their 
behalf is confirmed by the fact that in both letters to him, Mensura thanks him for his support 
and his promise to do everything in his powers to help them.  Therefore, Ilijas’ argument that the 
lawsuit against him had been orchestrated not only by his mother and sister, but had in large part 
been driven by the local Shari’a court is borne out by the timing of the letters by Nejra and the 
judge in question as well as the Reis’ own promise of intervention on behalf of Nejra which he 
made to her daughter Mensura. 
  What the Čordić case aptly illustrates is the escalation of ethnic demands in the everyday 
life of Muslims following the ban on mixed marriage and the careful collaboration between the 
elites and non-elites in making religiously-based ethnicity more salient.  The story shows a 
remarkable ability of Nejra and her daughter Mensura to embed a decade old family conflict into 
the new ideological reality of the late 1930s Bosnia: Ilijas, the outcast son and brother, 
respectively, who had attempted to murder his own father to take his property was now 
transformed into an apostate who, with his mixed marriage and conversion to Orthodoxy, 
became a threat to Islam.  The coaching Nejra and Mensura received from the local clerics in 
giving Ilijas this makeover suggests that rather than being a heavy handed imposition by the 
elites, the overwhelming salience of ethno-religious identity was a result of a collaborative 
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alliance between elites and non-elites, a point that many studies of national indifference 
underemphasize. 
Conclusion 
 The fate of Husein Kulenović Busovača, who was ordered to appear before his district 
Shari’a court to answer the charges of religious negligence, was similar to that of many 
Europeans during the first half of the twentieth century who were swept up by their own 
national dramas.  “Religiously indifferent” Muslims in the late 1930s Bosnia echoed the 
behavior of the early twentieth-century Bohemian parents who resisted the pleas of German 
and Czech nationalists to stamp out the bilingualism of their own children, the Ukrainian 
peasants who in 1925 reacted with confusion to the attempts of Leninist officials to assign 
them a national identity, and the citizens of mixed descent living in post-WWI Alsace Lorraine 
who were issued special identity cards distinguishing them from their nationally unambiguous 
neighbors.   Just as the institutionalization of nation-state in post WWI Europe resulted in 
greater surveillance of nationally ambiguous individuals, the resurgence of the conservatives 
within the recently homogenized Bosnian Muslim institutions in the second half of the 1930s 
turned mixed marriage Muslims into a problem to be regulated, banned, and eventually 
excommunicated. 
 The Supreme Shari’a Court’s decision to place Husein’s children under the protective 
custody of a more devout Muslim portended the intrusive reach of the Shari’a into the lives of 
many mixed marriage couples on the eve of World War II.   For example, in late 1940 the 
recently wed couple Višnja Smiciklaš and Sulejman Hrenovica were summoned to the district 
Shari’a court in Sarajevo and subjected to a criminal style interrogation by judges who were 
bent on proving that the couple had cleverly tried to exploit the loophole in the ban on mixed 
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marriage by claiming that they had wed before the ban went into effect and were now only 
seeking to have their marriage registered, a strategy that many couples successfully used in 
obtaining approval for their mixed unions.267  The questioning was similar to that of Husein 
from the beginning of our story in that it showed the determination of the presiding judge to 
investigate the most intimate corners of the couple’s romantic life, but also Sulejman’s protest 
against what he saw as the authorities’ illegitimate intrusion into his “private matters.”268  But 
like the case of Husein Kulenović Busovača, the aggressive investigation of Sulejman and 
Višnja belied the limits of Shari’a jurisdiction in a secular state: despite the decision of the 
Supreme Court it is highly doubtful that Husein’s children were ever taken away from him and 
the marriage of Sulejman and Višnja was eventually approved.  In short, these Bosnians could 
talk back to the imposing Shari’a authorities and in the process reveal, in the words of Zahra, 
“the outer limits of nationalizing projects.”269 
 It is important to emphasize, however, that in the Bosnian case, indifference was not only 
“called into being by nationalists themselves through their own paranoia” to quote Zahra 
again,270 but was also a concern that animated many ordinary Bosnians to re-examine their 
lives in their efforts to be better Muslims.  In their petitions to the Reis-ul-ulema they 
confessed to their own failures to uphold the standards of Islamic parenting, worried about the 
religious indifference of their young children, sought police help in breaking up mixed 
relationships of their adult children, and attributed their own religious apathy to their treatment 
at the hands of Christian neighbors.  Precisely because the intensely ideological tenor of these 
petitions masked the more practical concerns of the petitioners these sources reveal the process 
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by which religiously-based national identity became so compelling to many ordinary 
individuals: it offered them a coherent narrative through which they could not only explain, but 
also improve their lives.  Thus, the Muslim victimhood narrative became the paradigm through 
which a railway clerk in Slovenia could explain the “emotional depression” into which he had 
fallen, could turn an anonymous, unemployed Zagreb man into a newspaper sensation and a 
symbol of wounded Muslim pride, and help an elderly woman make sense of her tragic 
estrangement from her son.  The last example in particular, the Čordić family feud, neatly 
illustrates the collaboration of the elites and non-elites in that Mensura and her daughter Nejra 
were almost certainly coached by the local Shari’a judge and the imam in transforming their 
long-running inheritance dispute into an existential crisis of Islamic identity.  These examples 
then complicate the image of nationalist elites as imposing ideologically coherent identities on 
a recalcitrant population by suggesting that in their worries about religious indifference the 
elites might have been responding to grassroots pressure as much as they were acting out of 
their own paranoia.   
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CHAPTER III 
Lowering Socialist Expectations: 
The Yugoslav Communists and the Neglect of Mixed Marriage 
 
Mixed marriages and their offspring are manifestations of a process whose 
characteristics are not affected by offspring’s subjective declarations of belonging 
to the father’s or the mother’s nation.  The process of ethno-biological 
homogenization does not have to be completely in sync with the process of socio-
cultural homogenization and although these two phenomena are…connected, 
individuals [in mixed marriage] do not have to be aware of this connection. 
 
Ruža Petrović, 
1968271 
 
Some have tried to use mixed marriages to justify and sustain the idea of a 
Yugoslav nation.  However, this approach is highly unscientific and tendentious.  
First of all, a nation is acquired not through birth, because nation is a social rather 
than a biological category.  A nation neither appears nor disappears via mixed 
marriages…Even though there is a high number of mixed marriages in our 
country, this does not create any Yugoslav nation.  The question of national 
belonging of children from mixed marriages creates unnecessary dilemmas and 
illusions particularly if one has in mind the fact that most often, mixed marriage 
parents have still chosen for their children one of the national categories. 
 
Hamdija Pozderac, 1971272  
 
 The two quotes, by Yugoslavia’s leading sociologist and a high-level Communist 
functionary, respectively, reveal a moment in the life of socialist Yugoslavia when mixed 
marriage came roaring back as an issue in the midst of the country’s most serious identity crisis 
since its creation in 1945.  Less than twenty years after the Communists had declared that their 
federal rearrangement of Yugoslavia had solved the national question, antagonisms between the 
country’s nationalities sent the party leadership scrambling for a response.  In the midst of what 
one prominent Communist functionary described as the party’s “crisis of ideas,”273 country’s 
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chief theoreticians redefined Yugoslavia’s identity in the span of a decade, marking a departure 
from their Marxist roots that can only be described as revolutionary.  The revamping of the 
regime’s nationality policy included a revision of the country’s theoretical premise, an effort to 
transfer many powers from the federation to the republics, and most importantly for our 
purposes, denounce all hopes for the emergence of a Yugoslav nation as reactionary, 
chauvinistic, and unrealistic.  By emphasizing the permanence of national identities and branding 
any supranational, integrative sense of belonging as reactionary or misguided, the party isolated 
mixed marriage as an issue that had to be discussed lest it be used to deny national differences.  
It was in this context that Hamdija Pozderac, one of the leading members of the Bosnian Central 
Committee, mocked the idea of mixed marriage as a melting pot of national identities.   
 In their vehement rejection of mixed identities the Communists were at odds with the 
country’s leading sociologists, such as the marriage scholar Ruža Petrović, who argued that the 
seismic postwar transformation of Yugoslavia had led to a process of biological homogenization 
of the different Yugoslav nations.  Although her argument was belied by her empirical evidence, 
which showed continuing ethnic divisions, unlike the Communists, Petrović proved a true 
Marxist in remaining hopeful that the material reality, which she saw as characterized by the 
inexorable lurch towards a more integrative identity, did not depend upon subjective feelings of 
individuals who had remained stubbornly national.  While for Petrović biology trumped 
ideology, for the Communist leaders it was national sentiments that caused them to revise the 
goals of socialism. 
 Thus, not only did the Yugoslav Communist regime not use mixed marriage as a trope for 
a Yugoslav nation, but starting in the 1960s its officials openly derided the idea that such a 
nation was in the making.  During the first decade of socialism, mixed marriage figured in the 
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regime’s nationality policies only to the extent that it was a part of the larger campaign to 
secularize the society by confining organized religion to easily monitored spaces, an effort which 
included the introduction of obligatory civil marriage.  Enthusiastic pronouncements by officials 
that Yugoslav citizens were abandoning religion in droves implied emptying of religious content 
out of national identities, but did not mean the erasure of these identities.  Revolutionary policies 
came only in the 1960s when the regime clarified its attitude towards the nation by openly 
embracing it and denouncing any integrative identity as antisocialist.  In other words, the 
regime’s most revolutionary policy was surprisingly anti-Marxist and represented a deathblow to 
the Yugoslav idea more than twenty years before the country’s ultimate demise.  It was in the 
midst of this regime-instigated national revival that mixed marriage emerged as an issue to be 
quantified, analyzed, and discussed.  It was no accident that the first serious sociological studies 
of mixed marriage in Yugoslavia appeared only in the late 1960s on the heels of the regime’s 
embrace of national identities.  Surprisingly, it was the sociologists who were more consistent 
Marxists from the Marxists in power as it was the sociologists who viewed mixed marriage as a 
symptom of the biological homogenization of identities and held out in their belief in the 
transformative power of socialism.  When faced with Yugoslavia’s version of the turbulent 
sixties—characterized by massive student protests, the rise of republican-based Communist 
elites, fragmentation of political power, and the regionally uneven economic development—
regime’s chief theoreticians responded by lowering expectations: socialism was no longer going 
to free people of their religiosity, would not lead people to adopt less exclusive identities, and 
had in fact not solved the national question.  Instead, people were now being asked to celebrate 
their national specificities and embrace “Yugoslav socialist patriotism,” a notion that was as 
vague as it was detrimental to Yugoslavia’s future for it wedded the country to a single ideology. 
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Although the theoretical premises of Yugoslavism had always been somewhat foggy 
even in its inception in the early 19th century, the 1960s were a watershed because the Yugoslav 
Communists broke definitely with the idea.  That the early Yugoslavs chose Illyria as the name 
for their utopia suggested nostalgia for both, the pre-Slav antiquity of the Balkans and for a 
Napoleon-style unification of the Slav lands, as the name echoed his brief occupation of 
Dalmatia during the first decade of the century.  The tension between the desire for the South 
Slav unification based on a vague notion of a common ancient past and one based on military 
might accompanied the historical trajectory of the movement right up to its demise in the 1960s.  
Before being cut short by imperial realpolitik the early 19th century flirtation between the 
movement’s Croatian-born founder Ljudevit Gaj and the King of a politically and militarily 
confident Serbia laid bare the difficulties in defining the ultimate goal of Yugoslavism: was it to 
simply liberate the South Slavs from the yoke of empires, unify them into a loose state which 
would grant them the autonomy they so desired while living under empire, or would they melt 
into Serbia, the Balkan Piedmont, or into an entirely new nation?  The crumbling of empires in 
1918 made the South Slav state a reality, but instead of answering these questions, the creation of 
first Yugoslavia seemed to multiply them.  Democratic parliamentarianism made for a bottleneck 
in which the different visions of Yugoslavia—as a confederation, a federation, another 
centralized France, a Greater Serbia—became jammed.  Meant to break the jam, King 
Alexander’s dictatorship in 1929 broke the entire bottle by turning Yugoslavia into a synonym 
for Serbian tyranny, the reaction to which entailed the dismantling of the state into a Serbian-
Croat confederation.  Hitler’s invasion of Yugoslavia and the bloody civil wars ripped the 
country apart, but the cataclysmic nature of World War II also made it a fertile ground for the 
dreaming up of new utopias.   
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Playing out on the larger stage of World War II, these civil wars were Yugoslav 
Communists’ own “baptism by fire,” to borrow Sheila Fitzpatrick’s famous assessment of the 
importance of the Russian Civil War for the Bolsheviks274, in that they created an opportunity for 
Tito’s Communists to redefine the country’s foundational premise and divorce it from its 
universally despised interwar version.  In the words of Dennison Russinow: “It was the war itself 
which gradually created a propensity to accept a rebirth of the idea in a form which promised 
national equality and autonomy in a federal framework.”275  The interwar and (early) Communist 
dictatorships differed in method more than in their ultimate goal, which was to prod people into a 
coherent, overarching identity be it Yugoslav or socialist, respectively.  But while the interwar 
answer to the national question was to suffocate national identities while preserving their 
religious content, the Communists, at least during their first decade and a half in power, strove to 
preserve national identities but empty them of their religious substance.  It was the failure of this 
policy that led to the re-emergence of mixed marriage as a controversial issue in the late 1960s. 
The Failure of Secularization  
Prior to the 1960s, the Yugoslav Communist Party (the League of Communists of 
Yugoslavia after 1952) had barely addressed the issue of mixed marriage, a reticence that was a 
reflection of the party’s deeper ambivalence vis-à-vis the national question.  As Paul Shoup has 
pointed out in his now classic study of the Yugoslav Communists’ approach to nationalism, the 
party’s policy problems in this area date to the early 20th century when the Serbian socialists first 
proposed the idea of a Balkan federation with their Croatian counterparts remaining suspicious 
and instead calling for an autonomous Croatia.  Throughout the interwar period, the party’s 
approach to the national question swung abruptly from one extreme position to another: while 
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they greeted the creation of first Yugoslavia with enthusiasm, the Yugoslav Communists soon 
yielded to pressure from Stalin’s Comintern and began to advocate the country’s disintegration, 
calling on all nations to secede from the union, a policy that eventually caused the Yugoslav 
regime to ban the party in 1921.  The rise of Hitler pushed Stalin into a more cooperative united 
front approach, causing the Yugoslav Communists to drop the anti-Yugoslav approach.  In 
addition, the arrival of Tito at the helm of the party in 1937 ameliorated internal disagreements 
somewhat, but the party’s factional disputes continued throughout World War II even in the 
midst of the Communist-led Partisan resistance against the Nazis.  These disputes often had a 
pronounced nationalist tenor, as was the case in Macedonia where the Yugoslavs struggled with 
the Bulgarians for the influence within the party and in Croatia where the Partisan movement 
was mostly composed of Serbs and the Zagreb Communist Party refused to carry out orders from 
the headquarters causing Tito to purge the entire leadership in 1941.  Shoup argues that it was the 
Communists’ tortured experience in dealing with nationalism that eventually made them more 
nuanced in their approach.  
It was this nuanced approach that led Tito and his party to create a federal Yugoslavia in 
which all nations were granted at least nominal autonomy within the six republics and two 
autonomous provinces as the party strove to distance itself from the idea of a Yugoslav nation, 
which had been advocated by the failed interwar state.  Because the Yugoslav idea had become 
synonymous with Greater Serbian expansionism by the end of World War II, the Communists 
obsessively repeated their respect for the equality and specificity of all nations.  In the words of 
Shoup, “[p]arty propaganda never really attempted to persuade the Partisan that he was a 
Yugoslav rather than a Serb, Croat, or Macedonian, but sought rather to get him to tolerate 
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persons of other national origins.”276  Although the party’s idea of “brotherhood and unity” never 
even implied the disappearance of national differences in favor of some new Yugoslav nation, its 
atheism, hostility towards organized religion, and the confidence about the transformative 
powers of socialism did reveal their hope that nations would eventually become irrelevant in the 
new Yugoslavia. 
 Despite its varied approach to different religions in Yugoslavia, until the 1960s the 
Communist regime remained largely consistent in its attempts to secularize the society.  As 
Sabrina Ramet has pointed out, Tito’s policy towards religion, like the religious policies of most 
other Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, was motivated not by dogmatic atheism but rather 
by political pragmatism.  More specifically, official Communist attitude towards a particular 
religion was dependent upon the way the institutions of that religion had carried themselves 
during World War II, their size, the extent to which they were willing to allow governmental 
interference in their affairs, and the ethnic composition of the country.  It was because 
Communist regimes based their religious policies on political calculations rather than firm atheist 
principles that these policies often varied based on the political currents of the day.277   
 In Yugoslavia, upon assuming power Tito’s regime embarked on an aggressive campaign 
to confine religious life to public spaces where they could be easily monitored by the state.  In 
1946, the Communists abolished the Shari’a courts, closed down most of religious schools, 
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including mektebs, expropriated numerous church and mosque properties, and ordered religious 
institutions to relinquish their birth, marriage, and death records.  After initially resisting, the 
Islamic and Orthodox establishments largely acquiesced to the new order, elected religious 
officials who were generally not hostile to the government, and supported state-sponsored 
clerical associations.  Thus, by the late 1950s, the Patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church had 
established a modus vivendi of sorts with the regime even lending his support to the regime’s 
creation of an autocephalous Macedonian Orthodox Church in 1967.278  For their part, after their 
initial resistance to the Communist state over the expropriation of waqf property, Muslim clerics 
in Bosnia largely supported state’s secularization of marriage, the ban on women’s full-faced veil 
(feredža), and state literacy campaigns amongst Muslim women.  By 1955 the relations between 
the regime and Islamic authorities had improved to such an extent that the President of the 
Federal Commission for Religious Affairs Dobrivoje Radosavljević declared at the meeting of 
the Federal Executive Council that year (SIV): “When it comes to the leadership of the Islamic 
religious community we can safely say that we have best relations with them—relative to the 
Orthodox and Catholic church.”279  Indeed, the Catholic Church remained steadfast in its 
opposition to the state, the position that, in addition to its collaboration with the wartime Ustasha 
regime in Croatia, eventually led to the trial of its archbishop Alojzije Stepinac in 1946 when he 
was sentenced to 16 years in prison for his supposed Ustasha activities during World War II.280  
Following the imprisonment of the archbishop, the relations between the state and the Catholic 
Church deteriorated further with the majority of the clergy vehemently opposing government-
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sponsored clerical societies, protesting against expropriation of its property, and complaining of 
constant harassment by local officials.  In addition to its different approaches to different 
religions, the state policy was further fragmented at the republican level as it was implemented 
by republican-based Commissions for Religious Affairs.  But the common thread uniting 
Communist attitudes towards all religions in all republics was the effort to secularize the society 
and in particular, to divorce religious from national identity. 
 This effort became particularly evident during the state’s campaign to introduce 
obligatory civil marriage immediately upon assuming power in 1945, a campaign which came 
under sustained assault by the Catholic Church under Archbishop Alojzije Stepinac.  Stepinac 
spoke out against civil marriage in a written message to all Catholics in July 1945 in which he 
argued that the Catholic Church had exclusive jurisdiction over marriages between Catholics, 
reminded his flock that Christian marriages could never be resolved, and warned that anyone 
who entered into a civil marriage “would be committing a grave sin in front of God…”281 Even 
Monsignor Rotig, known as someone who was sympathetic to the regime, urged the Yugoslav 
Parliament during its debate on marriage in January 1946 to follow the example of the United 
States and allow individuals the freedom to choose between religious and civil marriage and 
warned the legislators “not to offend people’s religious feelings.”282   
 As if sensing possible public opposition to civil marriage, the Sarajevo daily 
Oslobodjenje and other major newspapers printed an article, which was a defense of civil 
marriage and which argued that “civil marriage is simply a natural consequence of the separation 
of church and state.”  Preempting any charges of repression, the article pointed out that civil 
marriage had been made obligatory in most European countries after a prolonged battle with the 
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church.  In interwar Yugoslavia the supremacy of the church over the state meant that marriage 
relations were “medieval” as the Church “jealously guarded” its jurisdiction, turning marriage 
into “a dungeon” for many people, particularly Catholics who could never obtain a divorce.  But 
besides being a political issue, the introduction of obligatory civil marriage was also a biological 
imperative designed to correct religion’s “violence against nature” manifested in its centuries’ 
old opposition to mixed marriage.  By devising laws which had made mixed marriage practically 
impossible, the church and mosque “had deepened artificial differences between members of 
different faiths.”  Making mixed marriages possible was also paramount for the stability of 
Yugoslavia because religion had become synonymous with nation, cementing differences 
between Yugoslavia’s peoples into “Chinese walls.”  Thus, civil marriage was “to create the 
possibilities for genuine unity so that marriage ties between peoples of the same blood but 
different faiths can further strengthen the foundations of our state structure.”283  But if religious 
differences were superficial as well as synonymous with nations then the implication was that 
national differences would eventually become irrelevant once they shed their religious character. 
One of the first steps the regime took in secularizing identities of Yugoslavs was to 
repossess birth, marriage, and death registries from religious authorities, a campaign which 
began in earnest as early as 1946.  The 1946 Law on Registries nationalized all registries and 
prohibited religious officials from entering any individual information, including baptismal 
records, before the state could inspect and stamp these registries.  Local police authorities 
implemented the law with such zeal that many priests were punished with stiff fines for even 
entering additional information into the records that had already been inspected and approved by 
state authorities.  During the second half of 1946 complaints poured into the Bosnian 
Commission for Religious Affairs (KVP) in which priests pointed out that the registry law did 
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not prohibit them from supplementing records, which the state had already sealed, with 
additional information, such as death of an individual or baptism of a child.  Often the state 
Commission intervened on behalf of religious authorities.  For example, in November 1947 the 
Commission wrote a complaint to the President of Bosnia-Herzegovina asking him to reprimand 
the People’s Committee in the northern Bosnian town of Derventa for overstepping its authority 
in preventing church officials from entering any information on baptism of children, harassing 
church officials to turn over those records that have been sealed by the state and were church’s 
private property, and for prohibiting congregations of children in churches even for purposes of 
religious rituals.284  The complaints were numerous enough that the Commission felt compelled 
to ask its Croatian and Serbian counterparts for clarification of the Law on Registries and the 
latter agreed that clergy were allowed to use registries for their own purposes after they had been 
sealed by the state.  The Bosnian KVP then wrote a complaint to the Bosnian Interior Ministry 
arguing that priests had been unjustly punished.  In the letter, the KVP official pointed out that 
“the law does not specify that after a state clerk has placed the official closure on the records, on 
9 May 1946, the priest cannot use the registry for church recordkeeping which of course after the 
state sealed it has no legal ramifications.”285  When the Interior Ministry did not budge, the 
matter had to be referred to the Attorney General who eventually sided with the police and 
modified the law to clearly ban the use of registries for any purposes after the state seal had been 
placed.  Despite the fact that the amended law was passed almost three years after the original 
Law on Registries, the priests who had been fined in the meantime were not pardoned although 
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some had their fines lowered.286  The repossession of birth, marriage and death registries was 
part and parcel of the larger campaign to secularize marriage.   
The Basic Law on Marriage, adopted in April 1946, introduced obligatory civil marriage 
and proscribed prison and financial penalties for religious figures that presided over marriage 
ceremonies before they could be sanctioned by state justices of peace.  However, in the spirit of 
the Article 46 of the 1946 Constitution, which proclaimed religion to be “a free and private 
matter of the individual,”287 Yugoslavs could still choose to have their marriages sanctioned by 
religious authorities but only after a visit to their city hall.  Since the state saw civil marriage as 
the foundation of socialism offending priests were vigorously prosecuted.  For example, in June 
1958 a Catholic priest by the name of Josip Tomić, from a central Bosnian village was sentenced 
to nine months in prison for concluding a marriage that had not been previously sanctioned by 
state authorities.  In his appeal the priest assured the authorities that he had been duped by the 
bride and groom who had falsely told him that they had previously concluded their marriage in 
the city hall.  The appellate court denied his appeal, arguing that the priest had been required to 
obtain a proof of marriage from the newlyweds before officiating a church wedding, but lowered 
his punishment from nine to seven months in prison.288   
Those priests who were suspected of being opposed to civil or mixed marriages were kept 
under police surveillance.  In a police report submitted to the Mostar section of the Commission 
for Religious Affairs in January 1962, the authorities in the central Bosnian town of Konjic 
worried about “the lively activities” of two priests who had been lobbying a few local Catholic 
families to have their marriages sanctioned by the church.  According to the report, father Leo 
Radišić had visited the house of Sara Kobačić in order to persuade her recently wed daughter to 
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have a church wedding.  After the woman assured the priest that her daughter would not listen to 
her pleas, he reportedly scolded the mother for not properly raising her daughter.  In another 
instance, “the priests were angry” after a Catholic woman had married “some Serb,” and “father 
Mikulić declared that he would no longer bless the house” of her family.289  The chief of the 
Commission considered the report important enough to include it in the briefing material 
presented to the other members at their regular meeting.  In 1959, a Catholic priest in the 
Western Herzegovinian town of Čitluk was reported of having used his sermons to speak against 
civil marriage, denigrate its value, and urge young people to have their marriages concluded in 
churches.  After being summoned by the local authorities, he reportedly expressed regret for his 
behavior, but it is not clear if he ever faced any other legal consequences.290  The state’s 
surveillance of opposition to civil and mixed marriages was not limited to church officials. 
 If opposition to mixed marriage could land a priest’s name on the pages of police reports 
and result in summons to the local police station, for members of the Communist Party such 
opposition meant immediate expulsion and public condemnation by the party.  In December 
1953, the Mostar newspaper Sloboda, which was the official mouthpiece of the local League of 
Communists, reported that the local party officials had held a meeting at which they expelled one 
of their members for his opposition to his (Muslim) daughter’s marriage to a Serb.  Even though 
Ahmet K. and his wife Hana had been active in the War of Liberation and had been loyal party 
members, Ahmet became distraught after his daughter married “a Communist who was Orthodox 
by birth.”  Ahmet’s opposition to the union was so vehement that he broke off all ties to his 
daughter and had rebuffed his wife’s attempts at reconciliation.  Because Ahmet “viewed the 
marriage with the eyes of a religious fanatic,” the party members voted to expel him “as it is no 
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way possible to be a Communist with those beliefs regardless of his past or future.”291  The 
article’s title, “backward beliefs,” and its insistence that Ahmet’s behavior was more appropriate 
to someone “living fifty or hundred years ago” than to someone who belonged to the League of 
Communists echoed the party’s larger message at the time that religious differences were a 
remnant of the past and by implication, that the Communists were the vanguard of the future. 
 Besides secularizing family, another way to make Yugoslavs less religious was to follow 
the Marxist prescription and raise their economic, cultural, and educational living standards.  Of 
course, it is well known that members of the Communist party could not be religious, as Tito 
himself stated as early as 1936: “In our worldview we [the Communists] ascribe to dialectic 
materialism and as such, we are nonbelievers.  On the other hand, Catholics in their worldview 
are idealists, they believe in God and Church dogmas.  These two worldviews are truly 
irreconcilable.”292  In 1952 obligatory atheism was inserted in the Yugoslav League of 
Communist Statute and in the following six years over 7,000 Party members was expelled for 
expressions of religiosity, which included attending religious services and even funerals.293   
 It is clear that during the first decade the regime hoped to extend their atheism to the 
populace.  At the meeting of the Federal Executive Council in late 1955, the president of the 
Federal Commission for Religious Affairs Dobrivoje Radosavljević expressed satisfaction with 
progress made not only in repressing the activities of antisocialist clerics but also in “freeing 
people from religious feelings and traditions.”  In addition to various administrative measures, “it 
was in large part educational and cultural work that has affected the changes in religiosity.”  In 
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the very next sentence, however, Radosavljević countered this optimistic assessment, noting that 
government’s relaxation of repressive measures in the early 1950s294 had had the opposite effect: 
With the transition from the administrative period, the move away from the period 
of state intervention in many areas, and the transition to socialist democracy, 
during 1952 and 1953, there was a wave of intensifying religious feeling and the 
increase in religious gatherings.  With the development of new democratic 
relations it is a natural thing for religious life to manifest itself more in such 
conditions.295 
   
 The Commission director was particularly disappointed with the information obtained 
during the last census, in 1953, when more than fourteen and a half million citizens had chosen 
to identify themselves as belonging to one of the faiths and only two million had left the rubric 
blank.  Thus, even though in the two years since the relaxation of administrative measures, 
religious life had to a certain extent become depoliticized, “It is significant that a large number of 
our citizens still feel as members of one of the religious communities.”  Lest the regime be lulled 
into a false sense of security, Radosavljević warned that the census “shows that in terms of 
problems with religious feelings of the masses we will continue to have difficulties for a long 
period of time.”296  Essential to battling religiosity was not only the continuation of efforts to 
support pro-regime clerics in order to neutralize the work of those who were unsympathetic to 
the socialist order, but also the intensification of economic development since poverty, according 
to Radosavljević, was the main reason people turned to religion. 
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 Not everyone at the meeting, however, shared this orthodox Marxist view.  For 
Aleksandar Ranković—the Vice President of the Federal Executive Council and the chief of the 
feared secret police or UDBA—the census had revealed a false picture of religiosity because it 
had been flawed.  In particular, Ranković objected to the decision to include the category of 
“confessional affiliation” in the census: 
I think that the data on the confessional affiliation, which Comrade Bobi 
[Radosavljević] presented on the basis of the census, cannot be considered to 
represent the reality.  Nevertheless, it should not be important to us whether 
individuals feel members of this or that church or if they are religiously 
predisposed, if they have religious feeling or not.  I think the most important point 
is that in those forms used for the census we should not have included that rubric 
in the first place because by introducing it we forced people into a dilemma as to 
what they should say and it was easiest for them to simply say they are Catholics 
or Orthodox.297 
 
 This extraordinary statement reveals Ranković’s (in)famous administrative bent, an 
insistence that religiosity could simply be decreed away by government fiat.  In other words, it 
was the government’s inadequate classification that had made people embrace the traditional 
religious identities. That Tito himself shared the same opinion became clear at the Second 
Plenum of the Central Committee of the Yugoslav League Communists in 1959 when he 
declared that in their struggle to keep religion a private matter of individuals, Communists were 
to strive to have the “confessional affiliation category” removed from the census 
questionnaires.298  Hence, the category was dropped from subsequent censuses.  In fact, the 
demographer Ruža Petrović would complain in the late 1960s that the decision to omit religious 
identity from federal censuses had made it extremely difficult to study the phenomenon despite 
the fact that “religion has become so embedded in the religious moment that even today the two 
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are synonymous in social relations.”299  It seems that the pronouncements about the waning of 
religious feeling in 1955 may have been premature. 
 Despite growing evidence to the contrary, however, many state officials remained 
optimistic throughout the 1950s that the masses had been progressively moving away from 
religious affiliations.  At the meeting of the Federal Commission for Religious Affairs on 18 
October 1958, a member of the Commission’s Croatian branch, Josip Gržetić, tried to dispel any 
notion that the increased activity of the Catholic Church in his Republic was a reflection of 
increased religiosity of the Croats: “The number of believers is in no way increasing…because to 
a large extent our man has evolved, even the little guy.”  If people were attending religious 
ceremonies in larger numbers, Gržetić argued, this was because “our man is inclined to stop by 
those gatherings for a glass of drink and something to eat.”  He urged the government to be more 
aggressive in preventing church organizations from serving alcohol and food at their meetings.300  
At the insistence of the Commission member from Slovenia that the Slovenian Catholic Church 
had been intensifying its activities, which have resulted in some 20,000 people attending one of 
their gatherings, the chief of the Federal Commission Dobrivoje Radosavljević insisted that they 
attended “not because of the Vatican, but in order to eat, drink, and dance.”  He reminded his 
Slovenian colleagues that in Serbia thousands of peasants come to ostensibly religious 
gatherings, but noted that “This is not a manifestation of religious life.”  Radosavljević would 
not allow that Slovenia, as a place “with most progressive social relations,” a place that had 
become a model “to which we aspire,” had remained deeply religious. 301  After the Commission 
Secretary Miloje Dilparić suggested that teachers be deployed to villages so that they could 
“sober people up from their religious illusions,” Radosavljević reminded his colleagues that it 
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was the politicization of religion and not religious feelings of individuals as such that was a 
threat.  State policy was to “liquidate” political activity of religious organizations, but “not faith 
as faith, not religion itself, because religion is a long-term problem.”302  Similarly to the 1955 
meeting, optimistic pronouncements about the atheization of the Yugoslav society contained a 
not-so-veiled admission of the continuing religiosity of Yugoslav citizens. 
 Although Dobrivoje Radosavljević would boast at the 1958 meeting that the regime had 
managed to “stuff religion into church,”303 there is evidence that the efforts to confine religious 
activity to increasingly limited space, where it could be monitored, had caused a backlash from 
the populace.  By the end of the decade, the Bosnian Commission for Religious Affairs had 
received numerous reports of clashes between clerics from all three denominations and local 
Communist officials over religious instruction in school.  What is significant about these reports 
is not that these incidents happened—as Communist officials rarely hid their hostility towards 
organized religion—but that in most cases the local population had stood behind the clerics.  As 
early as 1945, the Yugoslav federal law protected religious instruction in public schools, but 
made it an elective, rather than a mandatory subject as it had been before the war.  It was 
relegated to the last class of the school day and children could attend only if both parents agreed.  
Religious teachers had to be certified by the state, which investigated every potential instructor 
to make sure his “attitude during the War of National Liberation was not in conflict with the 
interests and goals of our struggle.”304  Those instructors who had taught religion before the war 
as state employees were to be paid by the state while those licensed after the war had to be paid 
from the coffers of their religious community.  Although the state would control the licensing 
and employment of religious teachers, the law did not mandate that it find a religious instructor 
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for each faith, noting that in cases where an instructor could not be located it was to be explained 
to students and their parents that “this is not the fault of the school director or the authorities.”305  
The formal protections of the law notwithstanding, many local school and police officials strove 
to keep religion out of public schools. 
These efforts often backfired resulting in incidents whose repercussions sometimes 
reached Tito himself.  In one such case, a Catholic priest near the town of Bihać wrote a letter to 
Tito, pleading for him to stop the local elementary school teachers from harassing children who 
attended catechization.  Reminding the President that the right of catechization was protected by 
law, the priest complained that the teachers were threatening religious children with afterschool 
detention and bad grades if they continued to attend religious classes.  After being asked to 
investigate the matter, the secret police, or UDBA¸ reported that the priest’s accusations were 
unfounded as they were based on his antipathy towards the state, but acknowledged that the local 
Catholic population was supportive of him: “He has truly found support amongst the faithful and 
the members of the church committee because the people of the Zavalje county are extremely 
religious and most of them have Ustasha sympathies.”306   
In another case, an imam from a village near the Bosnian town of Prijedor complained to 
his superiors at the Ulema medžlis that the director of the local elementary school had been 
preventing children from attending mekteb, Islamic religious classes, while another teacher had 
instructed the children who regularly attended them to disrupt imam’s classes by shouting “you 
lie.”  At a parent-teacher meeting at the school, the tensions escalated into an all out shouting 
match between the parents who wanted their children to attend the mekteb and the school 
director.  After the Commission inquired about the incident, the village’s People’s Committee 
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accused the imam of organizing a lobbying effort to induct as many children as possible into the 
mekteb all with the purpose of “infiltrating extreme nationalist thinking into the heads of 
believers and their children.”307  During a meeting between the imam and the school director, the 
latter remained unapologetic insisting that the whole affair had started because the imam “was 
uncomfortable that in school, we teach the kids to be atheists.”308  Although the imam apologized 
to the director for the misunderstanding—which was not surprising given the fact that the 
meeting had been organized by the local People’s Committee—in his letter to the Ulema medžlis 
he insisted that the parents had remained strongly supportive of his efforts: “[At the parent-
teacher meeting] the parents were prepared to come out and say their piece.  And that’s how it 
was.  Parents, particularly women, shouted and whistled at the teachers for the entire two hours 
after the latter had spoken out against religious instruction.”309  By the mid 1960s, incidents like 
these led many party officials to acknowledge that twenty years after the beginning of the 
secularization campaign, many Yugoslavs had remained deeply religious. 
The realization that despite economic progress religion had for the most part retained its 
hold on people caused a fair amount of soul searching on the part of the Commission officials.  
The stenographic record of the Commission’s meeting in Mostar in September 1965 reads more 
like an exercise in self-criticism than a series of euphoric pronouncements about the inevitable 
end of religion, as it had been the case during previous meetings.  The main topic on the agenda 
was the increase in the activity of the Catholic Church in western Herzegovina, a development 
which had one Commission member concerned that it was atheists who had to be protected 
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“even if they only make up 5%.”310  The Commission member Ismet Kreso regretted that some 
party officials had approached the religious phenomenon with strict formalism without 
comprehending its significance for many villagers.  In particular, he complained that many active 
and loyal members of the Party had been expelled in some areas simply for attending religious 
funerals even when they did so out of respect for their religiously-oriented community.  Kreso 
argued that religion was “a manifestation of a thousand-year long sedimentation of illusions”311 
that could not be willed away by administrative measures.  By employing the latter many 
Communist officials had caused a considerable harm to state-church relations and further 
deepened locals’ suspicion towards the regime.  Kreso still remained optimistic about the ability 
of socialism to trample over religious “backwardness” with its arsenal of economic development 
and scientific innovation.  Rationalism had already been accepted by many citizens as was 
evident by the Church’s panic over the increasing number of civil marriages and the failure of 
many Catholics to baptize their children.  He argued that until that happened, however, party 
activists should not treat religion as an obstacle to the development of socialism.312   
Joining Kreso’s criticism of the party’s overzealous and bureaucratic approach to religion 
was Esad Ćimić, considered as the party’s official theoretician of religion, noting that any new 
policy had to be based on the realization “that the religious phenomenon is permanent, that it has 
a long-term perspective, and that we have to make peace with the fact that this phenomenon will 
continue to persist on the Herzegovinian soil for a long, long period of time…”313  Ćimić scolded 
some party activists who had used protection of atheists as an excuse to wage a repressive 
campaign against religion and warned that any new approach had to be much more nuanced and 
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sensitive.  In what amounted to an explicit rejection of the party’s previous attempts to divorce 
religion from nation, he pointed out that his research in Herzegovina had proved “that religion 
and nation are synonymous,” a finding that made a sensible approach to religion ever more 
important.  For Ćimić, religion was inextricably linked to the economic and interethnic relations 
in the country and as such, it necessitated a policy that would be based on scientific research 
rather than knee-jerk overreactions of some party activists.314  Most Commission members 
agreed that the latter was a result of a fragmented state policy and they entrusted Esad Ćimić 
with writing a book which would be a manual for a more coherent approach to religion. 
Esad Ćimić’s manifesto, Religion and the League of Communists, could be read as an 
effort to change the image of the party as one that was hostile to religion and instruct its activists 
how to involve the believers in the building of socialism. The main thrust of the work was the 
argument that the Socialist Associations—which were Communist-led, countrywide 
organizations of citizens, dating back to the Partisan War of Liberation—were not an exclusive 
domain of atheists, but were also open to believers whose faith should never be seen as an 
obstacle to the building of socialism.  Admitting that in the past, party activists who led these 
associations had often alienated believers, Ćimić urged that in the future, such leadership 
positions be entrusted to the faithful.  He warned the party against spreading atheism as a matter 
of state policy, predicting that this would only lead people to further embrace religion.  The 
seeming increase in religiosity in the past few years Ćimić attributed not to any change in the 
way people actually felt, but to the democratization of the Yugoslav society and the 
abandonment of the etatist policies.315  Citing Marx, he insisted that the extinction of religious 
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devotion would come about as a natural consequence of successful development of socialism and 
not through the imposition of antireligious laws.  Remarkably, Ćimić lumped overzealous 
atheists in the same category as the believers who worked actively against socialism:  
The enemies of socialism want to divide us on the basis of religion…and nation 
and most recently some activists have tried to divide people into believers and 
atheists which is damaging not only because it is inhumane but because it ignores 
the political reality.316   
 
Accepting the political reality meant dealing sensitively with the continuing religious 
devotion even among some Communist League members.  For example, Ćimić echoed Lenin’s 
insistence that party members could not be believers, but emphasized that “it was extremely 
important” to adopt “an elastic approach” which would distinguish between those party members 
who were believers in the philosophical sense and those who attend religious ceremonies for the 
sake of conformity with their community.  As to the methodology the party could use in 
distinguishing between the two types, Ćimić only advised that each case be considered on an 
individual basis with most weight given to the individual’s contributions to the development of 
socialism rather than their formal adherence to a religion.317  The latter distinction, between 
formal and philosophical embrace of faith, echoed one made by the Commission President 
Radosavljević back in 1955, when he ascribed Serbian peasants’ attendance of church activities 
to their love of food, drink, and dance, but Ćimić’s manifesto included an unprecedented 
concession to organized religion: a call for its participation in the political process.   
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
ousting of Aleksandar Rankovic in 1966, Tito’s Vice President, and the feared chief of the secret police who had 
become a symbol of a repressive, centralizing state apparatus.  His removal signaled that Tito himself embraced the 
decentralizing reformists. 
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Embracing the Nation, Pathologizing Mixed Marriage 
There are cases in our country where people are afraid to say they feel Yugoslav.  
I think this is because Yugoslavism is often confused with the state, which is 
wrong.  I have to say that in the last few days I have received a lot of letters 
concerning this matter. And they were mostly from children.  Children understood 
what I had been saying.  One little girl from Slovenia, a student in fourth or fifth 
grade, whose father is Slovenian and mother Macedonian, wrote to tell me how 
happy she was that she can say that she is a Yugoslav.  See my dear comrades, a 
child wrote this in her own handwriting.  This goes to show how absurd it is to 
force someone to be a member of one nation, be it Serb, Croat, Slovenian.  It is as 
absurd as it would be stupid to ask someone to give these [identities] up.318 
 
Tito spoke these words to a group of reporters in 1963 not as an argument “for the 
creation of a supranational, Yugoslav identity,”319 as the historian Predrag Marković would have 
it, but rather as a wistful defense of its possibility in the face of an ever growing assault on 
Yugoslavism emanating from the highest circles of the Yugoslav League of Communists.  Tito’s 
defensive statement was a nostalgic invocation of a could have been as he anticipated his party’s 
unforgiving abandonment of the idea, a path onto which he himself would be pushed two years 
later however reluctantly.  The fact that not even a decade after Tito spoke these words the 
party’s chief theoreticians would come close to forcing “mixed” Yugoslavs into national rubrics 
speaks of the remarkable transformation of the country’s identity in the span of a decade. 
 The historiography of socialist Yugoslavia has comprehensively analyzed the economic, 
political, and cultural factors that led to the abandonment of Yugoslavism in the 1960s, but it has 
not addressed the question of how this affected mixed marriage.  By 1960 the regime could boast 
of raising the country’s GDP by 191.7% since the end of World War II320 but the price of this 
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economic growth was the increasing discrepancy between the richer, northern republics 
(Slovenia and Croatia) and the poorer, southern republics, particularly Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Serbia and the autonomous province of Kosovo.321  The decentralization of political power in 
1952 following Tito’s split with the Soviet Union and the introduction of the self-management 
system meant that once the economic growth became a recession in 1961 each republic had its 
own separate Communist leadership to represent its interests at the federal level.  As Pedro 
Ramet’s classic study of Yugoslav federalism has shown, by the 1960s the Yugoslav federation 
increasingly resembled a balance of power system with each republic acting as a separate state, 
coordinating alliances with other republics, and competing with the federal government.   
 The deteriorating economic situation led to what Dennison Rusinow has termed “the 
great debate” within the party, between the conservatives, who advocated the reversal to 
centralization and greater Party control, and the liberals who called for an even greater diffusion 
of state power away from Belgrade and down to local enterprises.  The 1963 Constitution 
represented a definite victory of the liberals over the conservatives as it further weakened the 
federation and empowered republics in numerous ways, most importantly through the creation of 
a Federal Assembly composed of chambers with deputies elected from the republics in order to 
represent republican, not federal, interests.  In further moving away from planned economy, the 
reforms also abolished the General Investment Fund, the federal agency that allocated 
investment capital, and transferred major financial obligations to republican-based banks.322  
 Further exacerbating tensions was the rise of a new generation of Communist leaders 
who had been born after World War II and were not as invested in the memories of the Partisan 
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War of Liberation as Tito’s inner circle and were more likely to challenge the old guard.323  It 
was in this state of cultural, economic, and political flux that Yugoslavia greeted the 1960s, the 
decade which would redefine the country’s identity. 
 It was Edvard Kardelj, the regime’s theoretician-in-chief, who first set the ground for the 
party’s definite break with Yugoslavism by revising Stalin’s approach to nationalism 
encapsulated in the motto “national in form, socialist in content.”  In the second edition of his 
work on the national question in 1957, Kardelj remained true to his Marxist roots in attributing 
the emergence of nation to the “social division of labor in the epoch of capitalism,” but seemed 
to lower the expectation that socialism could do away with nations: “The unity of all nations of 
Yugoslavia is possible only on the basis of independent national development and equality of all 
nations of Yugoslavia.”324  Nation may have developed during the initial stages of capitalism but 
it would remain essential for the development of the Yugoslav style of socialism.  Kardelj 
elaborated on this during the Yugoslav League of Communists’ 8th Congress in 1964 when he 
explicitly broke with Stalinist formalistic view of nation—which implied its temporary 
character—by arguing that the “foundation of interethnic and economic relations [in Yugoslavia] 
is certainly economic independence of each nation that enables it to produce and allocate its 
resources independently in creating the material basis for the development of its own culture and 
civilization.”325  Although nation was here to stay Kardelj left open the possibility that the 
Yugoslav nations would participate in “the general global process of amalgamation of nations” 
triggered by the ever increasing economic interdependence, technological progress, and the 
inevitable retreat of “that which is narrow-minded and nationalist in the face of that which is 
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universally human.”326  With this, Kardelj seemed to echo the sentiment popular in Europe at the 
time, and which inspired the creation of the European Union, which saw economic cooperation 
as the best way to tame excesses of nationalism by drawing nations into relationships of 
interdependence.  Incrementalism may have been a revolutionary doctrine for reordering the 
German-French relations for example, given the historical enmity of the two nations, but when 
applied to Yugoslavia, where the Communists had promised to demolish the “Chinese walls” 
between the nations, it signaled a substantial lowering of expectations. 
 Kardelj’s revision also seemed to leave no room for a spontaneous emergence of a 
Yugoslav national feeling amongst the people as he branded such notions as expressions of 
“chauvinism” and “bureaucratic-centralist tendencies,”327 a reference to Stalinist statism.  He 
argued that although the new global processes would change both the “cultural and economic” 
nature of nation, to insist on the possibility of a Yugoslav nation was tantamount to negating 
“national specificities of cultures,” and was an attempt at “forced assimilation of small 
nations.”328  As Dejan Jović has argued, Kardelj’s denunciation of Yugoslavism was a result of 
the regime’s efforts to distance themselves from both, the Soviet Union style of centralism, and 
the interwar version of Yugoslavia in which Yugoslavism had been the official state ideology.329  
Despite his passionate plea on behalf of mixed marriage Yugoslavs in 1963, by the 8th party 
congress Tito himself had adopted Kardelj’s contempt for the idea of a Yugoslav nation, stating 
in his opening remarks:  
…there are people out there, even some Communists…who believe that in our 
socialist society nations have outlived their use and need to wither away.  They 
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confuse the unity of our nations with the liquidation of nations and the creation of 
something new and artificial, a single Yugoslav nation, which resembles 
assimilation and bureaucratic centralization, unitarism and hegemony.330 
 
 Following Tito’s speech, speaker after speaker denounced both “chauvinistic” 
nationalism and assimilationist Yugoslavism and echoed the belief in Yugoslavia as a haven for 
the unfettered development of all nations, which were brought together on the basis of their 
devotion to socialism.  As Jovic has persuasively argued, the abandonment of Yugoslavism 
entailed the exclusive emphasis on socialism as the only glue holding the state together.  In fact, 
Jovic insists, for Kardelj Yugoslavia was nothing more than a way to achieve a perfect socialist 
society, as he saw it, while for Tito, socialism was the way to achieve Yugoslavia.331  According 
to Paul Shoup, the Party’s move away from Yugoslavism “was a personal defeat for Tito, 
perhaps the most serious the Yugoslav leader experienced in the field of national policy.”332  
Jovic notes that Kardelj’s own move from Belgrade back to Ljubljana in the early 1970s 
personified the regime’s disenchantment with the Yugoslav idea.333   
 Following the 8th Congress some in the party thought that the pendulum on the national 
question had swung too far away from unitarism and they called for a stronger emphasis on 
socialist unity even if it was not based on the disappearance of nations.  This sentiment was 
particularly widespread amongst the Bosnian Communists who at their 4th Party Congress in 
1965 expressed anxiety regarding the deteriorating ethnic situation in the country.  For example, 
the prominent Bosnian Communist Esad Ćerić echoed the party line in negating the existence of 
a Yugoslav nation “in the classic sense,” but insisted that “when it comes to Yugoslavism as an 
expression of unity of our socialist Yugoslav community, we have to take particular care to 
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cherish it because this community is how equality, brotherhood and unity of our peoples can ever 
be achieved.”334  In his defense of those who considered themselves Yugoslav there was more 
than a hint of criticism of the official party line: “anyone can say that they are Yugoslav-
nationally undeclared.  When it comes to the question of Yugoslavism in the sense of being 
nationally neutral we cannot prohibit this let alone encourage it.  This is the ultimate question of 
freedom—a matter of individual choice.”335   
 His call, however, was not heeded.  Two years later during internal party discussions 
about the next census, scheduled for 1971, there was a suggestion that the category “Yugoslav” 
be completely removed.  At the meeting of the Central Committee of the Bosnian League of 
Communists in April 1967, a representative from the Banjaluka region wondered aloud why 
there had been so much criticism of Yugoslavs, which numbered 42,000 in his district and hailed 
from all nationalities.  He worried that some Communists had been swayed by conservative 
beliefs of the past and held up Yugoslavs as examples of firm belief in socialist brotherhood and 
unity, asking the party to consider adding a Constitutional amendment which would protect their 
status.336   
 Worries about increasing ethnic tensions prompted some at the 4th Congress of the 
Bosnian League of Communists to call for greater inter-republican cooperation which would 
help stimulate Yugoslav socialist patriotism.  Milorad Popović lamented the behavior of most 
enterprises who conducted more business abroad than with enterprises from other republics and 
insisted that Yugoslav self-management implied “the overcoming of territorial boundaries” 
between the republics.337  Milena Joksimović from Sarajevo expressed her shock at the complete 
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fragmentation of Yugoslavia’s educational system, noting that each republic had its own 
curriculum, which made it extremely difficult for students to transfer from one republic to 
another.338  Implicit in these complaints was an anxiety about the lack of concrete steps to 
encourage inter-ethnic cooperation following the abandonment of Yugoslavism. 
 Based on the blunt assessments many Bosnian Communists provided regarding the ethnic 
situation in the country during the second half of the 1960s, this anxiety was well founded.  At 
the 4th Congress of the Bosnian League of Communists, Dr. Ibro Arnautović from the University 
of Sarajevo plead with his colleagues to form a unified front in dealing with nationalism, 
pointing out that the ethnic situation had deteriorated to such an extent that there were nationalist 
grumblings even at the university over perceived ethnic slights in professorial appointments.339  
Esad Ćerić reported on the increasing opposition to mixed marriage in some areas: 
The intensive process of coming together of people from all nationalities in their 
working environments, self-managing enterprises, while living together in mixed 
and urbanized areas, of ever increasing communications between them including 
mixed marriages, has provoked amongst some conservative and nationalist 
elements sporadic reactions.  All of this makes this process more complicated and 
asks of us Communists more work and more thorough study of the problem; a 
more elastic, tolerant, but at the same time energetic, approach depending on the 
nature of each individual problem.  The widespread view which equates religious 
with national belonging in Bosnia-Herzegovina makes this an even more 
complicated problem.340 
 
 The statement was tantamount to an admission that the secularization policy had failed.  
In addition, instead of healing ethnic tensions urbanization had often exacerbated them by 
provoking a counter-reaction by more nationally-minded citizens.  Indeed, some recent 
demographic studies have shown that while postwar urbanization of Bosnian cities did lead to 
the emergence of more ethnically mixed neighborhoods, it could also reinforce ethnic 
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homogenization.  For example, Dervo Vajzović’s comprehensive study of Mostar’s urbanization 
noted that despite the city’s impressive growth in the postwar period, characterized by increasing 
population density, the growth of suburbs, and lively economic activity, many emerging, 
industrially robust neighborhoods remained ethnically homogenous.  Thus, out of the fifty-seven 
neighborhoods of the Mostar district, with the exception of the city’s urban core, thirty-three 
were ethnically homogenous and twenty-four were ethnically heterogeneous.  Using these 
figures Vajzović concludes that the “[r]ule which says that national heterogeneity is greater in 
more developed spaces, which are centers of industrial production, with a higher level of 
urbanization, while rural areas or some of their parts remain nationally homogenous has not been 
completely confirmed by the cases of some neighborhoods in the Mostar district.”341  Even when 
mixed, these industrial neighborhoods did not necessarily symbolize the success of socialist 
policies as was shown by the worries of party officials that some mixed neighborhoods were 
witnessing a rise in ethnic tension over claims of ethnic bias in hiring, urban planning decisions, 
scholarship and welfare distribution.  At the 4th Congress party officials like Esad Ćerić pointed 
out that these complaints notwithstanding the authorities were taking great pains to ensure ethnic 
equality, insisting that the employment numbers in Bosnia-Herzegovina closely reflected the 
republic’s ethnic demography.342  Ethnic problems were grave enough to compel the Bosnian 
Communists to adopt a resolution which explicitly rejected the notion that the national question 
had been solved: “Unacceptable are also the claims that the question of interethnic relations is no 
longer relevant in our society.”343 
 Despite official proclamations about the strength of Yugoslav socialism, by the end of the 
decade the Communists seemed to be losing their grip on ethnic tensions which had turned 
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violent in some areas.  During a meeting of the Bosnian League of Communists in 1968, 
convened to deal with the crisis, the officials discussed the deterioration of Croat-Muslim 
relations in the village of Kiseljak near Sarajevo where two Muslims had been killed in a brawl 
with a group of Croats, an incident that was followed by vows of revenge from both sides.  
While partly attributing the incident to unsettled property rights in the village, the officials 
acknowledged that the tensions in the village dated to World War II and blamed increased 
activities of the clergy for the religious polarization.  Particularly worrying was the fact that 
ethnic division had infected local Communists.  For example, after a group of Croats had clashed 
with a group of Muslims in the village of Crnići near the Herzegovinian town of Stolac, the local 
Communists became divided along the ethnic lines in deciding on how to respond to the incident.  
In another Herzegovinian town, Nevesinje, the authorities had recorded twenty-three nationalist 
incidents during the previous year, most of which were reports of individuals or groups singing 
Chetnik or Ustasha songs, praising nationalist figures, or saying offensive things about other 
nationalities.  In Bosanska Kostajnica a Serb man had been killed and when the police failed to 
find the culprit there emerged a saying amongst the Serbs that “had a Serb killed a Turk he 
would have immediately been sent to jail.”344  In some areas, there were grumblings among the 
population that with “mixed national demography it was impossible to value work and develop 
self-management.”345  Remarkably however, in what seemed more like wishful thinking than a 
factual statement, the officials at the meeting concluded that “despite these sporadic phenomena 
and these primitive passions and conflicts, caused mostly by interference by some external 
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carriers of chauvinism, national relations in our Republic are more favorable than ever 
before.”346 
 That nationalist sentiment had indeed spread through the highest ranks of republican 
Communist parties became clear in the so-called Croatian spring crisis, which culminated in the 
fall of 1971.  The beginning of the crisis dated to the mid 1960s when major Croatian 
newspapers openly accused Serbian firms of unfairly profiting from the Croatian economy, 
complained that Belgrade had been hoarding Croatia’s foreign currency, and criticized federal 
government’s distribution of aid to the underdeveloped republics.  In 1967 the tensions escalated 
when a group of prominent Croatian intellectuals and writers published the “Declaration on the 
Status and the Position of the Croatian language” in which they complained that the Croatian 
language had been relegated to a dialect and pushed out of state institutions in favor of Serbian.  
The Declaration eventually led Matica Hrvatska, Croatia’s most prominent cultural institution, to 
pull out of the Novi Sad Agreement, a joint Serbo-Croatian effort to come up with a dictionary 
which would combine the two dialects.  The revival of Croatian nationalism triggered a counter-
reaction amongst the Serbian population in the republic with the increasing calls for Serbian 
autonomy in Croatia.  Most disturbingly for Tito, the Croatian Communist Party succumbed to 
the nationalist pressure and ousted from its ranks the opponents of the movement, openly 
embracing many of the nationalist demands.  For more than three years, Tito and the federal 
government reacted to the spread of the Croatian mass movement (Maspokret) with little else 
than expressions of concern, but decided to act in the autumn of 1971 after Tito had complained 
that Croat-Serb tensions in some areas of Croatia resembled the dark days of 1941.  Although 
some ten thousand Croatian Communists were purged, including the republic’s top leaders, and 
hundreds were arrested, many scholars have argued that the Constitution of 1974 represented 
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federal government’s concession to many of the movement’s demands.347  As one such scholar 
has pointed out, the Constitution diluted the power of the federal government to such an extent 
that it transformed the country into a confederation, making a complete disintegration of the state 
highly likely.348 
 The Yugoslav lurch away from integrative and towards exclusive national identities was 
also evident by the decision of the League of Communists to recognize the Bosnian Muslims as a 
nation.  The party’s approach to this question had been as torturous, ambivalent, and 
contradictory as its attitude towards Yugoslavism.  In the midst of World War II many Partisan 
leaders, including Ranković, echoed the interwar belief that the Bosnian Muslims were in fact 
Serbs who still had to be made aware of their national belonging.349  Writing from the Partisan 
trenches in 1942, Veselin Masleša noted that while the Bosnian Muslims had no national 
attributes he acknowledged that the Muslims had been endangered in interwar Yugoslavia and 
promised that in a socialist Yugoslavia they would be guaranteed equality.350  Although after 
assuming power the Communist regime preserved Bosnia-Herzegovina as a single republic, 
resisting calls for a Serbo-Croatian partition, the ambiguity of the official policy towards the 
Bosnian Muslims was reflected in the constantly changing census rubrics under which they were 
supposed to identify.  Thus, in the 1948 census they could either declare themselves as Serb, 
Croat or undeclared while in the 1953 census, the category of “Yugoslav undeclared” was 
introduced as an alternative to Serb and Croat.  The census of 1961 was the unofficial beginning 
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of the campaign to legalize the Bosnian Muslim nation because for the first time “Muslim in the 
ethnic sense” appeared on the form.351   
 That the fogginess of the party’s position on the matter began to dissipate starting in 1961 
was not coincidental.  By this time, a new generation of Bosnian Muslim Communist leaders had 
emerged in Bosnia-Herzegovina as became evident with the rise of the Mostar politician Džemal 
Bijedić to the Presidency of the Federal Executive Committee, the position second only to Tito’s.  
The idea of the Bosnian Muslim nation was also promoted by Atif Purivatra, a Bosnian Muslim 
theoretician with an unblemished record of party loyalty, who helped legitimize the idea within 
the highest party circles.  Recently, the historian Husnija Kamberović has argued that the party 
was compelled to make this move also in order to take the steam out of the increasingly active 
Islamic religious establishment and reposition itself as the leader of the Bosnian Muslims.352 The 
ultimate success of the campaign, however, was inextricable from the Croatian spring crisis 
whose radicalization led for some in Croatia to call for the annexation of parts of Bosnia by 
Croatia, a development that Pedro Ramet described as Croatia’s “declaration of war” on 
Yugoslavia.353  Recognizing the Bosnian Muslims as a separate nation was thus meant to prevent 
any potential rivalry between Croatia and Serbia over the republic and further cement the federal 
system.  On 17 May 1968, soon after the Croatian activists had published the Declaration on the 
Croatian language, the Central Committee of the Bosnian League of Communists adopted a 
declaration of its own: “History has shown the destructiveness of different forms of pressure for 
Muslims to declare themselves as Serbs or Croats given the fact that it was revealed much 
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earlier, and confirmed in our socialist system, that the Muslims are a separate nation.”354  The 
census of 1971 was the first time the rubric “Muslim” appeared on the questionnaire without any 
caveats. 
 The national revivals and the concomitant fragmentation of the Yugoslav League of 
Communists into republican-based, national parties entailed a revamping of the country’s very 
identity, a process that marked mixed marriage, for the first time since the 1930s, as an issue to 
be discussed.  Following the legitimization of the Bosnian Muslim nation in 1968, the Bosnian 
Communist intellectual Salim Ćerić wrote a pamphlet which amounted to a forceful attack on 
Yugoslavism.  Ćerić argued that while the roots of the Yugoslav movement had been 
progressive, because it originated as a well-meaning effort to unite the South Slavs and liberate 
them from the imperial yoke, by the end of the Second World War the idea had shed its 
progressive façade.  In attributing the failure of interwar Yugoslavia to irreconcilable cultural 
differences, rather than policies of the Serbian monarchy or economic underdevelopment, Ćerić 
countered the Marxist view of Yugoslav history that blamed the country’s failure on the 
squabbling of bourgeois, nationalist parties.  In relegating economics to a matter of secondary 
importance he also openly rejected the argument of the first Secretary of the Yugoslav 
Communist Party Sima Marković who had claimed during the 1920s that economic development 
through socialism would lead to a merging of nations on the basis of common class interests.  
Instead, Ćerić insisted that nation was a “historical necessity” and lowered expectations 
regarding the capabilities of socialism: “The purpose of a socialist society is not to plan, create, 
and declare the existence of new nations.  It is only to ensure [nations’] freedom and a 
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development which would not threaten any one nation’s interests.”355  In his suggestion that the 
Yugoslav nations might have different economic interests under socialism Ćerić dismantled the 
country’s raison d’etre even more aggressively than Kardelj had done as the latter’s rejection of 
Yugoslavism still entailed defining Yugoslavia as “an affirmation of common interests of [the 
working people of Yugoslavia] on the basis of socialist relations.”356 
 According to Ćerić the main threat to Yugoslavia was no longer bourgeois nationalism, 
but a revival of Yugoslavism, a development which he partially attributed to mixed marriages.   
Because it necessarily implied assimilation of non-Slavs, contained the seeds of interwar Serbian 
hegemony, and triggered nationalist reactions, Yugoslavism was now “a new barrier between the 
nations of our country.”357 Ćerić saw the embrace of a Yugoslav nation by many of the country’s 
citizens not as evidence of the existence of such a nation, but rather as an illusion.  For Ćerić 
socialism had been too successful in bringing Yugoslavia’s nations together for it had inspired 
some to identify themselves as Yugoslavs, disregarding the consequences this would have for the 
long-term development of the country.  Here, Ćerić singled out mixed marriages: 
The emergence of a growing number of mixed marriages, particularly in 
nationally mixed areas, and as a result of the ever increasing economic and 
cultural communication and trust between our nations, revives the idea of 
Yugoslavism.  In particular, when we ask ourselves to what nation do the children 
from these marriages belong, the answer that imposes itself most logically is that 
they belong to a Yugoslav nation.358 
 
 Mixed marriages thus became a problem in that their very existence had led to the revival 
of an ideology which Ćerić saw as detrimental to Yugoslavia’s future.  The Communists 
themselves had sowed the seeds of confusion, according to Ćerić, when they chose to keep 
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Yugoslavia as the name of the country and adopt “Hey Slavs” as the national anthem, 
disregarding all the non-Slav citizens.  In addition, with their misconceived policy towards the 
Bosnian Muslims in the early postwar years, the Communists had forced many of them to 
declare themselves Yugoslav.  Instead of allowing for the possibility that some may have 
genuinely felt Yugoslav, whatever that meant, Ćerić marked the identity as a social ill: 
The loss of a connection with their own ethnic being, without finding a new one, 
created a moral and psychological vacuum of sorts in some members of this 
[Muslim] community.  Consequently, some individuals exhibited asocial and 
destructive behavior.  A huge number of these individuals then sought a solution 
by supporting the idea of a Yugoslav nationality, which has shown to be a shot in 
the dark.359 
 
 To feel Yugoslav was an affliction, a symptom of a social and psychological disorder 
caused by one’s alienation from one’s own nation.  Although he expressed understanding for 
those who felt to be Yugoslav because they were in mixed marriages, Ćerić still felt that they 
were a part of the problem, which had to be explained and ultimately solved: 
[In mixed marriages] there is a great tendency for both parents to direct their 
children towards that new, Yugoslav nationality.  Our democratic society cannot 
and should not prohibit or qualify as negative this feeling.  The best we can do in 
this case, and other cases, is to try and explain to these people the larger social 
meaning of modern development of nation but without commanding with their 
feelings and always respecting their behavior which stems from their feeling [of 
being Yugoslav]. 
 
 His patronizing caveat about the need to respect the feelings of those in mixed marriages 
was impossible to reconcile with his insistence that being a Yugoslav was an historical as well as 
a psychological disorder, which threatened the very foundations of the state.  How were mixed 
marriage parents supposed to feel free in declaring their children Yugoslav when Ćerić branded 
their identity “a petty bourgeois disbelief in the future of socialism” and insisted it was a sign not 
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of cosmopolitan internationalism, but of “provincialism”360?  He further escalated the pressure 
on mixed marriage by implying that for many Muslims it could put their national identity into a 
straightjacket: 
A huge number of Muslim men (and women) married members of other 
nationalities at a time when there was a widespread belief that they were actually 
(or potentially) Serbs, Croats, Montenegrins, or Yugoslavs.  If this assumption 
was of a particular importance for the spouse of the other nationality, then Muslim 
spouses may have problems in declaring themselves as such.361 
 
 This ideologization of mixed marriage subtly echoed the interwar warnings of Muslim 
intellectuals and clerics about the danger mixed marriage posed to Muslim identity.  Of course, 
as wearing religion on one’s sleeve was still strictly prohibited for party members, it was the 
nation that was seen as threatened.  Ćerić’s branding of mixed marriages as problems for the 
Bosnian Muslim identity, just a few years after this identity was officially recognized, reflected 
the anxiety about its future at a time of homogenization amongst all of the country’s nations.  
Ćerić’s assault on Yugoslavism also ignored Tito’s warning from 1963 not to force people into 
national identities and showed the extent to which the federal power in the state had become 
eroded by the end of the decade.  That Tito himself felt compelled to deny the prophecies about 
the inevitable collapse of Yugoslavia revealed how pervasive this anxiety might have been 
amongst the highest party circles.  In his opening remarks at the Second Conference of the 
League of Communists in 1972, a few months after the end of the Croatian Spring crisis, Tito 
spoke of the state’s successful fight against nationalism and promised that Yugoslavia was here 
to stay: 
I would like to state here in front of the entire world that it is really stupid to be 
talking about some crisis of ours, about how everything will fall apart.  
Yugoslavia is a strong community.  Yugoslavia has a League of Communists with 
one million members...  Thus, we cannot talk about some crisis of our social 
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system.  The system moves courageously forward despite all the difficulties it 
encounters.362 
 
 Tito’s effort to instill confidence in his party seemed to fall on deaf ears in the conference 
hall as presentations by his comrades bespoke of a dispirited, anxious, and exhausted party 
leadership. Many quoted the Bosnian Communist Veljko Vlahović in describing “a crisis of 
ideas” in the League of Communists.  The Zagreb representative Marinko Grujić ascribed this 
crisis to the party’s lack of ideological passion due to “pragmatism which corrodes the League of 
Communists, including its leadership structures.”363  The representative from Tuzla Esad 
Horozić complained that the Communists had lost the battle of ideas and urged for a new Marxist 
offensive against theoretical works that had undermined party authority.364  The famous Bosnian 
Communist and the country’s national hero Avdo Humo seemed to openly contradict Tito when 
he acknowledged: “we find ourselves in one serious situation which requires of us a sober and 
principled analysis.”365  Dragi Stamenković blamed the country’s predicament on the lack of a 
unified party policy in battling nationalism, the theme that was also echoed by the Zagreb 
representative who admitted that “the chauvinist forces and tendencies had become deeply 
ingrained in some areas of our city.”366  In short, the Communists had redefined Yugoslavia by 
inserting so many caveats in front of its identity that they had downgraded their own role in the 
country’s future.     
 There was a lone attempt by the Bosnian Communist theoretician and official historian 
Enver Redžić to come up with a more acceptable inclusive identity once Yugoslavism was 
relegated to the dustbin of history. An active participant in the War of Liberation and a recipient 
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of numerous medals for bravery, a committed Marxist, and a trained historian, Enver Redžić had 
held a number of prominent positions within the Bosnian Communist leadership, including the 
influential directorship of the Institute for the History of the Working Class movement, and had 
emerged as one of the official historians of the Partisan war.  Uncomfortable with his party’s 
enthusiastic embrace of national identities at the expense of more inclusive ones, Redžić argued 
that there was enough historical evidence to prove the existence of a Bosnian identity.  During 
the discussions regarding the Bosnian Muslim nation in the late 1960s, he pointed out that there 
was no other case in the world where a nation was named after a religion and insisted that the 
Muslims of Bosnia should be allowed to declare themselves Bosnians (Bosanci).  He traced the 
roots of the Bosnian ethnicity to the pre-Ottoman times when Bosnia’s Catholics, Orthodox, and 
so-called Bogumils had all formed an attachment to the Bosnian medieval state.  The Ottoman 
conquest meant not only the end of the Bosnian statehood, but also led to the Islamization of a 
significant portion of the Bosnians, a process which he described as “the beginning of the 
cleavage in the ethnic development of the Bosnian population.”367  While acknowledging that the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of two other national identities—
Serbs and Croats amongst the Orthodox and Catholics of Bosnia respectively—he insisted that 
throughout the Ottoman period many Bosnian Muslim lords consistently exhibited an attachment 
to a Bosnian, as opposed to an exclusively Islamic, identity.368  According to Redžić, the 
Communist revolution had further divorced religion from nationality making it impossible for 
atheist Muslims to identify with a Muslim nation.  Branding the attempts to name the nation 
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Muslim ahistorical and unscientific, Redžić urged his party colleagues to allow for Bosanac to 
appear on the 1971 census as a legitimate national category.369 
 Although Tito himself had suggested he would support introducing “Bosanac” as a 
census category, Enver Redžić’s proposal was met with a determined opposition by the Bosnian 
Communist leadership which resulted in the official censure of Redžić for his “oppositional” 
theories.  At the party’s Second Plenum in 1959 Tito complained about the increasing obsession 
with national categories for the upcoming census of 1961 and urged greater flexibility in 
designing these categories especially when it came to Bosnia-Herzegovina:  
People should be allowed to be nationally undeclared citizens of Yugoslavia, if 
they wish to be so.  Let those people be Bosnians or Herzegovinians.  Abroad, 
you are not known as anything else but Bosnians anyway, whether you are 
Muslims, Serbs, or Croats.370   
 
 However, by the late 1960s this sentiment had become as ostracized by the official party 
line as Yugoslavism as it became clear in Salim Ćerić’s strident attack on Enver Redžić’s 
proposal.  For Ćerić, Redžić’s idea was as destructive as it was ahistorical.  He meticulously 
deconstructed Redžić’s historical argument about the existence of a Bosnian ethnicity, arguing 
that the cultural differences between Bosnia’s three ethnic groups pre-dated the Ottomans.  
Rather than introducing a cleavage within a unified Bosnian ethnie, Islamization had deepened 
an already existing gaps between the groups, cementing them into full blown nations by the 18th 
century.  Ćerić saw the resistance of Bosnian Muslim lords against the Sultan as evidence of a 
class, and not national, identity as they defended their own parochial interests within the 
crumbling Ottoman empire.  While allowing that naming a nation after a religion was unusual 
and the first such case in history, Ćerić pointed out that choosing Muslim as the synonym for the 
nation was a response to the “overwhelming majority of the people…for whom there was no 
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dilemma” that they were Muslim.  For Ćerić the idea of a Bosnian nation was as dangerous as 
Yugoslavism as both contained assimilationist tendencies, offended the national sensibilities of 
Bosnia’s Serbs and Croats, and laid claim to a monopoly over the Bosnian statehood, ignoring 
the historical fact that “Bosnia-Herzegovina is neither Serbian, nor Muslim, nor Croat separately; 
she belongs collectively to Serbs, and Muslims, and Croats (and of course, to members of all 
other nations who are her citizens).”371  Finally, he expressed confidence in his party’s 
determination to counter the belief that “the time has come for the merging of nations.”372 
Ruža Petrović: Mixed Marriage and Ethno-Biological Homogenization of Nations 
 As politicians ranted against any new utopias about the merging of nations, the country’s 
most prominent sociologist of family Ruža Petrović was predicting the inevitable “ethno-
biological homogenization” of nations via mixed marriages.  In a series of pioneering studies of 
mixed marriage in Yugoslavia that culminated in the only monograph on the issue, published in 
1985, Petrović claimed that “mixed marriages, through offspring, lead to the intertwining, 
mixing, and disappearance of [ethnic] differences.”373  Far from denying them, she 
acknowledged the persistence of these differences even under socialism, arguing that 
homogenization had always been accompanied by differentiation between the groups, but 
insisted that “[h]istory is full of examples of biological merging and melting of nations, and 
mixed marriages are the only means of this process.”374  Coming precisely at the time when 
Croatian nationalism was escalating its demands, the Bosnian Muslim nation making strides 
towards official recognition, and the inter-ethnic relations throughout the country deteriorating, 
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the studies were the sociologist’s attempt to imagine a more integrative identity on the basis of 
scientific evidence. 
 Although Petrović’s empirical research confirmed an increase in the number of mixed 
marriages throughout Yugoslavia under socialism, it also revealed significant ethnic distance 
between the major ethnic groups, an observation she acknowledged but without altering her final 
conclusion about the inevitability of ethnic homogenization.  Following World War II 
Yugoslavia experienced a “sudden increase” in the number of mixed marriages, followed by a 
brief period of stagnation, which in the late 1950s turned into another increase, the trend Petrović 
ascribed to the intensified pace of urbanization.  By 1968, one in nine marriages in Yugoslavia 
was mixed, leading the sociologist to state that “it would be difficult to suggest that it is more 
widespread in any other society.”375  When compared to other ethnically mixed countries 
Yugoslavia was unique both in the fact that its ethnic groups intermingled throughout its 
territory, unlike in Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union where they were territorially 
segregated, and the lack of a barrier to intermarriage that was as significant as the “racial 
moment” in the United States.376  Petrović credited socialism for enabling mixed marriages 
through the policies of urbanization, secularization, including the introduction of obligatory civil 
marriage, weakening the influence of tradition and patriarchal ties, as well as enabling the social 
and professional mobility of citizens.  To illustrate the importance of urbanization, she pointed 
out that during 1952 out of the total number of marriages concluded in the country’s villages 
only 4.9% were mixed while 28.2% of city marriages were mixed.377  This statistic seemed to 
confirm the socialist mantra that modernization would bury any vestiges of an ethnically divided 
past. 
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 Analyzing the marriages officiated in 1960, 1961, and 1962 Petrović concluded that 
despite the continuing dominance of ethnic homogeny amongst marriages, there were some 
hopeful signs that the influence of ethnicity was on the wane.  Out of 449,302 marriages 
concluded during these three years, 57,906 or 12.9% were mixed with 67% of these being unions 
between nations belonging to the so-called Yugoslav circle.  What was particularly significant 
for Petrović was the fact that almost half of the mixed marriages between Yugoslav groups, or 
over 18,000, were between Croats and Serbs, the two largest Yugoslav ethnic groups, with the 
majority of these being between Croat women and Serb men.  Countering the sociological axiom 
that women of more isolated and less educated ethnic groups rarely intermarried was the 
example of Bosnian Muslim women who were twice as likely as Muslim men to intermarry.  
Although Slovenian women were carrying on the similar trend in relation to their male 
compatriots, Petrović ascribed the latter dynamic to higher education levels among Slovenian 
women while suggesting that it was social mobility that motivated many peasant Muslim women 
to marry outside of their group.  The highest rates of mixed marriage were recorded among 
Montenegrins and Hungarians, a quarter of whose marriages were mixed, and they mostly 
intermarried with the Serbs.  While Montenegrins owed their intermarriage proclivities to their 
high mobility, and often inhabited areas where they were a minority, Hungarians in Yugoslavia 
showed an inclination to intermarry regardless of where they lived, leading Petrović to conclude 
that “Hungarians have in large part freed themselves of ethnic and religious prejudices.”378  The 
suggestion that the same process awaited the other ethnic groups was implied in Petrović’s 
observation that even Šiptars,379 who were least likely to intermarry and even then almost 
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exclusively with partners of the same faith, had made “only the first step in breaking through 
their ethnic and cultural isolation.”380  Her hope for a less ethnically divided future, however, 
assumed government policies which encouraged mixed marriage, specifically, urbanization and 
education. 
  The growth of Yugoslav cities in the postwar period and the population movements it 
triggered were essential, although not the only, stimulants of mixed marriage.  Noting that in 
ethnically homogenous villages mixed marriage was “objectively impossible,”381 Petrović 
pointed to the data on its prevalence in cities between the years of 1950 and 1952 which showed 
the mixed marriage rate hovering around or below 9% in villages and reaching 28% in cities by 
1952.  Although there were no official records for mixed marriages in cities after 1952, there 
were other indicators that urbanization had made mixed marriage much more likely.  For 
example, Slovenians were the most compact ethnic group in Yugoslavia—with over 90% of 
them living in their own republic—and yet their participation in mixed marriages once they were 
outside of Slovenia was relatively high, with the rate of 7.5%, which was due to their high 
concentration in cities.  Urbanization was also the reason Serbia’s northern province of 
Vojvodina experienced a mixed marriage boom, almost always exceeding 20% after the war, 
while the republic’s less developed southern province of Kosmet (Kosovo and Metohija) had 
already witnessed a stagnation of mixed marriage, hovering around 10%.382  Urbanization 
compelled people to move to new environments, bringing them into contact with other ethnic 
groups and limiting their spousal choice within their own community.  Thus, the rate of mixed 
marriage amongst the Slovenians living in their republic was only 3% while this rate jumped to 
95% for those living in Kosmet.  Similarly, the Hungarians in Vojvodina, where they were a 
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relative majority, had the mixed marriage rate of 18.9%, which was still above the national 
average but nowhere near 88.4%, their mixed marriage rate once they moved into the heart of 
Serbia.383  The high mobility of Montenegrins, who were living scattered throughout Yugoslavia, 
also helped explain their high rate of intermarriage.    
 What was significant about Petrović’s findings was not so much that ethnic groups 
affected by urbanization and immigration became more open to mixed marriage, but that quite 
often this openness became limited by other factors.  Despite their high territorial mobility 
Montenegrins, for example, were consistently more open to marrying Serbs than the other ethnic 
groups.  The Montenegrins’ index of association for marriage with Serbs was 1.89, meaning that 
they were almost as twice as likely to marry Serbs than the latter’s overall participation in the 
country’s mixed marriage.  Of course, Serbs’ marriage patterns also registered a high association 
index with Montenegrins, leading Petrović to conclude that the two groups were closest from any 
other in Yugoslavia.  Reversely, during the three year period Montenegrins concluded only 4.4% 
of marriages with the Šiptars even though the two were most often neighbors.  In a similar vein, 
the Hungarians established more marriage ties with their neighbors than the Šiptars had with 
theirs, contributing to the overall picture of the latter as being “rejected” as “potential spouses” 
by “all other nations,” a phenomenon Petrović attributed to their cultural isolation.384  There was 
also some evidence that despite having an ample opportunity, Serbs did not enter into mixed 
marriage as much given their high representation throughout Yugoslavia: with 9.18% rate of 
mixed marriage they were below the Yugoslav average of 12.9%. Immigration also did not seem 
to alter the marriage habits of Bosnian Muslims whose hierarchy of spousal choices was the 
same when they were living in Bosnia-Herzegovina as when they immigrated.  On “the most to 
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least likely” scale of spousal ethnicity, the pattern was the same in both cases: Šiptars, Serbs, 
Croats, Montenegrins, with the latter being their least likely spouses.385  The data did not only 
point to the persistence of ethnic distance, however.  Interestingly, despite their territorial 
distance from Serbs, Slovenians concluded 29% of their mixed marriages with spouses from that 
ethnic group and Croats’ rate of mixed marriage (11.5%) was higher than expected given their 
moderate presence outside of Croatia.386 These deviations led Petrović to conclude that education 
could potentially change the ethnic dynamics in the country. 
 Echoing the Marxist belief in the ability of socialist education to heal ethnic and religious 
divisions, Petrović argued that “a high level of education…overcomes, if it already hasn’t erased, 
ethnic specificities which can be a significant obstacle to merging, such as religion, language and 
ethno-cultural values.”387  Suggesting that differing conceptions of beauty may have been at least 
partially responsible for keeping the Yugoslav ethnic groups apart, Petrović pointed out that 
education could make compatible Montenegrins’ understanding of beauty, for example, which 
placed emphasis on the width of man’s chest above all else, with those of the groups inhabiting 
lowland areas.  In addition, highly educated people tended to ignore the ethnic factor in their 
relations with other ethnic groups, ascribing individual behavior to character traits rather than 
some putative national mentality.  Her statistics seemed to confirm this argument: one quarter of 
all marriages between highly educated people was mixed and amongst this population ethnically 
mixed marriages were more frequent than marriages with less educated spouses.  There was also 
very little doubt that for women particularly education made mixed marriage less controversial: 
in 1963, uneducated women accounted for only 7.1% of mixed marriages while those with 
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higher education for 24.1%.388  Difference in education, as opposed to their territorial 
distribution, was also the reason Montenegrins had higher mixed marriage rates from Šiptars, 
Croats from Serbs, and Macedonians from Muslims.389   
 There was also compelling evidence for the argument that education brought people into 
same professions creating a sense of occupational identity that most of the time overrode the 
ethnic one.  Thus, mixed marriages were very common amongst whitecollar workers, less 
frequent amongst manual laborers, and least frequent amongst peasants.  In a later article 
Petrović presented a particularly interesting set of data that showed that ethnically mixed 
marriages were not only most stable amongst the highly educated, but they were more stable than 
ethnically homogeneous marriages within this population.  The high correlation between 
occupation and level of education on one hand and the proclivity for mixed marriage on the other 
also accounted for the lower stability of ethnically mixed marriages given that marriage in 
general was less stable amongst the highly educated, white collar professionals.390  People from 
different ethnic backgrounds with same educational and occupational identities may have been 
attracted to each other, but it is indisputable that ethnicity remained the most prevalent common 
denominator in most marriages. 
 The overwhelming prevalence of ethnically homogenous marriage, hovering at the rate of 
88.5% percent in the early 1960s, coupled with the emergence of first studies of ethnic 
sensibilities in the country led Petrović to acknowledge the persistence of ethnic and religious 
divisions in the Yugoslav society, more than twenty years after the onset of socialism.  The 
obsession of the political mainstream with ethnicity during the second half of the decade lifted 
the unspoken ban on the open airing of views on interethnic relations, leading to some of the first 
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opinion polls in the country.  A 1967 poll by Dragomir Pantić showed that while 60% of 
respondents expressed no distance from other ethnic groups in a variety of formal (work, school) 
and informal (friendship) settings, one fifth showed some ethnic distance, and another fifth a 
various degrees of distance “up to the complete rejection of any relations with members of all 
other nations except their own.”  Most significantly, the study concluded that in every single 
Yugoslav republic and both of autonomous provinces individuals were quickest to reject 
members of other ethnic groups as potential marriage spouses.391  For those concerned with 
Yugoslavia’s stability another discouraging opinion poll was conducted even earlier, in 1960, by 
Ante Fijamengo amongst the students of the University of Sarajevo in which they were asked if 
ethnicity played any role in choosing their marriage spouse.  At first glance the results were 
encouraging as over 77% of students described ethnicity as secondary in the choice of marriage 
partner with 52.6% choosing education level as their primary factor.  However, as Petrović 
herself noted, the results were less encouraging if one considered the fact that 22.9% of the 
correspondents, who were the most highly educated segmented of the population and supposedly 
free of ethnic prejudices, chose ethnicity and, even more disturbingly, 39.4% of them chose 
religion as the main factors.  Thus, the biological merging of Yugoslav nations Petrović 
predicted at the beginning of her article had to be occurring independently and despite of 
people’s subjective feelings which continued to show the “enormous significance [of] the ethnic 
moment,”392 in the words of Petrović herself. 
 A more meticulous analysis of Petrović’s mixed marriage statistics showed that if the 
purpose of the government’s secularization policy had been to diminish the influence of religion 
in the consciousness of Yugoslavs, it had failed.  Outlining ethno-religious heritage as the third 
                                                 
391 D. Pantic, Etnicka distance u SFRJ, 23, in Petrovic, “Etno-bioloska,” 7. 
392 Petrovic, “Etno-bioloska,” 7. 
 
 
 
174
factor influencing Yugoslavs’ marriage choices, she pointed out that the majority of mixed 
marriages still occurred between ethnic groups which shared the same religion.  Even a 
population with a high percentage of atheists, such as Montenegrins, preferred to marry Serbs, 
their religious kin, over the non-Orthodox.  Further, for the non-Slavs living in Yugoslavia 
religion was the “primary factor of ethnic heterogamy” as they almost exclusively married within 
the same faith: for example, for Šiptars and Turks marriage to Muslims was eight times as likely 
as their marriage to non-Muslims.393  For the other minorities in Yugoslavia religion was not as 
important, as was the case for Bulgarians whose preference for Macedonian spouses evaporated 
once they moved outside of Macedonia, while for Italians and Hungarians religion seemed to 
play no role whatsoever as both populations were overwhelmingly Catholic and most often 
intermarried with Orthodox Serbs.  However, for the major Yugoslav nations, religion remained 
a primary factor: despite their similar ethnic heritage with other Yugoslav groups, Bosnian 
Muslims’ association with groups of foreign heritage but same religion was as three times as 
strong as their association with groups of Yugoslav heritage but different religion.  Although not 
as strongly, other Yugoslav ethnic groups—Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Macedonians—preferred 
spouses from the same religion.  For example, the association index of Serbs towards other Slavs 
was 1.11 if the latter were Orthodox, but it dropped to 0.84 if they were Catholic.394   
 Of all the Yugoslav groups the greatest marriage distance was recorded between Croats 
and Muslims, a finding particularly disturbing for those concerned with the stability of Bosnia-
Herzegovina.  Whether they lived in or outside of the republic, Bosnian Muslims strongly 
preferred Šiptars and even Serbs as marriage partners, over Croats, and their weak association 
index with Croats (0.77) was only slightly higher from the one with Montenegrins (0.69).  
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Petrović attributed the distance between the Croats and Muslims of Bosnia to the imperial 
legacy, arguing that the Catholic Croats of Bosnia had lived largely isolated from the dominant 
Muslim population and were often seen as a threat by the Ottomans who warred with the 
neighboring Croatia, leaving a cultural gap between the two groups that had persisted into the 
socialist present.  Acknowledging that her explanation might be “controversial,” Petrović 
suggested that the degree of closeness between ethnic groups was reversely proportional to the 
means by which they settled their historical scores: “insofar as hostilities [between ethnic 
groups] were once solved through more acrimonious forms of conflict their relations today are 
closer.”395  This hypothesis was arguably borne out by the relations between Serbs and Muslims, 
who despite warring extensively in the past were now relatively close, but the same could not be 
said for Muslims’ relations with Montenegrins whose historical animosities seemed to be 
replicated in the low number of mixed marriages between the two.  The (in)accuracy of this 
assessment notwithstanding, Petrović showed the willingness to look beyond exclusively 
economic and Marxist explanations for Yugoslavia’s continuing ethnic divisions. 
 Indeed, in her subsequent article, in which she examined stability of mixed marriages, 
Ruža Petrović was even more explicit in recognizing the religiously-based differences between 
Yugoslavia’s nations, suggesting that these might make mixed marriage less stable:  
religion could have through its long presence in the life of an ethnic group 
entrenched some characteristics—the fatalism of Muhammedanism, the 
organizational skills and meticulousness of the Catholic Church, the pagan 
elements in Orthodoxy—into the mentality and lifestyle even of people who have 
never been religious.396 
 
 Although in her first article on mixed marriage, published some two years earlier, she had 
been quick to describe the higher divorce rates for mixed marriages as statistically insignificant, 
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in her 1968 study dedicated exclusively to this issue, she admitted that while other factors had a 
significant impact on marriage longevity, ethnically mixed marriages were less stable than 
homogenous ones and 1/3 of mixed marriage divorces “could be related to the difference in the 
nationality of spouses.”397  A highly significant factor in determining the strength of marriage 
were the occupation and education level of spouses with white collar and highly educated 
professionals much more prone to divorce than manual laborers or peasants.  The stability rate of 
mixed marriage was negatively impacted by this since highly educated, white collar 
professionals were overrepresented amongst the mixed marriage population.  In addition, the 
highly educated mixed marriage spouses were relatively young and often had fewer children, 
making these unions even less stable as the number of children and the age of spouses were both 
directly proportional to the length of marriage.   
 There was reason for concern, however, in that the few mixed marriages that did occur 
between manual workers proved to be much less stable than the ethnically homogenous 
marriages of their peers, a finding Petrović ascribed to the fact that manual laborers as the 
population with least favorable financial and social position and without “a wider circle of social 
ties which could help in the destruction of prejudices…”398 were more likely to fault their spouse 
on the basis of his or her ethnicity.  This suggestion may have been influenced by Petrović’s own 
elitism, but the breakdown of divorce rates among different ethnic groups seemed to confirm her 
fears about the continuing ethnic divisions.  That the most stable unions were Serbs-
Montenegrins, Serbs-Macedonians, Serbs-Bulgarians, Montenegrins-Šiptars, Muslims-Šiptars, 
and Montenegrins-Hungarians was not surprising given that in the overwhelming majority of 
these cases spouses belonged to the same religion with the Hungarian-Montenegrin unions being 
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the exception that proved the rule and that could be ascribed to the Hungarians’ unusually 
assimilated status in Yugoslavia.  Marriages which were particularly unstable were those in 
which spouses belonged to different religions and had a different heritage, such as Serbs and 
Slovenians whose divorce rate of 21.1 was more than twice the divorce rate of marriages 
between Serbs and Montenegrins or the extremely unstable, and rare, marriages between Serbs 
and Šiptars which were twice as likely to end in divorce than Slovenian-Hungarian marriages.  
Often it was enough for either religion or heritage to be different for a marriage to be unstable as 
was the case with Croats’ marriages to Hungarians, Slovenians, and Bosnian Muslims.  Having 
confidently declared just two years earlier that biology was melting away the boundaries of 
recalcitrant Yugoslav nations Petrović was now more humble in declaring that “love was a 
motive more frequent to a heterogeneous than homogenous marriage if only because they [mixed 
marriage spouses] have to fight against prejudices of their milieu and sometimes even against 
their own.”399  It was no longer clear that the process of ethno-biological homogenization would 
occur independently of the subjective feelings of individuals.  Maybe ideology would trump 
biology after all? 
 Almost exactly two decades after her pioneering research on Yugoslav mixed marriages 
Ruža Petrović would come out with the first and the only monograph on the issue in which she 
showed that by the early 1980s Yugoslavs had become even more hesitant in intermarrying each 
other.  In the most comprehensive analysis to date, she probed the marriage statistics for the 
period between 1950 and 1981 in arguing that it had slowed down considerably amongst all 
major Yugoslav ethnic groups.  She was the first demographer to point to the period between 
1966 and 1969 as the watershed moment for the history of mixed marriage suggesting that it was 
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during this time that mixed marriage rates started decreasing throughout the country and would 
never again recover their rapid growth of the previous decade.   
 During the first twenty years of socialism, due to the policies of urbanization, spread of 
literacy, waning influence of religious institutions and the revolutionary zeal of many citizens the 
mixed marriage rate ticked up consistently throughout the country: from 1956 to 1965 it jumped 
from 9.1% to 12.2% of all marriages on the federal level.  Some republics experienced 
phenomenal bursts of mixed marriage as was recorded in Macedonia where during a nine year 
period, between 1956 and 1965, it increased from 9.6% to 14.4%.  During the same period 
Croatia recorded a bump from 10.9% to 15.5%.   Bosnia-Herzegovina had a consistently slower 
increase while Serbia experienced a brief jump from 1956 to 1960 which turned into a moderate 
growth by the middle of the decade.  Curiously, just as the rates of mixed marriage were slowing 
down at the time of the nationalist revivals, government stopped recording nationality of 
marriage spouses, placing the period between 1966 and 1969 out of the demographer’s reach.  
Interestingly, as soon as the record-keeping resumed in 1970, it showed mixed marriages on the 
decline throughout the country, leading Petrović to describe the ’66-’69 period as “the beginning 
of worsening ethnic relations.”400  Thus, Montenegro’s mixed marriage rate decline from 17.4% 
in 1956 to 12.7% in 1970 continued throughout the decade right up to 1981.  Having already 
begun their decline by 1964, the mixed marriages in Bosnia-Herzegovina continued the trend and 
it would take them a decade to reach 11%, still below the Yugoslav average.  The decline from 
early in the decade was made up fairly quickly only by Croatia which in the early 1970s became 
the republic with the highest level of heterogamy in Yugoslavia.  The only region which not only 
remained unscathed by the decline of mixed marriage but continued to measure record levels of 
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mixed marriages was Serbia’s northern autonomous province of Vojvodina where by 1981 
mixed marriages accounted for 27.3% of all marriages.  The Vojvodina exception 
notwithstanding, and accounting for the fact that smaller ethnic groups had already reached the 
maximum rates of mixed marriage, Petrović ascribed the decline of mixed marriage in the late 
1960s to “social movements on the global level, which were very significant in these years in 
terms of interethnic relations, and which were accompanied by certain conflicts and separation of 
special interests and which were eventually reflected in a more intimate sphere,”401 i.e. marriage.   
 Despite her discouraging empirical evidence, Petrović still remained an optimist in the 
Marxist sense, suggesting that policies could be designed to encourage the inevitable, yet slow, 
process of ethno-biological homogenization to which the ethnically minded Yugoslavs would 
eventually have to catch up.  For example, included in her first prediction about the merging of 
nations was an implication that active government policy would be required to push the process 
forward: “These obstacles [between ethnic groups] can be removed only in concert with the 
removal of general social barriers, i.e. the removal of social contradictions and differences on the 
basis of which ethnic fences between people are built and maintained.”402  As for the means by 
which this could be achieved, Petrović left little doubt that this was education which she credited 
with the ability to “remove ethnic barricades and prejudices, assuage or erase the specificities of 
ethnic cultures which can be a barrier for entrance into a mixed marriage.”403  Even in her most 
recent study, in which she highlighted the indisputable decades’ long decline in mixed marriage 
rates, Petrović remained true to her belief that “[a]nthropological and cultural homogenization of 
the society is obvious and is strongly manifested.”404  But after having shown the increasing 
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hesitancy of Yugoslavs to intermarry, casting doubt on the influence of government policies, 
such as urbanization, education, and secularization, on mixed marriage, Petrović invoked the 
time tested legacy of socialist revolution which would supposedly keep erasing ethnic divisions: 
“Brotherhood and unity were the basic fighting principles and code of conduct [of the Partisans] 
that resisted the ethnic genocide which was being carried out by quislings and occupiers.  It is on 
this heritage of the Revolution that our social and ethnic developments will continue with a 
continuing strong influence on ethnic heterogamy.”405 
 But it was the carriers of the revolutionary legacy, the Communist leaders, who were 
dismissing the notions of a Yugoslav identity as antisocialist precisely at the time Petrović was 
predicting that this identity was in the making.  After all, it was just a few years after she 
predicted the ethno-biological homogenization through mixed marriage that the party’s 
theoretician Salim Ćerić and the head of the Bosnian Communists Hamdija Pozderac criticized 
and mocked this very same idea.  Whether or not the two were responding to the sociologist is 
not as clear as the fact that the party’s failure to devise any coherent policy on the matter left 
mixed marriage Yugoslavs without an institutional support which could have made their 
integrative identities more permanent.   
 In addition to the already discussed attempts of some party officials to remove the 
category “Yugoslav” from the census of 1971, Petrović pointed to the absence of Yugoslavs in 
official statistics for the period between 1950 to 1953 and then again from 1956 to 1961.  
Although the reasons for this statistical oversight are not known the fact that statistics figure 
prominently in the process of nation-making, as Benedict Anderson reminds us, coupled with the 
Communists’ retreat from any idea of a Yugoslav nation suggests a deliberate and pervasive 
neglect.  Petrović herself seemed to admit as much in 1985 when she argued that the lack of any 
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demographic policy had “stripped naked marriage and family, leaving them on their own.”406  
Pointing out that the only piece of demographic legislation was the 1985 bill dealing with 
unemployment, she accused the government of ignoring the biological aspects of family, and 
particularly reproduction, for the sake of its purely economic functions.  In his review of 
Petrović’s monograph on mixed marriage, the sociologist Miloš Marjanović echoed this criticism 
arguing that: 
due to certain failures of the Yugoslav statistical system in the tracking of 
marriage as an important social phenomenon and the lack of any scientific studies 
about certain important social phenomena make impossible a more 
comprehensive analysis and interpretation of ethnic heterogamy while some other 
failures make it harder to conceptualize and implement a coherent demographic 
policy.407 
 
 Therefore, by the 1980s the confident pronouncements about a less divisive future had 
given way to sober assessments, on the part of the sociologists at least, about the government’s 
failure to promote a sustainable interethnic integration. Writing in 1982 the Zagreb sociologist 
Vjeran Katunarić dismissed the Marxist overconfidence in industrialization’s ability to solve 
ethnic problems and argued that ethnicity was resilient in adapting to new systems as the case of 
socialist Yugoslavia had proven.  While Ruža Petrović and Miloš Marjanović faulted the 
authorities for not coming up with a coherent demographic policy, Katunarić laid to rest the 
notion that any institutional arrangement could resist the habits of ethnicity:  
A new institutional order, no matter how well thought out and planned in detail 
through thousands of regulations, as is the case in our country, cannot compete 
with the life practice which has been programmed long before, or with habits and 
customs which simply no longer take heed of any institutional changes.408   
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 He painted Yugoslavia’s future in uncertain terms, arguing that out of four possible paths 
of interethnic integration the country had failed to take either one.  Economic integration, which 
was Edvard Kardelj’s vision, had obviously failed, Katunarić argued, since Yugoslavia had an 
ethnically based economy in which republican-based technocrats and politicians represented the 
exclusive interests of their republics, and often their nations, and not some purported Yugoslav 
market.  In addition to the economy, the regime had encouraged interethnic integration through 
political means, including its “continuous propagation of brotherhood and unity,” a policy that 
had been as ineffective as it was counterproductive, triggering a nationalist reaction in many 
parts of the country.  The Zagreb sociologist was more ambivalent about the effectiveness of 
socio-cultural mechanisms of integration, or what Petrović had more bluntly called ethno-
biological homogenization, which he defined as a spontaneous growth of links between 
Yugoslavia’s nations on the basis of shared culture, language, and history.  But, echoing the 
frustration of his Belgrade colleagues, Katunarić acknowledged that the little research there was 
on the matter had not come up with a blueprint of how to exploit this type of integration for the 
purposes of buttressing Yugoslavia’s stability.  Finally, he did see a glimmer of hope in the 
emergence of non-ethnic grassroots activism in the country, which had showed its potency in the 
mass student demonstrations in the late 1960s, and which mimicked similar movements 
throughout Europe, such as the German Greens, but he quickly dampened the optimism by 
questioning their long-term effectiveness and sustainability given that they were in their infancy.  
In place of Petrović’s buoyancy at the prospect of mixed marriages leading to a more inclusive 
identity Katunarić now left a question which revealed the considerable anxiety regarding the 
country’s future: 
It is a question as to what extent could republics and provinces, in areas with 
mixed populations transform into neo-ethnic or supra-ethnic, but still interest-
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based entities which would eventually bring about a certain assimilation of other 
ethnic markers.409 
 
 There was an attempt to answer this question in the affirmative in the second half of the 
decade in the form of a brief campaign by the Bosnian-based Institute for the Study of 
Interethnic Relations to revitalize Yugoslavism.  In a 1986 article, Institute’s Pravoslav Ralić 
argued that the deteriorating ethnic situation in the country made it imperative for the 
Communists to “return to one of the main goals of our socialist revolution: the creation of a 
unified socialist culture.”410  The Communists would have to foster a new sensibility towards the 
idea of Yugoslav identity, emphasizing its progressive, socialist, and unifying aspects and 
countering any attempts to equate it with the delegitimized unitarism of the past which saw 
ethnic differences as irrelevant.  However, similarly to his predecessors, Ralić burdened the 
concept with so many caveats that there was very little substance left.  For example, the socialist 
culture was “neither unitary nor separatist nor hierarchial nor anational” but rather “a creative 
communion of the cultures of our nations which have all overcome their haunted reactionary 
traditions…”411 How the League of Communists would implement a policy based on such a 
vague concept Ralić did not explain. 
 Another Institute-sponsored study strove to show that the attachment to Yugoslavia 
remained strong in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Published in 1989, in the midst of the country’s yet 
another constitutional crisis, the study by Ibrahim Bakić was an opinion poll conducted among 
1090 Bosnian youth that probed the resonance of national sentiments amongst the republic’s 
young adults.  Although only 33.7% of correspondents described nation as a category which 
would be “overcome,” Bakić found comfort in the high number of correspondents who agreed 
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with the questionnaire’s statement “I am a Yugoslav and I would not give precedence to other 
affiliations.”  Moreover, the attachment to Yugoslavia was evenly spread amongst all three major 
ethnic groups with 74.9% of Serbs, 77.2% of Croats, and 77.9% of Muslims expressing strong 
agreement with this statement.  These results, however, were difficult to reconcile with the fact 
that only a slight majority, 59.4%, expressed a negative attitude towards an exaggerated sense of 
national pride.  Bakić found more reason for optimism in the finding that only 14% of the 
Bosnian youth agreed with the statement “the ethnically mixed marriages are doomed to failure,” 
which was four percentage points lower than the Yugoslav average.  These results Bakić argued, 
showed that the attitude of the “[y]outh of Yugoslavia and especially Bosnia-Herzegovina vis-à-
vis mixed marriages is positive,” echoing the larger argument of the study which was “to counter 
those views which have argued that nation and all that is related to it have expanded and become 
the basis of personal and social values.”412  Contradicting this optimism, however, were the 
22.7% of the young people who responded affirmatively when asked if “one had to be careful 
towards other nations even when they are your friends.”  What gave Bakić a cause for concern 
was that even a higher percentage of young people expressed agreement with this statement in a 
countrywide study with 30% echoing this “most extreme type of national attachment.”413  
 Nevertheless, Bakić concluded that the “degree of national attachment is always lower 
amongst the respondents in Bosnia-Herzegovina than in the rest of Yugoslavia.”414  In addition 
to the contradictions in findings, the methodological ambiguities of the study—who were the 
respondents? what was the criteria for their selection? who administered the questionnaire?—
further made this argument much more debatable, creating the impression that it was hastily 
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researched and ideologically interpreted, in sharp contrast to the meticulous, albeit less 
encouraging, research of Ruža Petrović. Finally, Bakić’s effort to define Yugoslav patriotism 
produced a definition that was as convoluted and ambiguous as all the others articulated after the 
1960s.  For Bakić Yugoslavism was neither supranational, nor anational, nor national, but was to 
be defined “through the prism of brotherhood and unity which sums up the possibility of ethnic 
coexistence and freedom.”415  Thus, twenty years after Veljko Vlahović had warned that the 
party was experiencing a “crisis of ideas,” formulaic slogans were still being used in place of any 
substantive rethinking of the country’s identity, leaving stranded all of those who were genuinely 
attached to the country.  Not even a year after Bakić supposedly located deep reservoirs of 
Yugoslav patriotism in Bosnia, the Yugoslav League of Communists would vote itself out of 
existence, plunging the country into a violent death.   
Conclusion 
 Rather than being central to Communist efforts to articulate ‘proletarian 
internationalism,” as Nikolai Botev would have it, or “were strongly encouraged” to promote 
multiculturalism as Le Goff and Giudici have put it, the mixed marriages of Yugoslavia figured 
only as an afterthought in the regime’s political calculations.  To argue otherwise would be to 
credit the Yugoslav Communists with being much more devoted Marxists than they actually 
were.  Although their own effort to “domesticate nationalism,” to borrow the words of Rogers 
Brubaker,416 involved an aggressive secularization of the society, including pushing religion out 
of the bedroom, their attitude towards mixed marriage always came in the form of reaction—
whether it was to censor the clergymen who campaigned against it or expel its party members 
who had feuded with their own family over it—but it never amounted to even a semblance of a 
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policy which could have ensured their more permanent political, demographic, or cultural 
resonance in the society.  The regime’s half-hearted approach might have been due to the popular 
resistance to their secularization policy, as it became evident during the meetings of the 
Commission for Religious Affairs, but the enthusiasm with which they abandoned Marxism in 
embracing the permanence of nation spoke to a much deeper failure of imagination. 
  The break with Yugoslavism was the party’s way of lowering people’s expectations in 
socialism in that it was an admission that ethnic divisions were not caused by economic and 
political inequality, both of which could be corrected by socialism, but originated out of deeply-
embedded cultural differences between the country’s ethnic groups.  The party embraced the 
nation with a revolutionary zeal which far exceeded the energy of its earlier efforts to re-imagine 
the country’s raison d’être. That Yugoslav Communists became nationalists much more ardently 
than they had ever been Marxists meant that mixed marriage necessarily had to become marked 
as an issue to be discussed and a problem to be analyzed.  Identifying attachment to one’s nation 
as a “natural” condition it was the party’s chief theoreticians and politicians who interpreted 
mixed marriage as a potential source of unsavory ideologies, such as unitarism, statism, and 
chauvinism, or a social ill that had to be diagnosed. 
 Therefore, it was not surprising that the first studies of mixed marriage in Yugoslavia 
emerged precisely at this moment, in the second half of the 1960s, as mixed Yugoslavs were 
coming under an ideological siege of sorts.  The sociologist Ruža Petrović became the lone voice 
who persisted in her hopes that the ethnically divided Yugoslavs were undergoing a biological 
homogenization which would trample over the petty differences of a backwards past.  Despite 
her own meticulous research pointing to the contrary conclusion, Petrović remained convinced 
that the material reality would trump nationalist ideologies.  By the time her monograph was 
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published in the mid-1980s and the violent resonance of ethnic identity could no longer be 
wished away by Marxist predictions, the sociologist and her colleagues could do little more than 
express frustration at the regime’s failure to imagine a more Yugoslav future.  Lamenting the 
lack of any demographic policy, revealing a statistical neglect by the regime of those who 
identified themselves Yugoslav, and calling for a more coherent articulation of the country’s 
identity, it was the sociologists who were the first ones to note the importance of mixed 
marriages for the survival of Yugoslavia.  It would prove to be too late. 
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CHAPTER IV 
How I Became Mixed 
And 
The Lies I Told About It 
 
 
The last regime coddled the mixed ones giving them opportunities for 
advancement just because they were the children of mixed marriages.  Because 
for heaven’s sake, there was no way their parents could be politically suspicious 
because they strengthened brotherhood and unity, that apple of the eye of the 
Communist dictatorship, in their beds…Come on, let’s not be naïve: real Serb, 
Croat, and Muslim families prevented in time the disillusioned son or daughter 
from entering into mixed marriage regardless of how much in love they were.  
Only the nationally or religiously indifferent families or those infected by 
Communism allowed [mixed marriages].417 
 
Mixed marriages, a sort of a banner of misunderstood ethnic coexistence, have 
been for the most part failed marriages, in which there were heavy conflicts, 
children from these marriages are frustrated by their heritage, so it would be best 
to stop with those disgusting messages [that mixed marriages were symbols of 
Bosnian multiculturalism].418 
 
The Lies My Diary Told 
  
The statements by the two leading ideologues of the main Bosnian Muslim party (SDA), 
Vedad Spahić and Džemaludin Latić, written at the height of the war in 1993 and 1994 
respectively, may have been offensive to many of us “mixed ones,”—the word Spahić used 
(mješanci) referred to dogs of impure breed—but when juxtaposed next to each other they serve 
as my mnemonic device.  In particular, their sense of resentment at the (supposedly privileged) 
difference of the mixed ones and the diagnosis of frustration help me remember a distinct type of 
emotion I felt during those war years, acute awareness of my own difference combined with the 
frustration at being stranded. It is only through memory that I can recover this emotion given that 
I had tried to obscure it in my own diary, tucking it away in sentences that present a continuous 
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self barely affected by the war.  For example, on 16 December 1993 I write of my decision to 
fast and pray during the Ramadan: 
I have never prayed or fasted before but today I felt some impulse to do so.  So 
this morning I woke up at 4 [am] and walked with everyone else downstairs to the 
cafeteria to eat…I’d like to emphasize one more time that I am not fasting to 
prove myself but because I felt an unexplainable desire to do so.  Afterwards I 
said a prayer and made a wish because this was the night of wishes…I’d like to 
say one more time that I wasn’t forced to do this, but that I did so voluntarily.  My 
family and I never led a religious life and we do not intend to do so.  But today I 
decided to do so because I felt a desire and because I feel that something does 
exist.  But from now on I will continue to lead the life like the one I had in 
Mostar—normal and ordinary.  I will love all good people regardless of their 
nationality.419 
 
 The first sentence of this statement was a lie.  I could be forgiven for unrealistically 
boasting that I would lead a normal and ordinary life while sitting on a bunk bed in a room my 
family and I shared with five other people, in a school turned refugee camp in the dusty Turkish 
market town of Hayrabolu, near the Bulgarian border.  Wishing a Mostar type of life might have 
been a therapeutic form of denial at the tectonic physical and mental displacement we had 
experienced since fleeing Mostar in July of that year.  More troubling from the perspective of the 
historian, however, is the factually incorrect statement that “I have never prayed or fasted 
before.”   
 The first Qur’anic verse (sura) I learned to recite in Arabic, without knowing what it 
meant, was during the previous Ramadan season in 1992 (almost a year to date before the diary 
entry) with the help of my friend Nihad whose encyclopedic knowledge of the Qur’an was what 
had attracted me to his friendship at the time when the regular shelling of Mostar by the Serb 
army had disrupted the school year, leaving us children scrambling for hobbies.  It helped that 
my new hobby involved eating Eurokrem420 for breakfast at Nihad’s apartment and recovering 
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my prewar pleasure of having sweets the first thing in the morning but also triggering intense 
pangs of guilt since I knew that only one floor above, my brother was stuck eating fried potatoes.  
Learning the first words of Subhaneke, the short recitation which opens the daily prayer (salah) 
thus almost always brought on a madeleine moment: biting into a soft homemade bread covered 
with a thick layer of Cipiripi, another Yugoslav imitation of Nutella, in locations that changed 
almost every morning with every repetition of the Qur’anic verse—my grandmother’s living 
room, a Dalmatian beach, or the bench in the woods next to our building.  While reciting my 
Yugoslav childhood in Arabic the thick and sluggish chocolate cream would get stuck in my 
esophagus, making the guttural Arabic sounds even more authentic, at least to my ears.   
 Nihad’s parents must have been impressed by my memorizing skills since they invited 
me to break the fast with them on Lejletul-kadr, the twenty-seventh and the most festive night of 
Ramadan, when the abundance of food was commensurate to the length of the special prayer 
performed that evening.  This meant that my metaphysical excursions to the past now gave way 
to the overwhelming logistics of learning the ritual—not only memorizing the necessary suras, 
including the opening El Fatiha, but also the number, content, and the order of all the required 
sequences (raka’ahs)—a process that took countless hours on Nihad’s prayer rug which smelled 
of his father’s cologne and whose softness makes me think of cashmere.  When the evening 
finally came, I was disappointed not because of food—which with its variety once again made 
me feel selfish for not caring enough about my own family’s bland dietary habits to reject the 
dinner invitation—or because of the difficulties of the prayer, which I performed without a 
glitch, but because the collective rug in the giant hall where we prayed, a student dorm turned 
mosque, was much coarser than the one in Nihad’s house, and smelled of sweaty feet, the 
sensation which may have been psychosomatic, my mind’s way of responding to the row of 
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heels which greeted me every time I prostrated myself.  I am not sure if it was this memory or 
the increasing frequency of shelling that made me decline Nihad’s future invitations to the 
mosque. 
 The diary’s omission of my previous experience with Islam could not have been an 
innocent memory slip because recitations of El-Fatiha had already become ingrained into my 
nightly ritual and would be the most consistent aspect of falling asleep during my life as a 
refugee when I changed beds with a dizzying frequency.  In fact, the nightly recitation of El 
Fatiha was an Arabized reincarnation of my first conversations with God in May 1992 when 
from a bed whose sheets smelled of lavender, in a tiny Montenegrin village, I would plea for the 
life of my parents in Mostar whom I imagined crouching in the basement of our building, on the 
benches we had stolen from the soccer stadium, while the “Serbs” lobed shells into the city to 
punish us for participating in some referendum.  But instead of caressing the band of my father’s 
watch, which smelled of his aftershave and reminded me of our early morning trips to my kinder 
garden, I could now pray in Arabic and be confident that God would understand it even if I did 
not.   
 Another memory that makes me certain my diary’s omission was not accidental is of me 
standing in the narrow hallway in the basement of our refugee camp in Hayrabolu, covering both 
of my ears, and bellowing out the call to prayer (azhan), terrified that my asthma inflicted lungs 
would give out during my favorite line, Allahu ekber, and make our imam regret giving me the 
opportunity.  My lungs must have exceeded expectations, though, since I do not remember being 
excoriated by the imam, or ridiculed by my mekteb friends.  Given the vividness of these 
memories almost two decades later why was it that I silenced them in my diary? 
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 My dishonesty becomes even clearer if one reads the entry from just a few weeks before 
my “first” fast, on 24 November, which at more than ten pages was one of my longest entries 
that year, a testimony to the amount of effort I had expanded during the preceding few days in 
revamping my identity by completely immersing myself into Islam.  My decision to attend a 
medresa in Istanbul came as abruptly as the three representatives of the Refah Partisi421 who 
visited our Hayrabolu camp one day, interrupting our monotonous routine to show us the 
catalogues of prestigious schools in Istanbul that the Bosnian children could enjoy only if they 
went with them.  To coax the suspicious parents, including my own, into signing their children 
up, the Refah representatives showed us pictures of villas turned schools, overlooking the 
Bosphorus, and insisted that the curriculum offered all the regular subjects in addition to 
religious instruction and Arabic.  Having had my hopes repeatedly squashed by Lejla 
Izetbegović422 of the Bosnian consulate, who had never delivered on her promise to open a 
school in our camp, and having proven my azhan abilities, I implored my parents to sign me up, 
arguing that our separation would only be temporary as the Refah people were promising to 
eventually relocate the parents to Istanbul. Stepping in between my mother and me as we argued 
in the hallway was the de facto leader of our Refah visitors, Hüseyn Kansu, who in his flawless 
Bosnian swore in “Allah’s name” that he would see to it that my parents and Vanja were 
transferred to Istanbul in a few weeks where they would be given an apartment and good-paying 
jobs.  It must have been the lingering look of suspicion on my mother’s face that finally 
persuaded him to suggest that parents accompany their children on their first visit to the schools 
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the election of the Refah founder Necmettin Erbakan as Turkey’s PM.  Erbakan’s openly Islamist policies in 
domestic but particularly foreign policy (as evidenced by his open animosity towards Israel) worried the country’s 
powerful military which accused him of violating the sacred secular principles of the Kemalist republic.  In 1997 the 
military orchestrated a coup overthrowing Erbakan from power and a year later the constitutional court banned 
Refah from the political process.  Many founders of the Refah brought their principles into the newly rebranded 
Islamist party, AK partisi, which is in power today. 
422 The daughter of the then President of Bosnia Alija Izetbegović. 
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and, in the event they were not persuaded, take them back to the camp the very next morning.  
That her acquiescence was equivocal at best is made clear by my diary’s constant references to 
her emotional state during the trip—“I saw a sad look on my mom’s face and tears in her eyes”; 
“…I could see on her face that this wasn’t easy for her”; “she wasn’t very happy that she would 
have to separate from me”.423  The worried look must have been partly rooted in her fear that she 
would be outed as a Croat, the fear that was evident by the fact that while on the bus to Istanbul 
she reminded me several times of her new name: Selma.   
 The Refah sponsored trip to Istanbul was the first time I had ever seen a woman wearing 
a burqa, in the house where we spent our first night and where I ate the thick Nutella which 
reminded me of my Qur’an recitations at Nihad’s apartment in Mostar.  The Refah sponsored trip 
was the first time my mother was forced to spend the night in a separate room because she was a 
woman, the segregation which at the time came as a relief to me as I had feared it meant she had 
been outed as a Croat.  The Refah sponsored trip was the first time I heard Israel mentioned in 
conversations about the Bosnian war.  The Refah sponsored trip was the first time I had a 
stranger, Hüseyn Kansu, shout at me in front of my mother for the supposedly rude manner in 
which I had been talking to her, plunging me into a flashback to the moment at the Croatian-
Bosnian border when a drunken HVO soldier scolded my mother for having a Serbian name.  
My mother’s shout “only I have the right to talk like that to my son,” seemed like a response not 
to the Refah leader but a delayed, albeit displaced, reaction to the insults of the drunken HVO 
soldier from a few months before.  The two-day long trip was the first time I paid any attention 
to beard, which decorated the face of every adult male I encountered and came in a variety of 
shapes and lengths; my initial suspicion that the length of man’s beard was directly proportional 
to the importance of his position in the Refah was proven wrong by Hüseyn Kansu whose neatly 
                                                 
423 Notebook III, 25 November 1993 
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trimmed beard belied his prominence as one of the founding members of the party (according to 
his own words).  The Refah sponsored trip was also the first time I realized that no matter how 
well I had learned El Fatiha, Subhaneke, or any other aspect of the daily prayer, no matter how 
flawlessly my asthma-inflicted lungs had performed at belching out the azhan, and no matter 
how cleverly my mother had concealed her name, I could never overcome the fear that came at 
the sight of the men with beards, at the students who trembled in front of Hüseyn Kansu as they 
explained to me the benefits of attending the medresa, and at the thought of the men who 
menacingly vowed to make our parents “regret” their decision to take us back to Hayrabolu.   
 Although they were silenced in my Ramadan entry, the uncomfortable memories of my 
encounter with the Refah must have contributed to my fear that I was an impostor to Islam, the 
feeling that is obvious in my repetitive insistence that I was acting Muslim not to “prove myself” 
or because I was “forced.”  Reading these lines brings me right back to that hall from where I 
called my first azhan, but this time I am sitting next to the imam who had generously allowed me 
to try out my Qur’an reciting skills.  Only now, he is asking me if Feđa was my real name, a 
question he would repeat often, gentle grin spreading across his wrinkled face, and to which I 
would always respond with a grin of my own, more out of politeness than any comprehension of 
the joke.  It was only when he asked me why I was not circumcised (how did he know?), slipping 
in his recommendation of the Hayrabolu clinic as the place where the procedure can be done 
painlessly, that I realized the grins signified condemnation and not some elaborate joke.  Today I 
squirm at the ease with which the imam brought up this question in front of the entire mekteb 
class and I grow more puzzled every time I recall the moment when during one of my many 
emergency trips to the Hayrabolu clinic, while wheezing through another asthma attack, I 
thought of asking the flustered doctor about scheduling a circumcision.  What makes this 
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memory so puzzling is my urge to invite the doctor to tamper with my sexuality even before I 
had ever shared this intention with my parents.  To ask for a circumcision would have been 
tantamount to accusing my father of neglecting his Islamic obligations.  It would have pithily 
summarized all those moments when while praying in Arabic I suddenly felt I was purposefully 
losing my parents in translation, excluding them from my daily conversations with God, and 
writing them out of my future.  It was my guilt over having burst the boundaries of our 
household, having caused my family history to spill into the open and ready to be condemned by 
the imam, that had turned me (momentarily I hope!) into a forger of history. 
The guilt at the self-imposed alienation from my family was also evident in my obsession 
with my mother’s ethnicity.  Her memory of me asking her frequently if she was upset that I was 
going to the mosque unequivocally confirms this argument.  Although I cannot remember these 
questions—which according to my mother, she shrugged off, encouraging me to do whatever 
made me happy—the diary entry of 20 November 1993, less than a month before I would decide 
to fast for (supposedly) the first time, makes it clear that my mother’s ethnicity was on my mind.  
After yet another unpleasant encounter with the camp director Salko Velić—who makes 
frequent, albeit contradictory, appearances in my diary, alternating between the life-saving 
superhero who wrestles Turkish doctors out of their beds and into our camp where they sleepily 
inject me with asthma medicine and bring me back to life, and the evil Gargamel424 whose 
favorite pastime is terrorizing small children—I tried to explain his decision to ban us from 
taking meals to our rooms: 
But it’s not only his fault.  It is also the fault of all these people who have 
brainwashed him with all sorts of stories and who can hardly wait for my mother 
to raise her voice so that they can stick it to her for being a Croat.  I only now see 
how hard it must me for my mom.  She is a Croat and there is so much 
                                                 
424 Gargamel is the evil nemesis of the fictional blue creatures “The Smurfs” popularized in an American cartoon in 
1981 and which made its way to Yugoslavia during the late 1980s. 
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nationalism in here and that she is afraid to say peep.  I only now see that 
Muslims also have their nationalism and that it is no less intense from that one of 
Croats and Serbs.  All three nationalisms are equally awful.  And now I realize 
(and this is how I was raised) that there are no Croats, Muslims, and Serbs, but 
only those who are humane and inhumane.  I have always believed this and will 
believe so in the future.  It is not important for me to what faith a man belongs, it 
is important that he is decent.425 
 
  The ease and the unexpectedness with which my mother’s ethnicity could flood my 
diary’s pages reflected the anxiety I felt in encountering the camp authorities and my paranoid 
ability to dream up conspiracies out of such ethnically neutral incidents like being excoriated for 
violating the camp’s dining rules.  The entry makes it clear that my mother’s ethnicity had 
become something external to me: she was a Croat, not me.  This statement was overloaded with 
so many assumptions that I am surprised it did not shatter right there on the page.  It assumed 
that my mother identified with an idea whose abrupt intrusion into our home just a few months 
earlier had made my terrified father lock himself up inside of our TV stand, which we had 
discovered was hallow inside and could fit a child or a crouched adult.  An idea whose distaste 
for ambiguous loyalties had made a fugitive out of my brother who, due to his short-lived service 
in the Bosnian Army, had to turn our grandfather’s apartment and his childhood home into a 
reincarnation of the Anne Frank’s house in which everyone inside spent their days leaning 
against the door, listening for the sound of boots.  It assumed that my mother had simply 
forgotten the moment at the Bosnia-Croatia border when a Serbianized spelling of her name had 
sent a drunken HVO426 soldier into a fit of rage, particles of his spit falling onto my mother’s 
wrinkled birth certificate, as he ordered her to follow him “to the next room.”  It assumed that 
my mother had simply not seen me push myself through the thick mass of camouflage uniforms, 
which smelled of sweat, alcohol and naphthalene, and stagger into the “next room” where I 
                                                 
425 Ibid., 20 November 1993 
426 HVO-Croatian Council of Defense (Hrvatsko Vijeće Obrane) was the army of the Bosnian Croats during the war. 
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wrapped my skinny hands around her like some wide-eyed infant on a National Geographic 
cover.  It assumed that she could no longer taste the salty torrent of her tears on that bus after the 
soldier had confessed that his rage was a “performance to fool those balije427 on the bus” and 
had, while stamping our exit visas, promised that we could get back on the bus as soon as his 
men had taken all “those balije” away.  It assumed she had repressed the memory of HVO 
soldiers halting their last hunt for our building’s Muslim men to stand outside of our apartment 
door, me propped up on a chair on the other side watching their peephole deformed faces read 
out my grandmother’s Croatian last name from her obituary, taped to our door, and deciding not 
to knock.  It assumed that my mother had forgiven her Croatian uncle for asking us to leave his 
Zagreb house and my grandmother’s birthplace on a scorching July day, throwing us on the 
street and into the clutches of the UN bureaucracy whose solution to our homelessness was to 
place us in a wagon of a disabled train in Eastern Slavonia where we were kept awake on the 
nightly basis either by the gunfire from the nearby Croat-Serb frontlines or the rain of rocks the 
local Croat peasants pelted at “the balije inside.” More troublingly though, the externalization of 
my mother’s ethnicity strove to exculpate me from my own crimes I had committed in the name 
of nation. 
 That the statement “there are no Croats, Muslims and Serbs” could be something other 
than a genuinely felt sentiment does not surprise me since I had heard the exact same 
phraseology inserted as a caveat to ethnic hatred as was the case when my uncle’s best friend 
came to his door dressed in his HVO uniform and smilingly promised to kill everyone if my 
uncle continued to hide my brother and father, prefacing the threat with the apologetic, “you 
know that there are no Croats, Muslims, and Serbs for me, but…”  More surprising is that in the 
                                                 
427 Balija is a pejorative term for Muslim. 
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private confines of my diary, I would also use the cover of this platitude to silence uncomfortable 
memories from just a few months before.   
 Every time I read this line I hear the sound of crunching glass beneath my feet, and see 
the frameless icon of Saint Sava,428 a part of his torso torn, propped up against a wall of our 
building as a target for our “who can hit his head” contest, the shattering frame glass a testimony 
to our bad aims.  I can still see the oak kitchen table and an elaborately ornate armchair, which 
made me think of some Russian novel I had had to read for school, and a framed beach 
photograph of teta Nada surrounded by children (her grandkids?) nailed to the wall from where 
we stole her Saint Sava icon.  I don’t remember how we got into her apartment but I do 
remember having to squeeze in between the HOS429 soldiers who were too busy carrying out the 
ornate armchair to notice us children.  The presence of the HOS soldiers suggests that this was 
around the time when the rumor that all of our Serb neighbors had abruptly left for Serbia—
leaving behind elaborate assassination plans against the non-Serb residents along with their fully 
stocked meat freezers—triggered daily raids on their empty apartments that resulted in piles of 
furniture, photographs, icons, and rotting meat on our front lawns.  The rumor branded the few 
remaining Serb residents would be assassins and brought one vivid image, which had supposedly 
been safely tucked away in a history archive, to our front lawn: an elderly man kneeling on all 
fours, eating grass, with an HOS soldier standing above him, smiling at us the spectators while 
we silently watched from the surrounding windows.  This memory tempts me to read my “there 
are no Croats, Muslims, and Serbs” statement as a thirteen year old boy’s clumsy attempt at 
                                                 
428 The first archbishop of the Serbian Orthodox Church 
429 HOS (Croatian Armed Forces) was a short-lived Croat-Muslim militia which with the black uniforms its soldiers 
wore, the pictures of Ante Pavelić taped on their vans, and brazen acts of violence against Serb civilians 
purposefully modeled themselves on the feared World War II Ustaše.   
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irony, but given the total absence of this rhetorical device in my diary it can certainly be read as a 
way to cover my own tracks. 
 Admitting to this, however, unravels other memories in which the thirteen year old boy is 
no longer a spectator helplessly observing ethnic violence from a window or an incidental vandal 
who stumbles onto an apartment robbery and makes away only with an Orthodox icon, but an 
accomplice.  Before the war, the image of an elderly man, hunched over as he watered his plants 
on the balcony of his first floor apartment in the building next to mine had been a mundane and 
barely noticeable part of our everyday reality.  Memory’s penchant for conciseness, even at the 
expense of historical accuracy, means that I always remember Drago as a slightly hunched 
elderly man, his younger version having evaporated with my other prewar memories.  His static 
physical appearance, as conjured up by my memory, belies his metamorphosis from the “man 
who always shouted at us to take our soccer game elsewhere,” to “the last Serb in the building” 
sometime during the summer of 1992.  We had promoted him to the last position after “the other 
Serb” had been taken away in a black HOS van, but not before he was made to eat grass from the 
lawn of our building.  It was around this time that my best friend Sanel and I decided that 
Drago’s daily trips to the nearby woods were suspicious particularly in light of all those 
assassination lists and meat-packed freezers his compatriots had left behind before leaving for 
Serbia.  Our inner detectives may have been awoken by my parents’ decision to limit our access 
to the biggest room in my apartment—where Sanel and I had been working on a cardboard 
model of Mostar so that we could later destroy it with “shells,” i.e. marbles—due to the fact that 
the room was dangerously exposed to the Serb artillery positions on the surrounding hill.  Given 
that just a few months before, while my brother and I were still in Montenegro, a projectile 
tumbled into the apartment two floors down, tossing our neighbor down the stairs and against the 
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railing, my parents’ decision to place this room off limits and make us sleep on the floor of our 
former storage room, was one that any responsible parent would have made.  But for a thirteen 
year old boy this was just another in a stream of evictions—from the school, from the soccer 
stadium, from our favorite construction site turned playground—whose only purpose was to lock 
him ever more tightly into the ever expanding bubble of boredom.  Following Drago on his daily 
excursions thus gave us a new purpose: we would uncover his radio-station, tucked away deep in 
the forest, and thwart his future plans to transmit massages to his friends on the hills who were 
planning our collective demise.  After informing our HOS neighbor about our discovery Drago 
would be whisked away in the black van and Sanel and I would be praised by our neighbors and 
more importantly by Sanja, a girl whose opinion I particularly cherished.  Our fantasies 
collapsed, however, when from our hiding place at a safe distance we saw Drago approach a 
metal contraption we later learned was a pigeon loft, housing three pigeons who looked to us as 
every bit as dirty and repulsive as the ones whose cooing on our balconies would frequently 
wake us up in the early hours of the morning.  The abrupt end of our investigation did not mean, 
however, clearing Drago of suspicion as became evident by my irresistible urge to look up at his 
balcony every time I passed by his building.   
Going Undercover in Montenegro 
In addition to boredom, my failed attempt to out a Serb spy may have also been inspired 
by the need to prove my non-Serb credentials, a need which stemmed from my mother’s brief 
stint as an undercover Serb from a few months earlier.  The stint had some of the makings of a 
James Bond movie—a mission to save the good guys from deep inside the enemy territory, the 
stern looking enemy border guards who are always on the brink of discovering the plot, and the 
harrowing escape—but with a Yugoslav twist: the hero was not a tall, handsome male aristocrat, 
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but a tiny woman of little over five feet whose success depended not on fancy gadgets or the 
support of the MI5, but the ethnic ambiguity of her name and her compulsive dedication to the 
idea of motherhood.  Also, instead of being knighted by the Queen following the successful 
completion of the mission, the hero of the Yugoslav story is forced to live in shadows out of fear 
of being sent to prison. 
 My diary’s complete silence on our trip to Montenegro at the very beginning of the war, 
between late April and June 1992, speaks to the anxiety I felt over being outed as a Serb 
sympathizer in both the post-Serb Mostar and the Turkish refugee camp.  I remember that upon 
returning from Montenegro in mid-June 1992 I was terrified by the memory of my brother, my 
two aunts, four cousins, and myself flying out of Mostar in a Serb army helicopter while that 
very same army was shelling our neighborhood to “punish us for seceding.”  The excitement I 
felt over flying in a helicopter for the first time in my life was dampened by the fact that I was 
saying goodbye to my parents with whom I had had a day-long fight over their decision to send 
my brother and me to our relatives’ in Montenegro “until this settles down in a few days.”  All I 
remember of that flight was the moaning of the pregnant woman sitting next to me, the nausea I 
felt while looking at the barren Herzegovinian countryside whizzing by, combined with the terror 
of being so close to the ground that I felt I could touch the rocks.  Even though this was my 
spring of firsts—the first time I rode in a helicopter, the first time I kissed a girl, the first time I 
smoked a cigarette, the first time I worked in a field, the first time I gambled—it was watching 
the news, all three daily time slots, that remains my most vivid memory of my encounter with 
Montenegro.  As the words “Islamic fundamentalists,” “Croat-Muslim crypto fascists,” “the New 
World Order,” reverberated through the house, filled to the brim with twelve cousins turned 
refugees, I would squeeze in on the living room couch and desperately search for images of 
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Mostar on the screen, hoping to satisfy the craving for my parents.  I consistently ignored the 
murmurs of my aunts, which my memory has summarized into “I am worried about this kid,” 
and spent most of the time between the newscasts in the wooden outhouse next to the portable 
radio where in addition to not being able to find the “Radijo Slobodna Evropa” my biggest fear 
was being interrupted by my cousin who was always trying to recruit me as the goalie for their 
next soccer game.  Kissing a dark haired girl, who tasted of the čunga lunga430 bubble gum, 
behind the bushes on a barren hillside, inhaling my first (and only) cigarette, which felt like 
swallowing fire and sent me into a half a day long asthma attack, clumsily picking at the ground 
with my shovel as I tried to dig potato holes, and losing my entire weekly allowance on a slot 
machine in the city, seem like an afterthought, conjured up by my memory to make this a more 
archetypal vacation.  Remembering my mother’s abrupt arrival to our Montenegrin village, 
looking shorter and being more reticent than I had remembered her, compresses these mundane 
memories into a fast moving reel of images as if I am recalling a movie in which the slow paced 
plot suddenly plunges towards a dramatic climax, whizzing through seemingly unimportant 
scenes. 
 My mother’s identity acrobatics during her mission to bring us back to Mostar could not 
have been possible had it not been for her father’s childhood in the Serbian town of Užice where 
his own father worked as a Communist-hunting chief of the gendarmerie in the service of the 
Yugoslav King.  It was in this western Serbian town, which during World War II would become 
a short-lived Communist Republic, where my Croatian-born grandfather obtained not only his 
Serbian accent but also his encyclopedic knowledge of Orthodox catechism as well as the set of 
thick scars zigzagging across his upper thighs like faded barbed wire.  The latter he received 
when he was twelve-years old after attending a banned Communist rally where he was handed 
                                                 
430 A popular brand of gum in the former Yugoslavia. 
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the sign “Give us Bread, not Dictatorship” and told to march towards the center of town.  But 
even before he reached the center, any enthusiasm the boy might have had for social justice 
evaporated in the billow of dust he left behind as he tossed the sign and sprinted away from the 
police.  What must have seemed like an abrupt act of cowardice to his comrades was a perfectly 
logical act by a twelve year old boy who had just seen his father on horseback, in the midst of the 
gendarmerie lines instructing his subordinates to chase down the bandits.  Upon seeing his son 
marching at the head of the Communist gang, carrying a sign that could have earned him a few 
years in the King’s dungeon, the father also reacted logically: he kicked his horse, jumped over 
his police officers, and went after his son who by this time had already reached the small central 
square of the town.  Trying to re-remember my grandfather’s memory evokes a scene that 
belongs on a reel of some silent movie from the Charlie Chaplin era: my grandfather wearing 
rags for clothes, running barefoot through the unpaved streets, looking maniacally over his 
shoulder to see how much time he had left until his inevitable doom.  As the terrified boy exists 
the screen, a heavyset mustached man in a gray uniform, weighed down by clanking medals, 
sword in his hand, and mounting a beautiful white horse—whose peaceful disposition seems out 
of place—appears in the scene and catches up to the boy somewhere beyond the screen.  After 
putting on his shorts at the beginning of every summer, my grandfather’s scars would retell the 
horrifying epilogue of this story: a barely conscious boy dragged on a leash by his own father 
whose thick military leather belt was dripping with bloody skin fragments after repeatedly 
whooshing across the boy’s skinny legs.  Just like these scars, my mother’s name was a product 
of Užice, a pronunciation error my grandfather made in a fit of nostalgia for his Serbian 
childhood and in front of the oblivious birth record keeper who wrote down the name as he heard 
it: “Snežana.” 
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 By simply penciling in the “j” between the “n” and the “e” on her birth certificate—
“Snježana”—my mother pushed through the checkpoints guarding the only exit out of Mostar, 
knocking over the sandbags, dismantling the barbed wire, and nudging the HVO guards out of 
her way, convinced that her new Croatized name in addition to the words “Zagreb” and “Split” 
noting her mother’s and father’s birthplaces, respectively, enveloped her with a shield of 
authentic Croatness.  My mother’s decision to use a pencil instead of a pen to tamper with her 
birth certificate was a harbinger of her long journey: the battle zones scarring most of the 
(former) Yugoslav landscape had made the usual two hour trip between Mostar and Montenegro 
impossible, forcing my mother on a journey around the former country which resembled a last 
pilgrimage to Yugoslavia.  Leaving behind the smoke enveloped Mostar she went south into 
Croatia, boarding a bus in her father’s birthplace and reached her mother’s birthplace after a 
night long trip, during which the bus had boarded a ferry in order to circle around the Krajina 
battle zone.  In Zagreb the passport official must not have noticed the penciled intruder in my 
mother’s birth certificate, quickly stamping a šahovnica431 emblazoned renewal in her Yugoslav 
passport, which with its five-pointed red star emblazoned above the Yugoslav coat of arms—the 
six flames symbolizing the republics—was already becoming a collector’s item amongst 
nostalgia enthusiasts.  The penciled intruder also managed to slip undetected under the nose of 
the characteristically unfriendly Hungarian border officer who after asking my mother in broken 
Croatian as to the purpose of her visit to Budapest, stamped her šahovnica-decorated Yugoslav 
passport without waiting for her to give him the answer, which she had rehearsed all night.  At 
the Budapest train station, while waiting for the train to Belgrade, with an eraser she bought at 
the nearby kiosk my mother once again turned herself into a Serb and thanked God for the first 
time in her life after the Serb border officer had overlooked the šahovnica page of her passport 
                                                 
431 Šahovnica is the red/white checkerboard that is the official coat of arms of Republic of Croatia. 
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before stamping her entry visa.  During the last leg of her trip, from Belgrade to Nikšić, Snežana 
remembered her father’s Užice childhood—his knowledge of Orthodox catechism, his ekavski 
dialect, and his Serbian name Veljko—and meticulously eliminated those memories which might 
draw the attention of a hostile Serb official to his Croatianness—his family’s move back to 
Croatia in 1941, his father’s World War II service in the Domobrani432, and the latter’s exile to 
Italy.  Maybe it was this shrinkage of her past that made her look shorter than usual when I 
hugged her on the dusty road out of our Montenegrin village? 
 A few days after my mother’s arrival we went to Gacko in what proved to be the first of 
many efforts to fit our identities in the post-Yugoslav reality.  Vanja and Feđa made it highly 
unlikely that smuggling of letters or tinkering with any aspect of grammar would be enough to 
turn us into Serbs.  Sn(j)ežana predated Yugoslavia.  In other words, the name allowed for 
alternative histories: it could recall both, a village of King Alexander’s Serbia or a coastal town 
of Vlatko Maček’s Croatia.  On the other hand, all the alternative histories that Vanja and Feđa 
recalled were coded socialist Yugoslav: the postwar infatuation with all things Russian, the 
nostalgia for Chekhov and Dostoyevsky respectively, or the baby-boomers’ desire to 
permanently preserve their urban, cosmopolitan credentials.  Her awareness of this may have 
been the reason my mother was so reserved when she arrived in Montenegro as she implemented 
her plan, designed to coax Milošević’s and Tuđman’s bureaucracies into forgetting the histories 
of our names.   
                                                 
432 Literally translated as the “Defenders of the Homeland” the Domobrani were the regular army of Ante Pavelić’s 
Nazi puppet state Independent State of Croatia (NDH).  Although the Domobrani were distinct from the more 
fanatical and vicious Ustaše they were also targeted by the Communists during the country’s liberation forcing 
thousands to flee to the Austrian village of Blaiburg from where they were handed back to the Partisans by the 
British in violation of the International Law.  Following their failed escape thousands were slaughtered by the 
Partisans and buried in mass graves, thousands fled to South America, and some survived eventually becoming 
integrated into socialist Yugoslavia.  It was only in 2007 that I learned that my own grandfather was one of the 
Blaiburg survivors who, after spending a few months in UDBA (Yugoslav Secret Police)-run prisons, was released 
and allowed to join the Communist Party, while his brother emigrated to Argentina and his father to Italy where he 
died a few years later. 
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At the time, the first leg of our journey seemed to me like an act of lunacy, an irrational 
decision by my tired and panicked mother, as it involved going several hundred miles west, deep 
into the Bosnian Serb territory, to the village of Avtovac near the Herzegovinian town of Gacko.  
In addition to being the place with which my only encounter had been in my history textbooks 
where it had been described as a World War II Četnik433 stronghold, the bus we took made me 
even more convinced that my mother’s long journey from Mostar had made her suicidal.  The 
rickety old bus reminded me of the old Yugoslav movie Ko to tamo peva (Who Sings Over There) 
in which two Gypsies, one playing a Jew’s harp and the other an accordion, chronicle the 
adventures filled journey of a group of people on a sputtering bus to Belgrade on 5 April 1941, 
just in time for everyone, with the exception of the two Gypsies, to be blown up by the first 
German bomb as soon as they reached the Serbian capital.434  But, instead of having the father-
son duo as our drivers, in which the son at one point drives blindfolded to prove himself in front 
of the terrified passengers, our driver insisted in pulling over at every bar on the road for “a 
break” after which he would swerve ever more closely to the edge of the road, offering us 
picturesque views of the ravine below.  Instead of a passenger accidentally firing his rifle on the 
bus, our most terrifying moment came at the Montenegro’s unrecognized, but yet guarded, 
border with Bosnia when a soldier—who with his double-headed eagle emblazoned on the top of 
his karakul hat, the shiny bandolier tightly strapped across his chest, and the long-bladed 
hunter’s knife hanging from his belt looked as if he had walked off of a page from my history 
textbook—insisted on taking away my brother because “Serbia needed him.”  Having safely 
                                                 
433 Chetniks (Četnici) was originally a generic name given to a variety of Serbian nationalist movements that fought 
against the Austrians in World War I but in World War II the name referred mostly to the royalist movement 
organized by the General Draža Mihailović who while initially resisting the Nazis became embroiled in a vicious 
civil war with the Communist-led Partisans earning the movement the title of collaborators in post-WWII 
Yugoslavia.  During the wars of Yugoslavia’s disintegration, Četnici became a synonym for war crimes perpetrated 
by Bosnian Serb forces and today for the overwhelming majority of the Serbs, the term is taken as an insult. 
434 Dušan Kovačević, Ko to tamo peva, VHS.  Directed by Slobodan Sijan. (Beograd: Centarfilm, 1980). 
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hidden my brother’s birth certificate in her underwear, my mother nudged the heavily armed 
soldier to the side, away from the peasant who was begging some border guards not to take his 
sack of potatoes, and she told him of tortures we had endured at the hands of “those balije” in 
Mostar with such vivid detail that I began to believe her, showed him her birth certificate (the “j” 
erased), told him how much her father missed his beloved Užice, and vouched for the 
authenticity of her story with a 100 Deutsche mark bill, which he eagerly placed under his 
bandolier before he ordered us, my brother included, to board the bus. Finally, instead of 
perishing in a German artillery attack we ended our trip much more successfully: we returned to 
our Montenegrin village richer for a few hundred Deutsche marks we had borrowed from my 
mother’s friend and more importantly, with a phone number written on the back of my mother’s 
bus ticket.   
 The day after my mother dialed the number from the back of the crumpled ticket, we 
walked into a Belgrade office, which smelled of fresh paint and cigarettes and whose white walls 
were decorated only with an unframed picture of Slobodan Milošević.  While my brother and I 
sat in the black leather sofa, my sweaty skin sticking to it, she approached the man behind the 
imposing desk.  My memory has done away with the image of the man behind the desk, but I 
remember his breath smelling of coffee as he said, “I am afraid your kids cannot get our 
passports because they were not born in Serbia.”  In a shaky voice my mother recalled memories 
she had never had, piling them on top of the ones she had invented two days before in front of 
the bandolier-strapped soldier, in assembling an identity that would correspond to her birth 
certificate: the “j” erased, her father’s Užice childhood, my father’s “misfortune of having been 
wounded by a Croat shrapnel,” our need to get to the Croat side of Mostar where we had our 
apartment, and the “theft of our documents by Muslim fundamentalists.”  It may have been his 
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incredulous “but why would you want to go back, the Ustaše have taken over Mostar?,” the stale 
salami sandwich I had had for breakfast that morning, or the thought of the fifteen-hour bus ride 
to Slovenia ahead of us, that suddenly pushed my body into convulsive sobs, tears tapping on the 
leather couch.   
 Between the moment my first tears hit the couch and the words “we will have your 
passports ready by tomorrow morning” the image my memory recalls is of the man running his 
fingers through my hair—the yellowing fingertips a testimony to his chain smoking—and me 
mumbling something about how much I had loved riding in the Serbian military helicopter.  
However, the years of retelling of this moment by both my mother and my brother have filled my 
individual memory with more details, embedding it into yet another morally unambiguous story 
in our family repertoire: the high-ranking official from the Serbian Ministry of Interior broke his 
stern demeanor, stood up behind his oak desk, the photograph of Milošević behind him, and 
came over by the boy who was sobbing his way through a couple of lies—“I wish I could go 
back to our side of Mostar in that helicopter”; “I don’t know where my father has been since he 
was wounded by the Croats”—and while running his hand through his hair promised that “you 
will see your dad soon.”  Thus, according to the family narrative, we left Belgrade the next day 
as Serbs with our new passports in hand thanks to my ability to cry strategically.  As a historian I 
would argue that on the basis of the sources an alternative interpretation could be offered: the 
Serbian Interior Ministry Official was a relative or a good friend of my mother’s friend from 
Gacko who had intervened on our behalf.  It was family loyalties that motivated him to forge our 
passports and risk prison time, or worse, and not the tears of a cranky thirteen-year old boy. 
 The fifteen-hour bus ride from Belgrade to Ljubljana—which today takes only five but 
which in 1992 involved transferring from a Serbian to a Slovenian bus, in the middle of the 
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night, somewhere along the way and then snaking along the Croatian-Hungarian border in 
avoiding the Slavonia warzone—implanted me with a self-doubt that persists to this day.  Every 
time I have come across the question of Slovenia’s role in Yugoslavia’s disintegration I have 
always shuddered at the thought that the unpleasant memory of my encounter with this country 
on this particular trip would make any objective argument impossible and shatter my 
professional identity as a historian.  No theoretical approach I have learned allows me to 
rearrange the memories of this trip into a more nuanced argument from the one often articulated 
by my less politically correct mother who insists “that the Slovenians treated us like we were 
Gypsies at that border.”  Her words always make me recall an image which might be a composite 
of the actual events at the border, a scene from a Holocaust movie, and an Emir Kusturica film: a 
column of slightly hunched over women and children getting off of an idling bus in the middle of 
the night, surrounded by nothing but fields and a few armed guards who passively listen to the 
pleas of a hijab-veiled woman with a wailing child under her arm.  But instead of the trumpet-
blasting Gypsies from Kusturica’s imagination, it is the barking of the vicious looking canines 
that accounts for the background noise.  What caused me to shout expletives at the unfazed 
Slovenian border officer (I remember thinking that he looked younger than my brother) was not 
so much his refusal to let us enter his country as was his repossession of our passports, which he 
then took to a small booth where he huddled over them with his colleagues, his smile as he 
handed them back to us, and his “these are fake” in heavily accented Croatian.  When 
remembering this night it seems unfair that in just four moves—the repossession, the huddling, 
the smile, the accented refusal—one man, a boy, could destroy our hard-earned Serbian 
identities.  In just four moves, which took no longer than twenty minutes, he dismantled the 
carefully built edifice of a new past my mother had created since leaving Mostar.  In just four 
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moves he branded my mother a liar.  Often while reading historical accounts of the Yugoslav 
disintegration—whether it is Pedro Ramet’s discussion of Slovenia’s role in the “highway crisis 
of 1969,” or in the constitutional crisis of 1989, as illuminated by Robert Hayden435—I often 
inadvertently conjure up the image of that Slovenian border guard, the smile, the accent, and the 
bench which my mother, brother and I shared that night with our fellow Gypsies—the hijab-
veiled woman and her wailing child. 
 While being stranded at the Slovenian border, I experienced for the last time a tantrum 
which that had been a constant companion in my childhood.  After being denied entry into 
Slovenia, we hesitated to sit on the only bench available out of politeness to the hijab-wearing 
woman with the wailing child under her arm.  Her child’s uncontrollable kicking and screaming 
forced the woman to forgo the customary politeness and lay her baby down, taking up most of 
the bench, a move which managed to abruptly quiet the child.  The child’s ear-piercing screams 
coupled with the residue of rage I still had towards that Slovenian border officer pushed me into 
a tantrum of my own as I experienced another one of my krizas.  For the better part of my 
childhood kriza seemed to be one of those fad words everyone used: the newscaster to describe 
either a meeting of important politicians or a group of demonstrators clashing with the police, a 
speaker behind a podium when talking about our country, my father when describing a Party 
meeting at his work.  But when I was around, my parents used kriza more as a codeword to begin 
executing a mission to get sweets and stave off a crisis which involved me shouting, crying, 
packing my suitcase in pretending to be leaving home—or often doing all three things at once—
in punishing my parents for not having sweets on hand when my cravings came on.  Even though 
                                                 
435 Pedro Ramet.  Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1963-1983.  Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 
1984. (Ch. 6); Robert M. Hayden.  Blueprints for a House Divided: The Constitutional Logic of the Yugoslav 
Conflicts.  Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999. 
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I would later justify my actions by arguing that the cravings were something I could not 
control—the excuse which once I came to the United States, became “I had a sugar 
imbalance”—I would like to think that the craving was not so much for the sweets as it was for 
those mornings with my grandmother when after dragging myself out of the bed, I would sit 
across from her, on a couch under a blanket, devouring a čokoladna bananica, a bar of either 
Seka i Braco or my favorite, Tortica.  By the time of my kriza at the Slovenian border, all of 
these tastes—the chewy combination of chocolate and factory-processed banana powder, the less 
chocolaty but creamier and sweeter Yugoslav version of Milka, and the chocolate wafer that I 
later discovered was the Yugoslav version of the Kit Kat—had summarized themselves into a 
nostalgia for my grandmother’s fluffy blanket, with the picture of Duško dugouško436 on it, for 
her dictation of our grocery list, and for all those daydreams I had while spending the day with 
her.  Since waking up at my grandmother’s meant that I was not going to the dreaded kinder 
garden that day, I would suggest that experiencing a kriza at the Slovenian border was the 
ultimate outburst of nostalgia for home and not a tantrum of a spoiled child. 
The absence of any stores and our dwindling food supplies, however, meant that kriza 
could only be averted through extraordinary means, which came in the form of my mother 
breaking into sobs, my brother excoriating me so harshly that I expected him to punch me at any 
moment, and my realization, which came with the dawn, that the baby on the bench was actually 
an older child with Down-Syndrome.  It is also possible that it was the Fićo taxi which took 
away our bench companions in the direction of the Croatian border that helped me overcome my 
kriza as I hoped that he might come back for us as well.  While we waited we contemplated our 
other options: walking back to the Slovenian border and either begging the guards to let us in or 
                                                 
436 Bugs Bunny. 
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running across the open field hoping they pretend not to see us, the latter being our last 
alternative to taking the humiliating ride back to Montenegro.   
It is ironic that the feeling of claustrophobia that came with being stranded between the 
three borders was dissipated by the Fićo, the tiny Italian-made Fiat 600 which had been the first 
and the only car my family had ever owned and which I associated with our cramped summer 
trips to the coast.  Almost every summer the Fićo had failed us.  Almost every summer it had 
sputtered to an abrupt stop somewhere along the windy roads of Dalmatia, forcing my 
dehydrated brother and me to briefly escape its sweat encrusted backseat and push our family 
heirloom closer to the beach, a cacophony of curses, honks and revving engines egging us on 
from behind.  This time, however, the Fićo did not stop once to the Croatian border where I saw 
the šahovnica flag in person for the first time.  Also this time, after another brief repossession of 
our Serbian passports followed by another “these are fake” by yet another border officer which 
was then followed by another one of my sobbing episodes, the Fićo lurched over the speed bump 
under the raised ramp and cruised slowly past the Croatian border officer who had turned his 
back on us in yet another act of random kindness.  With Fićo’s reputation fully redeemed in the 
family repertoire of stories, and my sobbing hero image having been confirmed, we reached the 
sleepy town of Čakovec, which my mother even today describes as “my favorite place on earth.”  
We were in Mostar the following morning, our Serbian passports safely discarded. 
Storytelling Our Way into Europe 
 Despite my efforts to fit in the post-Serb Mostar, following our return from Montenegro 
my patriotism grew ever more equivocal.  In addition to mingling with the HOS soldiers during 
their raid on the Serb apartment in our building, throwing rocks at the icon of Saint Sava, and 
attempting to out our pigeon-loving neighbor Drago as a Serb spy, I became obsessed with 
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concocting the memories of our brief refugee life in which “the military helicopter” turned into 
the “Karitas437 bus,” “Montenegro” into “Split,” and “Snežana” once again became “Snježana.”  
It may have been all the bonding with the HOS soldiers that instilled in me a perpetual feeling of 
dread at having the words “Montenegro” and “the military helicopter” spill out of our family 
archive and into the stairwell of our building where I imagined our neighbors waiting to raid our 
apartment for the assassination lists, the icons of Saint Sava, the armchairs from Russian novels, 
and the meat-packed freezer.   
 That my fear was not paranoia borne out of my compulsive news watching became clear 
to me after I witnessed my father lunge at our neighbor from the floor below, whose apartment 
always smelled of ajvar,438 and throw punches in his direction, but missing him as the latter fled 
inside of the building.  My father’s attempt at violence came after he had visited his old friend 
who was well connected to the local HVO unit and who informed my father that our ajvar-loving 
neighbor had inquired about the proper spelling of my mother’s name and in the process had 
uttered those words I had come to dread: “Montenegro” and the “military helicopter”.  However, 
the ajvar-loving neighbor’s investigation of my mother was soon halted by those same HVO 
soldiers whose favor he had sought: a few months after barely escaping my father’s punches he 
was greeted by HVO soldiers at his doorstep who threatened to kill his “balija ass” if he did not 
take off his HVO uniform and follow them to the heliodrom439 concentration camp.  All the 
while, one floor above, my father was hiding inside of our TV stand, and in the neighborhood 
below the soccer stadium, my brother was leaning against the door of our grandfather’s 
apartment, listening to the sound of boots. 
                                                 
437 Karitas was a major Catholic humanitarian organization that helped evacuate refugees to Croatia in the early 
days of the war. 
438 A relish made out of red bell peppers, garlic, and eggplant. 
439 A concentration camp, located south of Mostar, and operated by the HVO during the war between Croats and 
Muslims. 
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 “Rat sa Hrvatima,”440 as it became known in my family’s story repertoire, halted my 
identity makeover, tossed my father into our TV stand, supplemented the memory of my 
grandmother giving me sweets with the one where the peephole deformed HVO soldiers read out 
M A R I J A from her obituary taped to our door, forced me to abandon my treasured Dnevnik441 I 
had used when I played school, made us live in a wagon of an abandoned train for three weeks, 
and turned Turkey from an exotic “Muslim country” into our new homeland.  But by upending 
our almost certain Mostar futures—my father in his job as an engineer at the aluminum factory, 
my mother as a clerk at the Jugobanka, my brother as an architect and myself as a high school 
teacher—rat sa Hrvatima confronted us with new conjectures, making new dreams not only 
possible but essential.  The stories my mother had begun to devise during her undercover stint in 
Montenegro now became our collective enterprise and they grew more elaborate with new 
details added by all four of us at the most unexpected moments, in a whisper on the bus out of 
Mostar just before the drunk HVO soldier would spit on my mother’s birth certificate, over a 
laugh during our nightly remi game in the wagon either before or after the locals pelted our rusty 
new home with rocks, or in a barely audible shout on the noisy Turkish jumbo jet on our way to 
Turkey.  These stories were not simply some cliché coping mechanisms, tools of self-denial, or 
improvised gadgets of entertainment during our dull refugee life, but rather our attempts to 
negotiate our future identities on our own terms as we stood at the conjectures of our histories. 
  The one “what if” story that dominates all four notebooks of my diary is that of us living 
in Marseilles, France, in a house next to my aunt Edisa’s.  However, when today I trace our 
movements during the summer of 1993 it looks as if we were purposefully trying to throw a 
                                                 
440 “The war with the Croats” 
441 Dnevnik was the generic term we used for the school gradebook which came in either green or red color and was 
the dreaded symbol of teacher’s power.  My Dnevnik was procured for me by my aunt who worked in a school for 
children with special needs.   
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potential stalker off our trail by constantly inching further northeast, masking our designs on 
France towards which we would make one quick dash once we gathered all the necessary 
documents—a few days in Split in the apartment of my grandfather’s sister, where the small, 
albeit delicious, meals she served us seemed proportional to her tiny physique; a ferry ride to 
Rijeka where I got an autograph from the famous long-haired Croatian singer Gibonni; our 
week-long stay in Zagreb with Braco and “his two whores” (my mother’s words) in the house 
where my grandmother was born; our first homeless day at the Zagreb train station; the eighteen 
days we spent as undercover Croats in the house of a nationalist journalist on the outskirts of 
Zagreb; and our week-long life on the railroad tracks in the Slavonian village of Ivankovo.   
 Our routine in Ivankovo gave no hint of our French obsession either: my father and I 
taking our morning walk to the post office, past the row of identical houses and past the widowed 
old ladies who with their stoic stares and black attire seem stolen from a scene of an old Western 
in which the town’s residents silently watch the lone hero make his way to the center where he 
would battle his nemesis and face certain death.  Our nemesis was an official at the Bosnian 
consulate in Zagreb who every morning on the phone promised us a trip to Slovakia only to 
qualify it with “we are still waiting for the green light from the Slovaks,” every afternoon.  The 
day my father went to battle our nemesis on his own he returned to our wagon, on the bicycle he 
borrowed from the camp’s German director, with the news that Slovakia had become Turkey, 
and that we would be leaving the next day.  By the time we left for Turkey, France had made 
appearance in my diary only as a side note, slipped into a “thank you God” for seeing my 
grandparents arrive safely in Marseilles, a worry about Edisa’s husband Dražen who had stayed 
behind in Mostar to battle HVO, our real nemeses, or into a summary of the days when our trip 
to the post office included a phone call to my aunt. 
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 It was during our first attempt at a routine in Hayrabolu, when my father and I made our 
first trip to the post-office and Edisa promised to send us the garantno pismo442 that France 
began to take shape as our new story.  Soon the story itself became the routine.  France 
dominated every trip my father and I made to Istanbul, intruding into my visits to Yediküle 
hospital where a Bosnian doctor was supposed to make my asthma attacks less frequent, our 
meetings at the Bosnian consulate where the daughter of President Alija Izetbegović, Lejla, was 
to give us materials for starting a school in the camp, and into our overnight stays at our friend’s 
apartment on Taksim where we were supposed to act the role of refugees and humbly accept yet 
another bag full of clothes and an envelope of cash.  Instead, my day-long stay at Yediküle 
became a few hours’ routine check-up before we had to rush to the meeting with Lejla who spent 
only a few minutes talking about the reasons why the Bosnian school could not be opened before 
she discussed what support our consulate could offer to my father during his upcoming visit to 
the French consulate.  In place of accepting the clothes and cash from our Taksim friend, my 
father invoked our future life in Marseilles as the reason that “we won’t be needing this.”  
Sometime in mid-November, the story invaded the pages of my diary entrenching itself into 
almost every entry in the form of “FRANCE THE PROMISED LAND,” the bold capital letters 
presenting our dream in the breaking news format, reflecting not only my continuing obsession 
with news watching but also the need to turn the dream into a tangible newsbyte and present the 
future anonymous French visa bureaucrat with a fait accompli.  After we picked up Edisa’s 
garantno pismo at the barracks which were our makeshift post-office, I increasingly felt like my 
family and I were trapped in one of those nightmarish episodes of the Twilight Zone in which 
everyone around us behaved as if they were living in some alternate reality, in a refugee camp, 
and not in a Marseilles suburb. 
                                                 
442 Letter of sponsorship 
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 By the time we took it to the French consulate in Istanbul, the garantno pismo had taken 
on magical powers.  As soon as we tugged it out of the brown “par avion” envelope, which had 
been clumsily taped after being opened by some nosy Turkish postman, we felt vindicated in our 
obsession with France: the beautiful cursive handwriting in blank ink which reminded me of the 
fountain-pen with which I had written in my own Dnevnik, and the rough-edged watermark 
which bore the signature of some important French official, whom Edisa had described “as a 
close friend of Bernard Kouchner443,” gave our abstract dream a tangible form.  I often felt 
anxious at the thought of the letter disappearing in the stack of papers on the desk of some 
anonymous, stern looking French bureaucrat.  At least while it was safely ensconced in its nylon 
wrap inside our document bag in our room in the camp, we retained some sovereignty over our 
dream.  We could pull it out of the bag, unfurl it on the table, gather around it, and plan our 
future French life.  When we had visitors, my father would often talk about his job at a Renault 
factory in southern France as if he was evoking some precious memory.  Soon, my father’s 
stories became ever more elaborate: my mother obtained employment as a loan officer at the 
bank in a nameless town, which we somehow all knew was close to Marseilles; my brother 
would soon graduate with honors from the school of architecture; and I would get tenure 
teaching languages at a university.  To prove to the guest that this life was real, my father would 
often take the document out of the bag, place it in front of the guest, and, like an archeologist 
proudly showing his historic find to the world, point to the watermark and the signature of 
“Bernard Kouchner’s friend,” documenting the existence of the life he was narrating.   
 Some evenings my father would tell the stories of our vacations to the French Riviera 
when after a day-long fishing trip with a buddy he would rejoin the rest of us for dinner at some 
tiny restaurant overlooking the Mediterranean.  It was only much later, after looking through my 
                                                 
443 Bernard Kouchner is a famous French Socialist politician who during 1992-1993 was the Minister of Health. 
 
 
 
218
diary and discovering that my father invented his vacation story just a few days after we had 
heard that Edisa’s husband had been killed in Mostar that I began to suspect that the buddy in 
this story was none other than Dražen.  Thus, the French life offered my father what even God 
could not: a chance to go on another fishing expedition with Dražen and to drink wine with him 
not in our socialist apartment, as they had done many times before the war, but somewhere on 
the French Riviera.  The French Dražen would for that brief moment silence the memory of my 
mother receiving that phone call after which she let out a terrifying bellowing moan, which 
muted the noise of the plastic receiver shattering as it hit the floor.  The French Dražen 
momentarily turned my mother’s gut-wrenching bellow of grief into laughter uttered at the 
French Riviera over a fancy seafood dinner.  To turn over the garantno pismo to some bureaucrat 
could potentially kill the French Dražen with same callousness with which the HVO killed his 
Mostar double. 
 The terror I felt as I watched my father disappear behind a leather-upholstered door in the 
French consulate resembled the terror I had felt while watching the peephole deformed faces of 
the HVO soldiers in that both times I felt my stomach turn into knots before giving out loud 
grumbles.  This time, instead of my father being taken away to the concentration camp, the scene 
that brought me to the brink of a bowel movement was that of a French official examining the 
garantno pismo, puffing on his fancy thin cigarette, while rummaging through the memories of 
our French life. My father’s job at the Renault factory, my mother’s career as a loan officer, my 
brother’s reputation as a famed architect, and my university tenure, were all scrubbed away by 
the officer’s pudgy thumb with which he repeatedly trudged across the beloved watermark as I 
was trying to keep my bowel movement at bay.  This pudgy finger invaded the sovereign 
territory of our French existence and methodically erased the memories of our vacations to the 
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French Riviera, our evenings at the beach, and my father’s fishing expeditions with his murdered 
brother-in-law.   
 When my father finally emerged out of the office, his face looked like a smoldering 
battlefield.  His sunken eyes looked like trenches from a war in which he had made a courageous 
last stand for his right to dream with the garantno pismo as his only weapon.  His hunched 
posture, his gawking blue eyes, and his trembling hands gave him the look of a shell-shocked 
warrior.  Momentarily distracted by this image of my father, I let my guard down and allowed 
the grumblings of my stomach to turn into a bowel movement.  The warm diarrhea liquid poured 
out in surprisingly consistent waves.  Still shell-shocked, my father helped me to the bathroom 
where we stuffed my soiled underwear into a toilet which had already been clogged by floating 
feces.  In his last stand for our dream, my father flushed the toilet and we hurriedly left the 
building.  Our French life brutally suffocated in the shit-clogged toilet, we limped onto the bus to 
Hayrabolu and went back to our Twilight Zone. 
 My ignominious act in the consulate’s waiting area could not have been caused by being 
shocked that neither the fancy watermark nor the signature of “Bernard Kouchner’s friend” had 
forced the hand of the French bureaucrat to stamp entry visas into our passports because this was 
only one in a string of our abandonments at the hands of European bureaucracies.  The first one 
happened around the time my father was hiding in our TV stand when the convoy of the Spanish 
UN peacekeepers roared its way out of our neighborhood, past the HVO tanks on the Brkanovo 
hill, and past the soldiers whose deformed faces I would see through the peephole just a few days 
later.  This abandonment felt all the more personal because in the preceding several months we 
had struck up a friendship with our neighborhood “blue helmets,” selling them mundane things 
they considered souvenirs—my father’s titovka, a friend’s military boots, my brother’s comic 
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strips—and chatting with them in our broken English while sitting on their white armored 
vehicles, our skinny legs dangling over the black “UN” letters.   
 The second abandonment, which seemed less personal but more callous, came a few 
hours after we had walked into UNHCR’s Zagreb office, not even an hour after my mother’s 
uncle had asked us to leave his house, and begged for a home only to be placed in the Ivankovo 
“wagon village” within the range of the Serbian artillery.   
 The third and the final abandonment before my ignominious incident was caused by the 
indifference of the few EC “observers” who while sitting at a hotel near Ivankovo refused the 
pleas of our German driver and camp director to give us some gas for our car whose empty tank 
had caused it to lurch to a halt in the middle of the Slavonian countryside.  Of course, the EC 
“observers” could not have known that just a few minutes earlier a wild hog had splattered itself 
across our windshield, causing the German driver to swerve uncontrollably, and my father to 
shout “još treba da poginemo u ovoj vukojebini!444”  They could not have known that a few 
hours before that we had been told by the Bosnian consulate officials to come to the Zagreb 
airport by the following morning if we wanted to leave for Turkey.  But they could have known, 
and probably did, that the Croatian railroads had declared a general strike that day, making the 
German camp director Christopher our only remaining hope in reaching Zagreb in time.  They 
also could not have known that their groans of disproval at our request meant that we would 
spend that night in the van while our German driver paced up and down the nearby gas station 
furious at the tardy attendant who opened it some twenty minutes after five.  Thus, by the time 
we entered the French consulate on Taksim—after we had been herded along with a mass of 
people into a tiny cage at the entrance in which everyone kicked and shoved like enraged bulls 
                                                 
444 “We will die in this shithole!” 
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before being let out into the arena—we had endowed the garantno pismo with the qualities of a 
genie lamp convinced that rubbing its watermark could erase these past disappointments. 
 A few months after my incident at the French consulate and in the same broken English 
with which I had chatted with the “blue helmets”, I wrote our last appeal to Europe, the letter I 
today read as my last-ditch effort to rekindle a lapsed friendship. Having had our French life 
flushed down the toilet and being bombarded on a daily basis with the news of the raging war in 
Bosnia, I used the absence of our friend—who had gone with his family to visit Istanbul—to 
borrow his English dictionary and compose the following letter: 
Dear Gentlemen! 
 We heard for your organization and we are converting to you withhope 
[sic] that you will help us. 
 We are here in camp more than 12 montas [sic] and we are on border of 
madness, BECAUSE we live in very bad and difficult conditions.  In the name of 
god and our children helpus [sic] that we go in your some other country. 
     We are waiting for your answer! 
     GOD A BLESS YOU! 
 
Our names and our address: 
 Miro Burić—husband—1949 
 Snježana Burić—wife—1952 
 Vanja Burić—son—1974 
 Feđa Burić—son—1979 
 
 Address: 
 Kamp Bosna-Hersek 
 Misafirhanesi 
 Hayrabolu/ 59400 Tekirdağ 
 Türkiye 
 Tel. 0282 3154898445 
 
 The generic nature of the letter suggested our multiple audiences—the Belgians, the 
French (again), the Germans, the Swiss, the Red Cross, and at the advice of a friend, the New 
Zealanders, as our only non-European alternative—and the clumsy Christian-format of the God 
references was designed to coax the bureaucracies into letting us emigrate and prevent a repeat 
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of our French debacle, which we were certain had occurred because we were Muslims, a 
conviction which silenced my mother’s Croatness.  The only response came from the Red Cross 
headquarters in Geneva where the Deputy Head of Europe Desk Anne-Sophie Lundberg 
responded in an equally generic tone: “We acknowledge receipt of your request and regret to 
inform you that matters relating to the granting of asylum or emigration do not fall within the 
competence of the International Committee of the Red Cross.”446  They suggested we contact the 
UNHCR unaware of the latter’s penchant for placing refugees into rusty trains in the vicinity of 
battlefields.  In all its brevity, formality, and anonymity the letter marked the end of our story-
telling, bringing my diary to an abrupt stop on 26.8.1994.  
Conclusion 
 Why does this autobiographical story belong in a history dissertation?  After all, the 
story’s substantive findings have already been recovered and discussed by the mainstream 
historiography on Yugoslavia’s disintegration: the two wars—the first between the 
Yugoslav/Serb Army and the Croat/Muslim forces (April-July 1992), and the second one 
between the former allies, Croats and Muslims (May 1993-February 1994)—that pummeled 
Mostar in the first half of the 1990s and turned it into a wreck, resembling more a junkyard than 
a late 20th century European town; the indiscriminate persecution of the remaining Serb civilians 
in Mostar by the HOS militia whose random, vicious, and public acts of violence coupled with 
their black uniforms and fascist insignia mimicked the Nazi SS; the massive refugee crisis, 
caused by some two million former Yugoslavs who crowded Europe’s borders just at the time 
when the European Union was under construction; the confused, ineffective, and often 
counterproductive response of the so-called international community as evidenced by the 
powerlessness of the UN peacekeepers to halt the violence—most infamously symbolized by the 
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Srebrenica genocide—and the increasingly strict immigration policies of Western European 
nation-states as the war dragged on.  Given the thousands of pages written by hundreds of 
scholars on these very subjects, what is the novelty of yet another autobiographical witness 
account of the country’s breakup? 
 It is my contention that the genre of autobiography allows us to excavate a particular type 
of subjectivity at a historical moment when the escalating demands of nationalism on private 
lives mandated that “mixed” individuals engage in creative identity acrobatics of the kind my 
mother so successfully utilized during her trip to rescue us from Montenegro.  More specifically, 
autobiography makes possible a reconstruction, however imperfect, of a type of a feeling of 
being mixed at the moment of Yugoslavia’s disintegration.  The genre’s tolerance of more 
diverse type of sources and the less restrictive prose allows us to go beyond the arguments, 
which have already been clichéd by overuse, which see the Yugoslav mixed marriages as either 
symbols of the country’s melting pot identity or pariahs in the newly formed nation-states.  Thus, 
in using my own diary as an historical source and with the help of my memories and those of my 
family I am able to highlight the lies the diary told, the secrets it kept, and investigate the 
motivations behind my fabrications of my own history.  The main principle behind my 
methodology has been transparency in that I gave in to memory’s penchant for fragmentation 
and rather than following the calendar time chronology, I followed memory’s own messy way of 
rummaging through the past, trying to organize my narrative, as much as possible, on its own 
terms.  Of course, the very act of emplotment of my past implies a heavy handed intervention in 
its authenticity—although I would not go as far as Hayden White and completely erase the 
boundaries between fiction and history—447but I believe that this is more than offset by the 
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collaborative nature of autobiography that briefly turns my family into my fact-checkers and 
editors, as well as the richness of the final product. 
 In attempting to excavate a particular type of historical subjectivity, I am heavily 
indebted to Carolyn Steedman’s Landscape for a Good Woman in which she uses the disconnect 
between her mother’s working-class life and her Conservative politics “as a device that may help 
to explain a particular childhood, and out of that childhood explain an individual life lived in 
historical time.”448  For Steedman the misfit between her memories of her own mother and the 
latter’s representation in the Marxist interpretation of working-class motherhood is an occasion 
to explore the stories of her childhood in arguing against the axiom that painted working class 
women as selflessly devoted to the idea of motherhood.  Although Steedman’s is only one of 
many autobiographies written by historians449, with her unconventional methodology, which 
includes the psychoanalysis of a recurrent childhood dream, Steedman’s work is particularly 
important for our purposes for its use of childhood stories in reassembling a historical 
subjectivity.  For example, pointing to the memory of a health inspector excoriating her mother 
for the poor conditions of her apartment as the foundational event in her understanding of class, 
Steedman argues for the need to recognize “the social specificity of our understanding” of the 
“stories we make for ourselves.”450  It has been my goal in this chapter to reassemble the stories 
my family and I made for ourselves in order to recover how it felt to be mixed during 
Yugoslavia’s disintegration. 
Similarly to Steedman’s focus on the fragmented selves, I use the misfit between the self 
I presented in my diary, the one entrenched in my family’s story repertoire, and the one I 
                                                 
448 Carolyn Kay Steedman.  Landscape for a Good Woman: A Story of Two Lives.  (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 1987), 8. 
449 The most comprehensive, if not the only, study of historians’ autobiographies is by Jeremy D. Popkin, History, 
Historians, and Autobiography.  (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2005). 
450 Ibid., 5. 
 
 
 
225
remember while writing, in order to assemble a feeling of mixedness and go beyond the clichéd 
understanding of the category as it has been represented in the historiography.  Contrary to the 
oft-repeated image of mixed marriages as symbols of a Yugoslav identity or nationalist 
exclusivity, the preceding exploration shows the agility of mixed individuals to navigate between 
identities through continuous storytelling and often melt into the new nation-states.  As I hope 
the chapter makes clear, storytelling here is not simply a way to deceive a suspicious border 
guard, a drunken soldier, or a bored bureaucrat, but also a way of life, an effort to tinker with the 
everyday routine in such a way as to affect history.  For example, the story of Drago the Serb spy 
was not only our method of coping with boredom, but also a part of my larger campaign to shed 
the Serbness I feared I had acquired during our trip to Montenegro.  My mother’s identity 
acrobatics during her stint as a Yugoslav James Bond were not only lies she told to get us back to 
Mostar, but the beginning of her re-engagement with her past that eventually resulted in my 
grandfather’s transformation from a card-carrying Communist to a Blaiburg survivor.  The 
stories I told in my diary were not only accidental memory slips, but lies I used to re-invent 
myself following our final escape from Mostar, collapse of “our” alliance with the Croats, and 
my increasing disillusionment with Islam.  Finally, “France the promised land” was not simply a 
fantasy which kept us from despairing during our refugee life, but an everyday routine, which 
endowed us with a certain status in the eyes of the Bosnian consulate officials and whose 
suffocation in the toilet of the French consulate led us to abandon our life in Europe, emigrate to 
the United States, and follow the transformation of millions before us and become Americans.  
Thus, the general characteristics of the feeling of mixedness at this precise historical moment—
between 1991 and 1995, from the moment my father covered up his brotherhood and unity tattoo 
on the beach to the moment we arrived at the JFK airport—were: a survivalist thirst for 
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storytelling, the belief that even stories invented on the spot could affect the conjectures of 
history, and the post-modernist understanding of the constructed nature of these very stories.   
But what is particularly useful about autobiography is that in addition to these general 
characteristics, the feeling of mixedness is preserved in all its complexity.  To put differently, 
this feeling can only be recaptured through the tastes, images, sounds, and smells of the historical 
moment in which it is trapped.  For example, my experience of Islam is made inextricable from 
the taste of the Yugoslav version of Nutella, the smell of the prayer rug, and the shouts of the 
Refah party leader in Istanbul.  The claustrophobia of living in the disintegrating Yugoslavia is 
made concrete by the heavily accented refusal of the Slovenian border guard to let us in, the 
bench at the border we shared with the hijab-veiled woman, and the tiny Fićo which took us into 
Croatia.  The terror of the HVO raids on the Muslims of Mostar becomes all the more vivid by 
the memory of my father hiding in our TV stand, my brother listening to the sound of boots from 
the inside of his grandfather’s apartment, and the threat by my uncle’s best friend that he would 
kill everyone if my brother and father continued to hide in the apartment.  The ineffectiveness of 
the international community’s response to Yugoslavia’s implosion and our perception of this 
ineffectiveness as indifference is made clear by the image of the roaring UN trucks as they left 
our neighborhood in the midst of an HVO raid, the groans of refusal by the EC observers to refill 
our gas tank on our way to Zagreb, and the Red Cross’ pithy refusal of our clumsy pleas for help.  
Thus, by respecting the fragmentary and messy process of memory, autobiography allows us to 
represent scenes from the past along with the physical and psychological infrastructure in which 
they are forever trapped.  In this way, we are able to account for “the specificity of place and 
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politics,” which in the words of Steedman “has to be reckoned with in making an account of 
anybody’s life, and their use of their own past.”451 
Finally, as a historian of mixed marriage I had no choice but to end with this story.  
Obviously, the war in Yugoslavia profoundly changed my life and was the primary motivation 
for my interest in history in general and nationalism in particular.  More specifically, for a child 
who became mixed during this war, not to explore my memories and their repercussions for my 
understanding of Yugoslav history would have been as equally dishonest as my diary’s attempts 
to silence my complicity in nationalist hatred.  Whether or not my telling of the story has 
successfully made the case for the use of autobiography in the study of mixed marriage, I can 
rest assured that at least, to my readers I have extended the courtesy of honesty which the 
thirteen year old boy denied me.  
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CONCLUSION 
 Ibro Bijavica shouted at the Shari’a authorities, begging that he be left alone and 
threatening a hunger strike.  Husein Kulenović Busovača told his Shari’a interrogator that he 
could raise his children “any way he wants,” including turning them over to his Catholic mother-
in-law, since religion was only of “secondary importance” to him.  Sulejman Hrenovica refused 
to answer the questions by a Shari’a judge regarding his romance with Višnja Smiciklaš, calling 
it a “private matter.”  On the other hand, Nejra Čordić asked the Reis-ul-ulema to charge her son 
Ilijas, who had married a Serb woman, with apostasy, declare him a murtad, and prevent him 
from inheriting his father’s property.  The railway clerk Džemal Alendar wrote from his post in 
Slovenia of “emotional depression, bordering of desperation” as he asked the Reis for a transfer 
to a Muslim town.  Facing the Serbian Interior Ministry official my mother told him of her 
father’s Serbian childhood, our uncertain future in a Croat-run Mostar, just before she 
enthusiastically picked up our Serbian passports.  A few months later, my Serbian passport safely 
discarded, I stole the icon of Saint Sava to test my friends’ rock throwing skills. 
 To an extent, the preceding story of mixed marriage is “the history of individuals who 
stood outside or on the margins of [their] communities,”452 to borrow Tara Zahra’s words, but 
instead of finding people who “remained aloof to the nation’s appeal,”453 I found individuals 
actively engaged in the drama of nationalism.  In fact, precisely because they were branded 
“indifferent” by the nationalist elites, these individuals were forced to participate in nationalism 
even more animatedly than the rest of the population.  As the dissertation shows, and the few 
examples above summarize, the purportedly indifferent individuals shouted, talked back, wrote 
petitions, invented pasts, and became vandals, all in order to navigate the sudden flood of 
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ethnicity in their lives.  Rarely, did they emerge unscathed from their encounter with 
nationalism: moved to reexamine their religious devotion, rearrange plans for the custody of their 
children, made to renounce their right of inheritance, inspired to relocate their residency, forced 
to rummage through their own pasts, or seduced into profiting from ethnic cleansing, these 
individuals show how impossible it was to remain indifferent to the twentieth century drama of 
nationalism. 
 The longue durée approach to mixed marriage has illuminated a surprising number of 
consistencies in the way elites, in different periods of time and out of different ideological 
convictions, related to mixed marriage.  The Austro-Hungarian official who worried about the 
safety of Andromaha and Sabit in 1912, Reis Spaho who, in 1938, described it as “a cancer on 
the body” of Muslim community, the Communist Salim Ćerić who feared it was causing a 
revival of an ideology he branded “a petty bourgeois disbelief in the future of socialism,” and the 
SDA ideologue Džemaludin Latić who termed it “a banner of misunderstood ethnic 
coexistence,” all defined mixed marriage as a problem, social, political, and ideological.  Their 
motivations were certainly different: the Austro-Hungarian official may have genuinely feared 
for the safety of the two teachers; the Reis was echoing the chorus of calls for tighter religious 
discipline at a time of ethnic polarization; the Communist intellectual was protecting the 
legitimacy of the recently recognized Bosnian Muslim identity; and the SDA ideologue was 
trying to de-secularize the Muslim identity which he saw as having been diluted by the 
Communists.  Nevertheless, the anxiety which spans the entire twentieth century confirms the 
importance of marriage in nation-building projects. 
 Although the literature reviewed in the Introduction has noted the link between mixed 
marriage and national identity, less has been said about the material factors which make this link 
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so pronounced.  Property rights, financial obligations, and economic discrepancies all seem to 
play a prominent role in ethnic disputes discussed in this dissertation.  For example, Husein 
Kulenović Busovača decided to turn over his children to his Catholic mother-in-law because this 
would “spare [him] huge expenses.”  Nejra Čordić disowned her son Ilijas in order to remove 
him as a claimant to his deceased father’s property and win a property dispute which had divided 
the family for at least ten years prior.  Hakija Karadža petitioned the Reis to move back to 
Sarajevo as much for religious reasons as for his desire to live with his parents so that he could 
go to school and get a promotion.  At a 1968 meeting, the Bosnian Communists blamed 
“unsolved property disputes” for the outbreak of violence between Kiseljak’s Muslims and 
Croats, and echoed the fear that the deteriorating economic situation of the 1960s was behind the 
worsening of ethnic relations.  The HVO soldiers who ignored my mother’s Croatness in looking 
for my father eventually moved into our apartment, as did thousands of other soldiers in other 
parts of the town, setting up a battle over property-rights that has only recently been resolved.  
Thus, the salience of material factors in making mixed marriage easy to politicize cannot be 
ignored and mandates a more thorough investigation. 
 To argue for the importance of marriage in nation-building, however, is not to claim that 
mixed marriage is central to these efforts.  Another consistency the study has identified is that in 
all these periods mixed marriage figured mostly as an afterthought, albeit an important one, in 
the larger drama of nationalism.  The Austro-Hungarian anxiety over mixed marriage was a part 
of the occupation regime’s more existential struggle against the increasingly bold Muslim and 
Serb communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina that challenged the regime’s legitimacy.  The civil war 
within the interwar Islamic establishment touched upon mixed marriage only in the midst of the 
campaign to define more precisely the bounds of permissible Muslim behavior.  The Communist 
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theoretician worried that mixed marriages were leading to the revival of chauvinistic 
Yugoslavism only after the Party had abandoned both the ideology and the statistical 
archivization of Yugoslavs.  My family and I were forced to flee Mostar only two years after my 
father had covered his tattoo on that beach and well after the ideological foundations of 
Yugoslavia had given up under the weight of democracy-invigorated nationalisms.  Džemaludin 
Latić and his colleagues at Ljiljan may have dedicated several of their newspaper’s issues in 
1994 to battling mixed marriage, which one of them described as being “worse than rape,”454 but 
this was more than a year after my mother had tinkered with the letters of her name, the HVO 
soldiers had read out my grandmother’s obituary on our front door, and I had learned all the 
raka’ahs and suras.  In other words, the intense politicization of mixed marriages that certainly 
occurs during these moments seems like a delayed reaction to the already escalating demands of 
nationalism.  The argument that the Communist regime pro-actively encouraged mixed marriage 
in defining a Yugoslav identity ignores the reactionary nature of the politicization surrounding 
the practice. 
 But because mixed marriage most often emerges as an issue in an already overly 
politicized environment, extracating it from that environment is extremely difficult and requires 
innovative methodologies.  The anxieties, fears, hatreds, and hopes regarding mixed marriage are 
tucked away in the inheritance disputes, the Shari’a court records, the petitions to religious 
leaders, the few sentences at a Communist Party Congress, the pages of a diary, and in a few 
fragments of a family’s collective memory.  For for each of the periods, I tried to use the 
methodology which would excavate the most amount of the “cultural stuff,”455 in the words of 
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Frederik Barth, that surrounds mixed marriage and then analyze it against the larger context of 
Yugoslavia’s seventy-three year old history.   
 The diversity of methodologies I employed stemmed from the diversity of the sources I 
had available.  A microhistorical approach for both, the pre-Yugoslav and the interwar periods, 
was not only necessary in illuminating the tens of individual comedies and tragedies but was the 
only available tool I could use to uncover the veil of politicization over this subject.  When 
placed within the larger social context of the drama of nationalism, which stubbornly 
accompanied Yugoslavia for her entire life, this approach allowed me to break through the 
clichéd understandings of mixed marriage.  But no twentieth century history of mixed marriage 
in Yugoslavia would have been complete without a story about its fate during the country’s 
disintegration, the story which presented me with a difficult choice. 
 The decision of whether to use autobiography in exploring my own mixedness is the one 
I agonized over the course of this project.  The danger of being seduced by my narcistic 
impulses, of producing yet another politicized manifesto in defense of mixed marriage, and the 
fear that the inclusion of my relatively short life in a history dissertation would seem too 
presumptuous all weighed against the use of ego histoire in the study of mixed marriage.  
 However, during my research and the early writing phase I realized the extent to which 
my own experience impacted my original hypothesis and shaped my conclusions.  More 
specifically, my initial assumption (shared by many Western scholars) that mixed marriage had 
been widely accepted in Yugoslavia and that ethnic identity was irrelevant for the overwhelming 
majority of good intentioned people soon gave way to the discomforting realization about the 
relative marginality of mixed marriage throughout Yugoslavia’s life and the salience of ethnic 
identities even in socialism.  Investigating the reasons behind the huge discrepancy between my 
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initial assumptions and my conclusion led me right back to my diary, the letters, our family 
stories, and my memories.  Suddenly, my experience of Yugoslavia’s death seemed like a source 
no good historian would ignore as it allowed me to excavate a particular kind of historical 
subjectivity, which influenced the very dissertation I was writing.  Giving in to the temptation 
presented by these sources I decided to follow the fragments of my memory and the pages of my 
diary no matter where they would lead.  That the final chapter reveals some of my most 
ignominious moments proves, I hope more than anything else, my devotion to finding historical 
truth, no matter how elusive, fragmentary, and uncomfortable.   
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